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ABSTRACT 
The thesis focuses on comparative criminal evidence law and sets out to explore whether it 
is possible to devise rules of criminal evidence that would suit different jurisdictions. This 
work should be treated as an exploratory project as it aims to find a suitable approach and 
then test it using three different rubrics of evidence law – evidence of prior convictions, 
hearsay evidence and standard of proof. Those rubrics in six different jurisdictions will be 
examined. 
 
The thesis first discusses the mainstream dichotomous approach to comparative criminal 
procedure and evidence, concluding that the inquisitorial-adversarial distinction has by 
today lost much of its descriptive power and was never meant to be a normative model. 
Instead, the author finds that all Western style jurisdictions today are concerned with 
accurate fact-finding and in order to facilitate accurate fact-finding, should take into 
consideration the cognitive needs and abilities of fact-finders. Since for the most part 
human cognition is universally the same, this psychology-based approach can serve as a 
foundation for evaluating the evidentiary regulation – and unless some extra-epistemic 
factors prevail, should guide legislatures towards optimizing and unifying their evidentiary 
regulation. 
 
Based on the recent studies in legal psychology, the author offers recommendations that 
would be workable in all sample jurisdictions. This is in part possible because empirical 
research tends to debunk often-held beliefs about professional judges being far superior 
fact-finders immune from the cognitive biases and emotional appeal usually attributed to 
jurors. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In this thesis I will demonstrate that the great diversity in evidence law in different 
jurisdictions is not inevitable – and that it is possible to develop rules of evidence that can 
be applied across jurisdictions. I will demonstrate this through the examination of three 
areas of evidence law – evidence of prior convictions, hearsay evidence and standard of 
proof – and six different jurisdictions. I will heavily draw on the relevant psychological 
research as my argument is that it is human psychology and the common instrumental 
goals that form the common fabric joining together diverse jurisdictions.  
Arguments about law in different jurisdictions coming together or that evidence law should 
develop in better concordance with contemporary scientific research and psychological 
research in particular, have been made before. However, I am not aware of any attempts to 
develop universal rules of evidence based on insights from psychology. It is precisely the 
comparative (or even universal) nature of this project that makes it different from earlier 
studies.    
 
Background 
My original question arose in the context of juxtaposing the two criminal rules of witness 
examination in Estonia. In felony criminal procedure, witness examination at trial consists 
of direct and cross-examination. Whereas direct examination is to be carried out by the 
party who has called the witness and, as a rule, should be done without resorting to leading 
questions, cross-examination is by the opposing party and leading questions are allowed. 
The judge, if he chooses, can question the witness once the parties are finished with their 
questioning. In contrast, a witness in a misdemeanour case is supposedly first asked to 
provide a free narrative account of the event or circumstances in question, and then 
examined by the parties, with no leading questions allowed. I say ‘supposedly’, because 
my own observations show that the free narrative is sometimes omitted. 
The two different modes of witness examination are puzzling. Assuming that the purpose 
of the trial in both felony and misdemeanour cases is the same, why would witness 
examination be done differently? And since this is the case, are the two modes of witness 
examination equally fit for purpose? Then again, Estonia with its still fast-evolving legal 
system has frequently been an inspirational case study. Perhaps this is some special 
Estonian issue? I am not aware of such clear divergence within another single criminal 
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procedure jurisdiction (differences between civil and criminal procedure are fairly common 
and may arguably even be justified). However, any legal scholar taking interest in 
comparative criminal procedure knows that differences of this kind between jurisdictions 
are ubiquitous. There are hundreds of works detailing the differences in criminal procedure 
of various countries bearing evidence of the great diversity in this field.  
But why the differences? Is a witness not a witness regardless of whether the trial happens 
in Germany or the United States or Italy or Australia? Or, for example, how is it that in the 
United States a defendant must be guilty beyond a reasonable doubt but in Germany, the 
judge's "inner conviction" would suffice? Questions of comparative criminal procedure 
like these become increasingly more acute as the world is becoming more interconnected. 
Take, for example, mutual assistance in criminal matters where courts in one jurisdiction 
will often have to request their counterparts in another jurisdiction to help them with 
collecting evidence or to turn over evidence already collected. What is the significance of 
the fact that, for example, a witness statement was taken by the police criminal investigator 
instead of in open court before a judge and through the process of direct- and cross-
examination? Or, does the fact that the witness was cautioned instead of being sworn have 
any effect on the value of the statements given by the witness? And, what about mutual 
recognition of criminal court judgments? How can one jurisdiction recognize a verdict by 
another if the evidentiary basis for the judgment is markedly different? Then again, 
perhaps the differences are only cosmetic in that they have some symbolic meaning or are 
used to save court's time but have no effect upon the accuracy of the outcome? But what if 
I have misunderstood the goals and driving forces behind criminal evidence?  
 
Purpose of the study 
The study I have undertaken seeks to explore criminal evidence law from a comparative 
perspective but instead of detailing the differences or looking for their origins, its main 
thrust stems from the perception of the world shrinking. The question I attempt to answer 
is whether it is possible to devise a set of criminal evidence rules that could transcend the 
jurisdictional boundaries and be equally well suited for most, if not all, jurisdictions? I am 
not looking to discern common elements or provisions from the criminal evidence laws of 
different jurisdictions as they exist but rather seeking to answer this question de lege 
ferenda – for the law as it should be. The practical benefits of this inquiry would manifest 
themselves in not just the two instances I already mentioned – international assistance in 
criminal matters and mutual recognition of criminal judgments. If there was a set of 
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criminal evidence rules that is objectively better suited for its purpose, adopting them 
would mean a universal improvement in the quality of criminal justice all over. 
 
Structure 
This thesis has four chapters. The first chapter is dedicated to foundational matters and the 
three subsequent chapters deal with substantive matters. I will first look at the concept of 
criminal evidence law and attempt to clarify what it is that I am talking about and how it 
relates to criminal procedure. Many jurisdictions view the law of evidence as a part of 
criminal procedure. My approach is to keep them separate and to take procedure in its 
narrower sense as a given – a product of political, cultural and historical influences. 
Choices about procedure are determined by what a country is willing and able to invest in 
their criminal justice system in terms of time, money and people. Next I will embark on the 
search for some common ground to serve as the basis for my unification attempt. This 
common ground I find not in the law but in the human factor – the one constant in all 
jurisdictions is that the law of evidence attempts to regulate the mental operations 
performed by human adjudicators. Whether it be by prescribing what information in what 
form the adjudicators may consider or by stipulating what conclusions the adjudication 
process should return based on particular information, the law of evidence, regardless of 
what fundamental human rights instrument is applicable or what political party is in power 
operates through directing the same instrument – the human mind. This in turn means that 
the law of evidence, if it is to work,  must be grounded on relevant psychological research. 
This is a good starting point for my inquiry – but even if the instrument being used is the 
same, common rules cannot exist without their goal being something they share as well. 
After all, an axe could be used in a number of different ways depending on whether the 
goal is to chop up firewood or pound in a nail, for example. The purpose of criminal 
evidence law therefore becomes a crucial question - and a far more controversial one to 
answer than one might think. I will demonstrate that while there may be a number of 
different auxiliary objectives and secondary goals that may be different from jurisdiction to 
jurisdiction, there is one central goal underlying criminal evidence law in all jurisdictions – 
to ensure the accuracy of fact-finding so that the guilty are convicted and the innocent 
acquitted. 
Having identified the cognitive operations of the fact-finders as the object of regulation, 
and factual accuracy as the main goal, I will proceed by examining the various ways 
evidence law works. This whole first chapter could be termed as "laying the foundation" 
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for the future discussion and part of this foundation is also a quick glance at the model 
jurisdictions. I have selected England and Wales, the United States, Estonia, Chile, Russia 
and Germany to serve as my sample jurisdictions.1 There are several reasons behind this 
choice but the most important reason is to embrace the diversity of geographic locations, 
historical backgrounds, political systems – and the diverse choices in terms of procedural 
design and fact-finder profile. As we will see throughout this work, the jurisdictions I have 
chosen also present a great variety of combinations of evidentiary and procedural regimes. 
One should be mindful that this work does not purport to offer a comprehensive picture of 
any of these jurisdictions and due to the nature of this project can only touch upon the main 
principles.  
With the necessary general groundwork in the first chapter, in each of the subsequent 
chapters I will take a closer look at one of the following three rubrics of evidence law: 
evidence of prior convictions, hearsay, and standard of proof. For each of these rubrics I 
will explore the approaches taken by our model jurisdictions and the relevant 
psychological research. Where possible, I will also offer specific suggestions for 
fashioning an improved regulation.  
The results of this study are summarized in the final concluding part of this work at which 
point I will also offer my conclusion about the more general issue – is a pan-
jurisdictionally applicable set of evidence rules even possible? The study may also yield 
some ancillary insights into the issues of procedural design more generally and those will 
be presented at the end as well. 
 
Limitations 
One word of caution is also in order. While my study and its recommendations are based 
on the assumption that the relevant psychological research can be generalized across 
populations (i.e. studies about, for example, memory conducted on Americans also hold 
true for Estonians, Germans or Chileans), this may not be universally true – and may mean 
that the recommendations must be qualified in some jurisdictions because of socio-cultural 
quirks. Similarly, some of the psychological research itself is less than conclusive and thus 
it may turn out (as it has in the past time and time again) that things are not as they seem.  
 
                                                
1
 All translations of foreign language sources are my own unless indicated otherwise. 
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CHAPTER 1. FACTS, EVIDENCE, PROOF AND COGNITION – 
SETTING THE STAGE FOR HUMAN PSYCHOLOGY-FOCUSED 
INQUIRY INTO THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 
 
What is evidence law and how is it distinct from the law of procedure? 
 
What criminal evidence law is and how it relates to criminal procedure law is not 
immediately obvious. Evidence, Ian Dennis explains, is information that provides grounds 
for belief that a particular fact or a set of facts is true.2 Evidence law deals with questions 
about generation, collection, organization, presentation and evaluating information for the 
purpose of resolving disputes about past events in legal adjudication.3 Whereas the law of 
evidence is possibly one of the most complex and technical subjects in an American law 
school, there is no such subject or even a distinct branch of law in many countries and 
questions of evidence law are considered to be inextricable parts of procedural law in, for 
example, Germany, Austria, Russia, Estonia, Italy or Chile, to name a few. English 
evidence law, Roberts and Zuckerman observe, can claim the status of a self-conscious 
discipline for barely more than a century dating back to either the mid-nineteenth century 
or the mid-eighteenth century if one defines the development of a self-conscious discipline 
through legal practice rather than legal scholarship.4  
 
While the law of evidence deals with what essentially amounts to information processing, 
criminal procedure law either proscribes or prescribes real tangible actions by government 
agents and citizens in detecting crime and punishing criminals. The central issue is that of 
curbing individual rights and liberties in the process of crime-fighting: it is a balancing act 
the results of which are dictated by whether the jurisdiction places more value on crime 
control or ensuring due process, as Herbert Packer wrote of the two models of criminal 
process in 1964.5  
 
Although the law of evidence is traditionally associated with court procedure, this 
association is due to courts being tasked with resolving factual disputes in criminal matters 
                                                
2
 Ian Dennis, The Law of Evidence, 4th Ed. (Sweet&Maxwell: London, 2010), 3. 
3
 Paul Roberts & Adrian Zuckerman, Criminal Evidence, 2nd Ed. (OUP: Oxford, 2010), 2. 
4
 Roberts & Zuckerman, note 3, at 2. See also John Langbein, Historical Foundations of the Law of 
Evidence: A View from the Ryder Sources, 36 Wayne L. Rev. 1149 (1990).  
5
 Herbert L. Packer, Two Models of the Criminal Process, 113 U. Pa. L. Rev 1 (1964). 
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and not because information processing by other bodies or institutions could not possibly 
be regulated by evidence law. In fact, some scholars have pointed out that since full-blown 
criminal trials are becoming increasingly rare with different kinds of procedural diversions 
being the main mode of disposing of criminal cases, focusing on evidence law in the trial 
setting or even focusing evidence law itself on court procedure is a misplaced effort.6 In 
spite of these objections, I will still remain faithful to the trial-centeredness of evidence 
law for two reasons. Firstly, it appears that trial, regardless of its precise role and 
significance in the procedural framework of a particular jurisdiction, is the one constant 
that features as the culminating event across all jurisdictions. Secondly, trial as the 
capstone event in criminal procedure leaves its imprint on the rest of the procedure and 
guides the procedural decisions of the various actors even if in the end it never happens. 
The police will collect evidence considering the conditions for admissibility at trial; the 
prosecutor will decide whether to prosecute based on what admissible evidence has been 
collected; and the defendant's choice whether to accept a procedural diversion such as a 
plea agreement is also at least in part based on what evidence would likely be admissible at 
trial. In spite of only some cases going to trial, all defendants have the right to have one 
and the potential of a trial shapes the procedure leading up to it.7  
 
As a matter of doctrine, different jurisdictions may of course choose to look at the law of 
evidence as a component part of the law of procedure but for analytical purposes, I will 
keep them distinct so I can examine the nature of the relationship between procedure and 
the law of evidence in different jurisdictions. It seems clear from the outset that the two are 
interrelated and possibly interdependent in that choices about procedure will shape the law 
of evidence and vice versa. So when we delve into the comparative law of evidence, it 
often comes with procedure attached. 
 
  
The feasibility of universal rules of evidence 
 
Proposing that rules of evidence could be devised in a way that they are equally suitable 
for many jurisdictions will immediately meet this counter: legal systems and traditions are 
much too different for this. Perhaps a “Continental” system could borrow from another or 
an “Anglo-American” system might benefit from the insights of another system within the 
                                                
6
 Roberts & Zuckerman, note 3, at 44. 
7
 See further discussion in the English context in Roberts & Zuckerman, note 3, at 45.  
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same “tradition” but translations or transplants from across the “traditions” cannot work.8 
So goes the discourse when one accepts the dichotomous approach to comparative law of 
evidence and criminal procedure, as we will see in a bit. My journey to the land of 
comparative criminal procedure and evidence has a specific goal – not to find what 
separates the jurisdictions, systems and traditions, and makes them irreconcilably different 
but to find what unites them and acts as common ground – provided, of course, that there 
actually is some element that all systems can claim as their own. Nevertheless, the 
following will be limited to the realm of Western, more or less modern and rational 
criminal justice systems and scholarship. While an excursion to Islamic law or African 
tribal criminal justice would be fascinating, it would also far exceed the scope of this work.  
 
Traditional dichotomy and Mirjan Damaška's works 
 
Comparative criminal procedure law and evidence law inquiries often revolve around the 
idea of the great dichotomy of the adversarial model and the inquisitorial model of criminal 
procedure.9 Or in geographical terms – there are Continental-European (civil law) and 
Anglo-American (common law) legal systems with corresponding stereotypical law of 
criminal procedure and evidence. As Peter Duff notes,10 the classic exposition of the two 
systems is found in an article by Mirjan Damaška written in 1973.11 Damaška in his 
introduction uses a term that most others do not – he writes about “evidentiary style”12 that 
under his set of terms is associated with the legal system – civil law or common law. More 
specifically, he argues that the evidentiary styles are the product of three main 
confluencing procedural factors in any given legal system: whether the trial is preceded by 
an official investigation; whether the parties have the responsibility of presenting the 
evidence; and whether the fact-finding body is composed of laymen or (also) includes 
professional adjudicators. What exactly an evidentiary style is, remains undefined. The 
‘style’ appears to mean a procedure-inspired (or in some cases, dictated) preference for 
certain kinds of evidence over others (such as written official documents over live 
                                                
8
 See, for example, Mirjan Damaška, The Uncertain Fate of Evidentiary Transplants, 45 Am. J. of Comp. L. 
839 (1997), but see also Harry T. Edwards, Comments on Mirjan Damaška's Of Evidentiary Transplants, 45 
Am. J. Comp. L. 853 (1997). 
9
 John Jackson & Sarah Summers, The Internationalisation of Criminal Evidence (Cambridge University 
Press: Cambridge, 2012), 6. 
10
 Peter Duff, Changing Conceptions of the Scottish Criminal Trial: the Duty to Agree Uncontroversial 
Evidence in Antony Duff et al., The Trial on Trial. Volume 1 (Hart Publishing: Oxford, 2004), 30. 
11
 Mirjan Damaška, Evidentiary Barriers to Conviction and Two Models of Criminal Procedure: A 
Comparative Study, 121 U. Pa. L. Rev. 506 (1973). 
12
 Id., at 510. 
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testimony). As early as 1973, Damaška recognized that differences among jurisdictions 
even nominally belonging to the same legal system can be significant.  
 
For Damaška, ‘legal system’ refers to the tradition and historical-cultural origin of the 
entire system of laws and legal institutions whereas the question about the ‘model of 
criminal procedure’ (adversarial-inquisitorial-accusatorial…) refers to the features of the 
system designed for detecting, adjudicating and punishing crime. While this kind of 
differentiation may seem just a theoretical nicety, Damaška’s choice to keep the two 
separate is actually a wise one. It would be careless and superficial, as we will later see, to 
settle for the crude traditional associations between the legal system and procedural model. 
The associations especially today lack both prescriptive and descriptive power.  
 
Peter Duff13 has distilled Damaška ’s classic dichotomy down to six characteristic traits 
and this appears to be illustrative of how those who believe the dichotomous two-model 
approach is useful define the two models. According to him, the adversarial model carries 
with it the following implications: 
1. the parties are partisan and have sole control over the presentation of their case; 
2. there are complex and restrictive evidentiary rules; 
3. the prosecution must prove their case without compelling the assistance of the 
defence; 
4. the judge is a passive umpire with no prior knowledge of the case; 
5. the outcome is determined by a single hearing held in public at which there is 
heavy emphasis on the oral presentation of evidence. 
 
The non-adversarial14 model, on the other hand, is characterized by the following features: 
1. there is an official investigation to establish the truth; 
2. the parties do not control the presentation of evidence; 
3. there are few restrictive evidentiary rules; 
4. the defence is expected to assist in the discovery of the truth; 
5. the judge plays an active part in gathering and selection of evidence; 
6. the outcome results from a cumulative administrative process which has built up a 
case file, a dossier, of largely written evidence. 
Duff’s comparison sheet is compiled from an instrumental point of view and looks directly 
at the outward expressions in procedure as do actually many others if not most who choose 
                                                
13
 Duff, note 10. See also, Roberts & Zuckerman, note 3, at 46. 
14
 Duff uses this as the synonym for inquisitorial 
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to use the adversarial-inquisitorial dichotomy in their scholarship. Interestingly enough, it 
is none other than Damaška himself who in his later book15 cautions comparativists against 
such a simplified approach. He observes that the two models only have their very core 
carved out with sufficient definition – while the adversarial model of procedure takes its 
impetus from a dispute and requires a (private) complaint to get under way, the 
inquisitorial model is based on an official investigation that can be launched even in the 
absence of a complaint. Beyond these core ideas, the clusters of other features imputed to 
the two models are constantly shifting and changing. Damaška cautions against portraying 
the particular models as two distinctive groups of static systems – one embracing the 
descendants of the common law and the other one stemming from the continental tradition. 
This “lowest common denominator”16 approach is not viable as Damaška notes and we 
shall later see for ourselves: one cannot set up a model to which all systems of either 
pedigree would conform, not only because of the diversity in details but also because of the 
constant changes that are taking place.17 Another point is brought up by Nijboer in his 
article about Dutch criminal evidence law:18 the law on the books can be radically different 
from the law in action. In the Netherlands, for example, Nijboer writes, the current code of 
criminal procedure implies that a standard criminal case would culminate in a trial where 
most of the evidence is presented through live testimony. In practice, most of these 
provisions are usually dormant and the majority of cases are decided on the dossier. 
 
In his “Faces of Justice and State Authority” Damaška himself used two different 
parameters to chart the main forces influencing the evolution of court procedure: the 
organization of authority and the disposition of government.19 While held in high regard by 
other academics as a more nuanced way of organizing the “unruly data,”20 in his later 
                                                
15
 Mirjan Damaška, The Faces of Justice and State Authority (Yale University Press: New Haven, CT, 1986), 
4. 
16
 Maximo Langer, From Legal Transplants to Legal Translations: The Globalization of Plea Bargaining 
and the Americanization Thesis  in Criminal Procedure, 45 Harv. Int'l L. J. 1, 7 (2004). 
17
 Damaška, note 15, at 5. This is precisely why keeping legal system and procedural model strictly separate 
also at the level of definitions makes a lot of sense. 
18
 J. F. Nijboer, Common Law Tradition in Evidence Scholarship Observed from a Continental Perspective, 
41 Am. J. of Comp. J. 299 (1993). 
19
 Damaška, note 15, at 181.  
20
 Ronald J. Allen & Georgia N. Alexakis, Utility and Truth in the Scholarship of Mirjan Damaška, in John 
Jackson et al., eds., Crime, Procedure and Evidence in a Comparative and International Context. Essays in 
Honour of Professor Mirjan Damaška (Hart Publishing: Oxford, 2008), 332. According to Roberts, 
Damaška's approach has several methodological strengths as it bridges the justice system and the general 
political system, his two axes are better able to encapsulate the complexities of real legal processes than the 
unidimensional adversarial-inquisitorial dichotomy; the modular structure of his conceptual building blocks 
facilitates modeling of relatively unusual combinations of features; and he demonstrates that concepts are 
always ideologically loaded – all conceptualizations of legal process depend on the perspective of the 
observer. - Paul Roberts, Faces of Justice Adrift? Damaška's Comparative Method and the Future of 
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“Evidence law Adrift”21 Damaška reverted to the unidimensional adversarial-inquisitorial 
dichotomy and his two-axes grid explained in “Faces of Justice and State Authority” never 
made it into the mainstream – possibly because it is more nuanced than an average 
criminal procedure textbook.    
 
Although the dichotomous approach to criminal procedure and evidence law can probably 
still be considered the mainstream, now perhaps more than before one should pay attention 
to Damaška’s warnings that it lacks descriptive power with regard to particular systems 
and was never meant to be a normative tool. Roberts also points out that the conventional 
dichotomy's main flaw is that it is often unclear whether it is meant to be normative or 
descriptive22 but argues that as an analytical tool and a starting point for a more refined 
analysis, the dichotomous adversarial-inquisitorial scale is still useful even if not 
descriptive of any real legal order. Maximo Langer writes that the inquisitorial-adversarial 
dichotomy still serves the comparative law inquiry well as Weberian ideal-types 
highlighting the differences in the procedural and evidentiary framework of the two camps. 
The two models, he argues, represent a deeper culture that is responsible for distortions of 
and resistance to legal transplants from the other camp and that such transplants therefore  
should be more accurately referred to as legal translations.23 
 
While some scholars still view this dichotomous thinking as useful, others take a more 
principled stand and argue that the dualist perspective on criminal procedure and evidence 
law has become increasingly unhelpful.24  As Sklansky describes, the simple-looking 
approach by the comparativists has in some cases taken a fairly strange turn when judges 
have started dabbling in comparative law.25 Painting with a broad brush across a whole 
continent full of different legal systems, some American judges apparently view 
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“inquisitorialism” as something akin to the main evil in the realm of criminal procedure.26 
As Sklansky also aptly points out, it is far from clear what exactly is meant by 
“inquisitorialism” that must at all costs be resisted. Civil law tradition, he remarks, is not 
monolithic and does not serve well as a general-purpose contrast model.27 Apparently in 
those judicial opinions, the originally descriptive models have somehow transmogrified 
into prescriptive ones. Dennis suggests that the goals of adjudication dictate the aims of the 
law of evidence.28 It appears, however, that in some cases no such analytical approach can 
be identified and the new role of the two models is to concentrate on the perception of a 
standoff and differences rather than rational calculation.29 The dichotomous approach in 
itself probably helps to fuel the seeking of contrast and opposition30 – after all, its original 
aim was to explain why in different jurisdictions the same task – adjudication – is often 
subject to different regulation.  
 
For our inquiry, the two (or four) model approach appears rather unhelpful – it is divisive 
and focuses on differences between jurisdictions, perhaps even driving them apart as an 
ideological tool in that those designing criminal justice systems limit their search for 
workable arrangements to their own end of the traditional dichotomy and refuse to look 
farther. The approach of this thesis is to do exactly the opposite – look past the limits and 
obstacles to see if they really exist or are but self-imposed and illusory. The dichotomy, 
however, does show us where those potentially prohibitive differences are that need to be 
tackled. We also should not underestimate the dichotomy’s influence in shaping the 
scholarly discourse: even though it may be unhelpful for our purposes, others still prefer to 
use this language and look at the world through the dichotomous prism. Therefore, the 
reader should expect seeing references to inquisitorial and adversarial models further down 
the road but keep in mind that my own approach is not relying on this.  
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What is driving the procedure? Looking for commonalities rather than building a 
stand-off: Jackson and Summers 
 
Sarah Summers in her “Fair Trials”31 takes an approach that is explicitly contrary to that of 
Damaška's: instead of explaining why and where the criminal justice systems diverge, she 
set out to question the basis for this divergence and indeed, even question the existence of 
real differences among European criminal justice systems. Focusing on the 
inquisitorial/adversarial divide, she argues, creates several undesirable effects.32 Her focus 
and inspiration is the European Court of Human Rights and the “ease with which the court 
has assumed the mantle of the regulator of European Procedural Rights in Criminal 
proceedings.” Recent work by Jackson and Summers33 continues this endeavour and seeks 
to find the shared values and commonly accepted principles of criminal evidence law 
across various systems. Their hope is that if those values and principles can be discerned, 
one could recommend improvements while avoiding cries that foreign implants are being 
imposed upon native soil. It appears to be their focus on finding commonalities rather than 
lines of separation that prompts them to abandon the adversarial-inquisitorial dichotomy 
and turn their attention to two traditions that complement each other in contemporary 
evidence law in all Western legal systems: the rationalist tradition and the rights tradition.34  
 
The rationalist model of adjudication was developed by Twining, but is ultimately based 
on utilitarian ideas. The main assertion of the theory is that the fundamental aim of 
adjudication is rectitude of decision-making. Rectitude is in turn achieved by the correct 
application of substantive law to the true facts of the dispute. The facts are determined 
through the accurate evaluation of relevant and reliable evidence by a competent and 
impartial adjudicator applying the specified burden and standard of proof.35 It thus follows 
that achieving the rectitude of decision presupposes a pursuit of truth through reason.36 
And although far more popular in the English language evidence discourse than the  
German or French for example, Twining considered his model equally well applicable to 
both ends of the traditional dichotomy of continental and Anglo-American evidence law. 
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Jackson and Summers explain how rationalist theory has been able to expose faults in the 
fact-finding system in procedural arrangements on both sides of the English Channel: the 
English system had been taken captive by the parties and on the Continent, the Roman 
Canon system of legal proofs ran against the idea of rationality.37 The rationalist theory 
carries with it an important notion that can be traced back to the empiricist philosophy of 
Locke, Hume and Bacon: that observation and memory supply the basic data for reasoning 
and that we can only go beyond the data collected through our senses by what is now 
called inductive generalization. This also means that present knowledge about the facts is 
possible but since it is all the product of the inductive reasoning process, we are actually 
dealing with probabilities rather than certainties.38  
 
The rights tradition, Jackson and Summers argue, is the second major method for 
organizing the objectives of adjudication at work both in Anglo-American jurisdictions as 
well as in Continental Europe. Unlike the focus on general utility in the rationalist way of 
thinking, the rights model places the individual and his rights at the forefront. The rights 
tradition has its roots in the Enlightenment idea that an individual is not merely an object 
of state authority but the source and the reason of statehood and is thus to be treated 
accordingly. According to Dennis, there are two rights which are central to the debates on 
the law of evidence – the right of the accused not to be wrongfully convicted, and the right 
of any person to a fair hearing.39 These two rights both entail a number of subordinate 
components – the building blocks that make up the right to a fair hearing, for example.40 
Moreover, unless the fairness of the hearing is considered just a non-functional decoration 
unrelated to the accuracy of the outcome, holding a fair hearing seems to be one of the 
instruments of guaranteeing the defendant’s right not to be falsely convicted. The rights 
tradition is embodied in the American Bill of Rights as well as many more recent human 
rights documents such as the European Convention of Human Rights. The discussion about 
rights in criminal evidence law and criminal procedure in general usually revolves around 
the rights of the defendant – and for a good reason: the rights discourse emerged in earnest 
at a time when judicial torture in Continental Europe was common and English defendants 
had it only somewhat better.41 Nevertheless, as Roberts aptly remarks, criminal process 
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with the sole purpose of respecting the rights of the individual accused is inconceivable as 
this would defy the whole instrumental purpose of the criminal process.42 Individual rights 
cannot rise to the level where they completely block the operation of substantive criminal 
law in that the system is no longer able to collect and process information that would lead 
to apprehension and punishing of offenders. The rationalist tradition and the rights 
tradition are significant because, as Jackson and Summers show, they both are currently 
shaping criminal evidence law across the Continental/Anglo-American spectrum – they 
constitute a low-level commonality between different systems.  
 
Depicting the rationalist and rights traditions as something mutually exclusive or offsetting 
would mean that one is again looking to find confrontation where there is none. The two 
have actually in common what amounts to the central feature of not only criminal evidence 
law but the entire criminal procedure: the goal to ensure accurate implementation of 
substantive criminal law.  This can only be achieved through accurate fact-finding: the tool 
of choice of criminal law – punishment – should be meted out to those who chose law-
breaking as their course of action and deserve to be punished.43 The two vantage points - 
effectiveness (as represented in the rationalist model) and individual rights are but factors 
to consider and limitations to take notice of. Moreover, while it may be tempting to view 
the individual defendant’s rights in criminal procedure as hindrances and obstacles getting 
in the way of truth-seeking, the rights may actually be instrumental in securing accurate 
fact-finding (e.g. the right to counsel or the right to challenge the prosecution’s evidence 
are likely to favourably contribute to fact-finding accuracy regardless of whether the 
jurisdiction belongs to one end of the adversarial-inquisitorial scale or the other). While 
most of the rights discussion until very recently has been almost exclusively about the 
rights of the defendant, there are also other actors in the procedure now claiming their 
rights. Most prominent among them are probably crime victims44 but similar issues about 
individual rights in criminal procedure have been raised on behalf of witnesses.45 Accurate 
fact-finding is also salient in striking a balance between the often contradictory rights of 
these different stakeholders.  
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Jackson and Summers' approach is certainly a step closer to finding a common ground for 
the law of criminal evidence in different jurisdictions. The international human rights 
treaties have effectively unified many aspects of criminal evidence law thereby creating a 
standard that, indeed, appears to successfully bridge the traditional dichotomous view on 
the legal systems. If one is to assume that the collective wisdom of the various human 
rights instruments and international tribunals represents the ideal of criminal evidence law 
then it is difficult to deny that Jackson and Summers' approach also entails a strong 
prescriptive/normative component.  
 
There are, however, weighty arguments that temper my optimism. As a universally 
applicable framework that would not only provide descriptive but also normative content, 
the legal world is notoriously volatile. Human rights seem to be en vogue these days in the 
West and most jurisdictions have been eager to ratify international conventions and 
demonstrate their compliance with their provisions – or at least declare their support for the 
ideals enshrined therein. The principles themselves, however, are less than principled and 
while Summers correctly points to the European Court of Human Rights taking on the role 
of pan-European criminal evidence and procedure law regulator, the Court's jurisprudence 
is characterized by concessions and compromises rather than actual unifying force.46 It also 
appears that Jackson and Summers have built their framework around the concept of 
universal defence rights. However, evidence law is not applicable to just the defence, nor 
can its purpose be just to defend individuals against the state. It thus appears that even 
though Jackson and Summers set out to combine the rationalist and rights tradition, the 
combination turned out a bit one-sided.  
 
 
Human psychology as the connecting element: Dan Simon 
 
There is a danger that we may miss an important point here: laws and rights in criminal 
procedure and evidence are not values by themselves. As we recall, evidence law is about 
ascertaining facts of the past based on available information. So the laws and rights must 
support this mission in order to have any real value. Alternatively, the question could be 
posed like this: can convicting a factually innocent person be moral, legitimate or 
purposeful? Or conversely, how can a system pride itself in setting factually guilty 
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defendants free so they could commit more crimes?47 Ultimately, this would be the result 
of the system not being able to get the facts right. When lawyers embark on the task of 
discussing, comparing or designing trial orders, philosophies of evidence evaluation, extent 
and substance of individual rights and meanings of truth, they often tend to lose sight that 
this is not a computer program or a machine they are devising or criticizing. Criminal 
process is “nothing else than a communicative act, which is set in place in order to answer 
the one question of the guilt of the accused,” as Safferling and Hoven point out.48 Or as 
Dan Simon explains: 
One of the most distinctive features of the criminal justice process is that it is 
operationalized predominantly through people: witnesses, detectives, prosecutors, 
suspects, defence attorneys, forensic examiners, judges, and jurors. These actors 
turn the wheels of the system through their mental operations: perceptions, 
memories, recognitions, assessments, inferences, judgments, and decisions-all tied 
in with emotions, affective states, motivations, role perceptions, and institutional 
commitments. As the process can perform no better than the mental performance of 
the people involved, it seems sensible to examine its workings from a 
psychological perspective.49 
Just like law cannot force the sun to shine, it will not be able to legislate for human nature 
or cognitive needs and abilities. We may assume and hope that humans have perfect 
memory but when the law proceeds on this assumption and the assumption is empirically 
wrong (as, indeed, this one obviously is), our carefully balanced system may be more sub-
optimal than we can accept. We may theorize about truth and proceed on the basis that, 
philosophically, truth is something objectively ascertainable and reality is something 
universally perceivable.50 Yet, empirical evidence tending to show that the same exact 
event or object can be perceived and construed radically differently by different individuals 
should at least make us pause and think how to deal with this dissonance. Or, while 
scholars have spent years and countless pages describing the proper way of inferential 
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reasoning the fact-finders are supposed to undertake,51 we will later see that empirically, 
the average fact-finder, be it a judge, juror, lay assessor or a mother trying to make sense of 
how her son parted company with his lunch money, will instead engage in unconscious 
heuristic reasoning and story construction. To address this, the legislation would have to 
either create the environment where fact-finders are forced to use methodical reasoning 
process or tailor the process so that the methodical deliberate reasoning is not needed. This 
is not to say that a system cannot make compromise at the expense of cognitively optimal 
fact-finding arrangement but in order for the compromise to be intelligent and informed, 
one must be aware of the implications of one’s choices.  
 
Dan Simon's focus on the human psychology of fact-finding as the basis for evidence law 
discussion is very attractive as human participants are indeed the common and arguably 
indispensable element across all jurisdictions. Moreover, unless the digital (r)evolution 
results in judges and lawyers being replaced by computers, human element is the one 
constant that remains even if the state order should change, a country should choose to 
leave the human rights convention or radically alter their criminal justice system. Simon 
himself focuses on the evidence law and the procedure in the United States but unlike the 
law and legal order, human cognitive needs and abilities are not limited by state borders. 
Until fairly recently, human cognition was commonly assumed to be universal. It is only 
over the past 10-20 years that psychology has developed an awareness for the existence of 
cross-cultural differences in cognition and reasoning. Whereas some qualities differ from 
culture to culture,52 most are still shared by all humans. As an example pertinent to this 
thesis, members of more collectivist cultures naturally tend to pay less attention to 
individual details and think more in terms of the big picture and relationships between 
objects than those belonging to more individualistic cultures.53 Still, as most findings of 
psychological science can be generalized universally it provides the common ground for 
analyzing the law of evidence in different jurisdictions. By asking what the human mind is 
capable of and under what conditions it can best do what it is expected in terms of 
information processing we create a function-driven normative approach that allows 
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evaluation of criminal evidence law in different jurisdictions and can suggest 
improvements to the current system.  
 
While we may look at the human mind as the tool that is used in this information 
processing exercise, we also need to identify the end goal against which then one may 
compare the results of one’s analysis. For Dan Simon, this end goal is discovery of truth 
which to him means accurate fact determination.54 Having identified accurate fact-
determination as the objective, he proceeds to analyze several aspects of the United States 
evidence law and criminal  procedure in light of what is known about the cognitive needs 
and abilities of the human actors in the criminal justice process. He then also makes several 
suggestions about how procedure and evidence law in the United States should be 
upgraded in order to better facilitate accurate fact-finding in criminal cases. Thus, to use 
Simon's approach to analyze the law of evidence in different jurisdictions, identifying the 
human mind as the common tool is not enough: there would also have to be a common 
objective. Whether there actually is a common objective is a question that will be more 
closely examined in the next section. 
 
The human psychology-focused approach to procedure and evidence is by far not 
unprecedented. Park and others note that doctrinal evidence scholarship has in recent times 
decreased to make way for various types of interdisciplinary research.55 Among these 
different branches, cooperation of law and psychology is arguably the most important one 
dating back to the early 20th century and the works of Hugo Münsterberg.56 From then on it 
has seen both bursts of enthusiasm and times of disenchantment.57 Dan Simon laments that 
procedure has for lawyers become a thing in itself and overshadows the drive for factual 
accuracy.58 Due process and fundamental rights may, but do not necessarily work towards 
alleviating the problems with the accuracy of fact-finding. This concern is substantiated by 
the hundreds of wrongful convictions that have been exposed.59 In his article Simon 
concedes that the current law of evidence “contains a considerable amount of 
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psychological intuitions” but argues that the law’s psychological sensibilities are often 
limited and inaccurate, and are frozen at the pre-experimental state of knowledge that 
prevailed at the time these common law rules were forged. “There is thus good reason to 
update the legal system with more reliable and nuanced knowledge of human behaviour.”60 
Simon himself examines jurors’ ability to accurately assess the probative value of witness 
statements and to deal with “non-evidential” factors such as courtroom persuasion tactics, 
emotional arousal, racial prejudices and the coherence effect.  
 
Dan Simon is not alone in looking into the jury and its decision making process from the 
psychological point of view. The works of Pennington and Hastie, for example, have been 
groundbreaking in exploring the way jurors actually organize information in order to make 
sense of the trial evidence. Their story model61 is not only widely accepted62 but has also 
laid the groundwork for further research by others, including Simon himself.  
 
At least as important are the works of Guthrie, Rachlinski and Wistrich – two professors 
and a federal judge who have conducted several experimental studies on judicial decision 
making and judges’ cognitive abilities. Their research quite clearly shows what often 
seems to be forgotten: judges are humans and not at all impervious to the many cognitive 
shortcomings commonly ascribed to lay decision makers.63  
 
All these works tend to be confined to just one jurisdiction or to the Anglo-American 
world at best. However, similar concerns should animate the debate over the best 
procedural arrangements everywhere. Analyzing procedural arrangements or rules of 
evidence from the perspective of human psychology as opposed to abstract philosophical 
ideas could easily be the key to getting closer to the resolution of the lingering dispute over 
the comparative fitness for purpose of different procedural arrangements.  
 
Before we can proceed with this, however, we must take a closer look at the other side of 
the equation: is accurate fact-finding really the goal that unites different jurisdictions? 
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The objective to be achieved by the law of criminal evidence 
 
The view of the criminal procedure and criminal trials as primarily a truth-finding 
enterprise seems to enjoy a widespread support. Even a cursory look at literature reveals 
the importance of this objective regardless of whether a system is more interested in crime 
control or ensuring fundamental rights to its citizens; or whether it belongs to one legal 
tradition or another. Ashworth and Redmayne state that the 'purpose for having trials in the 
first place is to make accurate decisions.'64 Findlay also posits that 'In criminal cases, fact-
finding accuracy is the driving objective and preventing conviction of the innocent is a 
paramount concern.'65 As Roberts writes about the English system, “the aspiration that 
judicial verdicts should conform as nearly as possible with the truth, not surprisingly, 
merits pride of place as the first principle of criminal evidence.”66 The United States 
Supreme Court in Funk v. United States wrote of the rules of evidence: “The fundamental 
basis upon which all rules of evidence must rest if they are to rest upon reason – is their 
adaptation to the successful development of the truth.”67 "Accuracy of fact-finding" or 
"ascertaining the truth" is held in similarly high regard in other systems.68  
 
A careful observer has by now picked up on a possible ambiguity in terms that could prove 
significant: accurate fact-finding is often used interchangeably with 'ascertaining the truth' 
but what is truth and whether it necessarily entails accurate fact-finding is not clear. Duff 
and others make this point and also argue that the forum where evidence law operates – the 
criminal trial – actually also serves purposes other than accurate fact-finding.69 Even 
though trials are sometimes viewed as purely instrumentalist (i.e. geared exclusively or 
mainly towards accurate fact-finding), the fact-finding function may not even represent 
their main objective and an accurate account of the past is itself a means, not the end. 
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Truth, they argue, cannot be equated to an accurate record of the past events in question for 
it is much richer and has intrinsic significance rather than being just the necessary 
precondition to imposing criminal punishment.70 Truth is not as much concerned with 
whether the defendant drove at 80 mph in a 30 mph zone but it is a statement by the fact-
finder condemning the defendant for his criminal wrongdoing – and this inherently also 
includes a value judgment.71 Still, the foundation for the verdict must be knowledge of the 
past events. Duff and his co-authors explain that this unhesitant knowledge must be 
gleaned from the evidence introduced at trial through the appropriate process. And of 
course it must be true knowledge, they continue – trial is not the place for 'pure procedural 
justice' where the justice of the outcome is contingent on the justice of the procedures 
employed. The trial aims at a verdict that is both true and justified by the adequate and 
legitimate evidence presented at the trial.72 This mission statement apparently holds true 
regardless of how a system is positioned on Damaška's conflict-resolution-truth finding 
scale73 and also provides further support for the hypothesis that accurate fact-finding is the 
one objective joining together all western style criminal justice systems where criminal law 
is in essence retributive. To wrap up this disambiguation attempt here, truth and accurate 
fact-determination may not be the same thing: truth emerging from the trial often has a 
normative component and its accuracy may be tempered by a variety of factors such as 
procedural rights afforded to the witnesses and the defendant (privileges, exclusionary 
rules etc), or time and resource restrictions.74 So even when accurate in light of the 
evidence presented at trial and thus "true", the verdict may be less than accurate in the 
wider sense.  
  
Is there a reality to be ascertained?  Realists and sceptics. 
 
However, regardless of how we declare our high aspirations towards factual accuracy, the 
relationship between reality and perception is not clear and even the concept of ‘reality’ is 
far from unambiguous. Broadly speaking, the divide in epistemology runs between realists 
and sceptics along the line of whether there exists objective and perceivable reality 
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independent of the observer (cognizer) or not. Depending on how reality and its 
relationship with perception and its reflection in language is conceptualized, fact-finding 
arrangements may have to be different as Jackson argued.75.  
 
The realists who apparently comprise much of the mainstream evidence scholarship76 posit 
that there is objectively some real world "out there" and that humans can gain knowledge 
of this objectively existent world through their senses. The oldest and possibly the best 
known and grasped by people who are not digging too deep into questions of ontology and 
epistemology is the correspondence theory of truth. The theory maintains that truth is an 
accurate reflection of outside reality – a statement is said to be true when it conforms to the 
external reality. At the most basic level, this entails an assumption that there is some form 
of objectively existent matter that “is what it is” independent of the observer, their 
background, language or location,77 and that knowledge of this reality can be objectively 
put into words. This knowledge should be obtained through inferential reasoning from 
one's own experiences. As Damaška explains, a more sophisticated version of the 
correspondence theory maintains that establishing the truth is to ascertain a match between 
a cognizer’s statement and phenomena that can be either intrinsic to nature or socially 
constructed.78 By offering this definition, he attempts to reconcile the correspondence 
theory with another prominent theory of truth – the social construction theory which 
asserts that there is no inherent relationship between words and external reality (but the 
external reality still exists and full knowledge of it is possible); the relationship and thus 
the world view is constructed within a societal framework. So, the same sensual 
perceptions may give rise to different versions of what it means in different societies as the 
meaning of language is a social construct. Damaška’s argument is also that much of what 
the law deals with is not phenomena internal to nature but social constructs like the days of 
the week and, therefore, the question about constructing a faithful image of external natural 
reality may not be the all-important issue in legal context anyway.79 Now, descending from 
the heights of the philosophy of science, for the purposes of adequate arrangements for 
judicial fact-finding, this simply means that the same sensation may be described by 
different words depending on the background of the witness and that in some instances this 
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is more than just a simple translation problem as demonstrated, for example, by the 
difficulties in translating into English the more than 50 words Eskimos have for snow.80  
 
Scepticism has always been a part of philosophy and in terms of epistemology, as Nicolson 
explains, there are degrees of scepticism ranging from those radical post-modernists who 
argue that there is nothing "out there" to be known to the more moderate sceptics who 
doubt the completeness and accuracy of knowledge.81 Sceptics argue that truth and 
knowledge are always partial and influenced by the background and abilities of the 
observer. While there may be something "out there" to be gleaned knowledge of, there are 
no absolute truths about it possible. Surely there may be social conventions, popular 
opinions or wide-ranging agreements about truth in any particular situation and about ways 
of gaining the knowledge sought. In fact, even some realists agree that true knowledge of 
the objective reality may be difficult to obtain. According to Jackson, many self-
proclaimed sceptics upon closer examination actually turn out to be ontological realists 
who have become disillusioned about the ability of the current procedures to achieve 
truth.82 The position that sets true sceptics apart from realists is that for a sceptic, true 
knowledge of objective reality is impossible.83 
 
 
Procedurally tempered compromises: consensus theory and procedural truth 
 
Weigend argues that while otherwise not making much sense, some features of criminal 
procedure are best explained through the consensus theory.84 The consensus theory is 
based on the works by Jürgen Habermas who has claimed:  
‘I can [correctly] ascribe a predicate to an object if and only if every person who 
could enter into a dialogue with me would ascribe the same predicate to the same 
object…. The condition of the truth of statements is the potential agreement of all 
others.’85 
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Whereas Weigend points to the explanatory value of the consensus theory, he is also 
critical of it. The theory on its face value purports to assume some objective reality, 
however, if so, it also entails some other assumptions that will make the consensus theory 
of truth at best shaky as demonstrated by Nicholas Rescher.86 As Weigend illustrates, 
accepting that truth can be just a matter of consensus could mean, for example, that a 
murder conviction would not be based on “because he did it” but rather on “because the 
parties negotiated and found that punishing the defendant is the desirable outcome.”87 
Damaška, too, takes a critical view on the consensus theory: consensus among the parties 
of the criminal process cannot be a result of a fair discussion since the parties are not on an 
equal footing and have partisan incentives thereby distorting the possible truth-indicating 
power of consensus. Jung is not ready to scrap the consensus theory just yet: he points to 
types of court procedure where consensus theory seems to be in action and well accepted – 
plea-bargaining and German Strafbefehl are evidence that criminal procedure in some 
instances may actually already accept the notion of truth through consensus.88 Similar is 
the significance of stipulations of fact in American courts.  
 
It appears though that Damaška, Weigend and Jung all have adopted a restrictive 
understanding of how the consensus theory would pan out in the context of criminal 
procedure – why would it be sufficient to have only the parties agree to the truth of the 
defendant's guilt in a criminal matter where the criterion for truth in other matters was the 
potential agreement of every other person who could participate in the dialogue? Damaška, 
Weigend and Jung seem to think for some reason that persons other than the parties to the 
particular criminal case have no business in the dialogue. While criminal procedure may 
indeed limit the number of people who can actually engage in the dialogue, the dialogue 
about the truth value in the criminal judgment is by no means limited to the parties alone: 
the outcome of criminal procedure affects more people than just the parties (victim, 
parties’ families, communities etc).  In order to preserve its legitimacy, they too must share 
the consensus that the outcome of the proceedings is a true verdict. Still, asserting 
universal agreement as the criterion of truth is not useful for the purposes of criminal 
procedure as a standard against which to evaluate the end product if one adopts the realist 
perspective. It does, however, fit well with the more sceptical outlook. Even Damaška 
himself recognizes that the degree of objectivity necessarily varies. The facts to be “found” 
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are not of the same type and their character can be quite different. Some facts to be found 
are exclusively of the past, others exist at the time of the proceedings and yet others would 
come to be in the future; some are about what happened, others are expected to answer the 
“why?”; some are devoid of value judgments, others are loaded.  The question of whether a 
person is dead, Damaška observes, is much less contingent upon the prevailing social 
views than whether his behaviour at the time of his death would be considered provocative 
or life-threatening.89 
 
Admitting that there is no objective truth does not necessarily mean that all arguments and 
statements have equal value or that there is no way to evaluate competing statements.90 
Rather than seeing truth in terms of correspondence to reality as the scientific method and 
correspondence theory of truth would, Jackson argues that although no one individual can 
claim a direct link to the 'Recording Angel,'91 truth as the goal should not be abandoned 
and the legal process should embrace a new dialectical method. Instead of looking for 
infallible correspondence to reality, the objective should be coherence that is achieved 
through a dialogue between interested parties. While there is no guarantee that the result 
actually is the truth, reaching agreement between as many involved and interested parties is 
as good as we can get, Jackson argues.92 Steps in the right direction in Jackson's view are 
mutual disclosure of evidence and allowing the parties and the judge an opportunity to 
pose questions and be heard. Nicolson argues that while for a sceptic, complete true 
knowledge is impossible, truth should be viewed as an aspiration – involving the best 
possible description or explanation we can muster and a commitment to remain as 
assiduous and honest in our inquiries and communications as we possibly can.93  
 
So how do these theories of truth map onto the criminal procedure and evidence law? As 
Hock Lai Ho correctly remarks, one must distinguish the internal and external perspective 
regarding the issue of truth and its relationship to the criminal process, evidence law or 
trial.94 The external vantage point is that of a system engineer – someone looking at the 
fact-finding machinery from the outside and evaluating whether the system as it stands 
supports a particular goal. The internal perspective is that of a fact-finder in the system and 
is concerned with how a fact-finder would conceptualize their task in that system.  
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Although presumably no judge would argue against the importance of truth as the main 
goal of trials, Ho cites both judges and legal scholars who explicitly claim that the purpose 
and task of a court is not to find the truth but to do something else (resolve a dispute, do 
justice between the parties, etc).95 His  examples of judicial dicta, however, are all 
concerning civil cases and not likely to be equally accepted in criminal cases – there is 
hardly a judge who could, with a straight face, argue that it is a legitimate and acceptable 
use of state power to impose criminal punishments on someone who has done nothing to 
deserve it even if it resolves the dispute or helps save resources.  
 
The points of view of system engineers are divergent, mostly all systems receive scholarly 
criticism for being somehow sub-optimal for ascertaining the truth. It is often at this 
juncture that the good old adversarial-inquisitorial dichotomy gets whipped out again, 
sometimes to the detriment of the analysis. Points of criticism include party dominance, 
excessive use of plea bargaining, constrained time-frame and exclusionary rules of 
evidence.96 But also the diametrically opposite system features get their share of criticism. 
A judge cannot be an impartial adjudicator while being a zealous investigator, the 
argument goes. The prosecutor has a direct line to the court via the investigative file or 
dossier97 which is handed to the court well before the trial if one is held.98 This has the 
effect of making the procedure bureaucratically cumbersome and slanted in favour of the 
prosecution. The defendant is objectified and is stripped of opportunities to mount an 
effective defence. The judge-dominated procedure also has an inglorious inquisitorial 
history that its proponents are reminded of.99 The end result, Weigend remarks, is equally 
dissatisfying in both systems: “a half-truth based on what the defendant and more or less 
interested third parties are willing to disclose.”100  
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In his view, ascertaining the whole truth in a criminal matter is an unattainable goal and the 
desired end result should be called “procedural truth”  - while certainly driven by the desire 
to get as close to the truth, the endeavour is tempered by the needs of a legal process, most 
notably the fact that finding the truth is not the end goal in itself but means towards 
resolving the conflict.101 This notion imposes limits on the time, methods and other 
resources available to the judicial inquiry. Conceptualized this way, Weigend argues, even 
plea-bargaining and other consensual forms of justice make sense as long as there is a 
visible honest effort put forth to introduce facts on which the decision maker can base a 
defensible verdict.102  
 
 
Conclusion: moderately sceptical about truth but certainly committed to finding it 
Apparently while no criminal justice system can afford to flat-out deny the existence of 
objective external reality and the need to ascertain it (thus also endorsing realist ontology), 
they also need to recognize that their capability of doing so is limited. Where opinions 
differ is the benchmark of success that depends on the theory of truth. Correspondence 
theory is very attractive because it assumes that there is the possibility that humans are able 
to gain objective detached knowledge of the outside reality – and thus verify whether truth 
has been ascertained or not. Here I will have to go with the moderate sceptics. Like 
Nicolson argued, even if there is objective reality, full and infallible knowledge of this 
objective reality cannot be achieved, especially within the constraints of criminal 
procedure regardless of the jurisdiction. Furthermore, while the rationalist theory might 
seem to support the notion of unfettered freedom of proof, Dennis explains that there are at 
least four considerations that justify limiting the evidence available to decision-makers: the 
need to avoid unnecessary cost and delay, the need to ensure procedural fairness, the need 
to avoid errors and quite possibly the need to pursue other competing values such as the 
security of the state or the protection of family relationships.103 In addition, one must also 
account for the imperfections of human fact-finders.  In any event, there is no independent 
way of verifying whether the ultimate truth has been found or not. This does not mean that 
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one should not set high aspirations and attempt to create a legal framework that would, as 
much as possible, help the pursuit of truth along (i.e. be conducive to accurate fact-
finding). Whether a system claims to be able to find the “objective reality” or admits to 
settling to a close approximation is actually irrelevant as no system would deny the 
importance of the aspiration of accurate fact-finding. This together with the human 
psychology factor or “cognitively optimal fact-finding arrangements” as Damaška puts it104 
serves as the bridge between the criminal evidence law of different jurisdictions. In other 
words, there is a universally pertinent question of how to make procedure more conducive 
to accurate fact-finding given the cognitive needs and abilities of the persons involved. 
While there are certainly limitations encroaching upon this goal of accurate fact-finding 
that cause jurisdictions to use sub-optimal arrangements, they do not void the goal itself. 
 
 
Selection of topics for the study 
 
This work will examine the rules of evidence and procedure from the point of view of what 
psychology now knows about fact-finders and their abilities. In order to examine the rules 
of procedure and evidence from the cognitive perspective, we can liken the exercise of the 
criminal trial to information processing much like psychologists use information 
processing terms to model cognitive operations. Fact-finding in adjudication is, after all, a 
cognitive operation that the rules of evidence purport to regulate: evidence is received by 
the fact-finder (information input), evaluated (processed) and then a verdict is rendered 
(output). We can see how the rules of procedure and evidence relate to this scheme if we 
view accurate fact-finding as the desired end product. Damaška is right when he argues 
that the kind of fact-finder used must be considered in designing the rules of evidence and 
procedure – much like the specifications of a computer will ultimately set limits to the type 
of software it can run, the modes of data entry available (camera, accelerometer and 
microphone or just perforated cards and keyboard), or the peripherals that can be 
connected to it (black and white screen or a 3D printer). So now our main question is this: 
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how to make the chosen “machinery of justice”105 work so that accurate fact-finding is 
possible. The rules of evidence can provide for two types of controls – input controls and 
reasoning controls on the fact-finding process.106  
 
Input controls 
Input controls often take the form of exclusionary rules like this one:  
The court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed 
by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, 
misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative 
evidence.107 
The rule is animated by the concern that fact-finders are not able to adequately assess the 
probative value of information presented them it and will reach an erroneous conclusion by 
according it too much weight. Incidentally, this rule also advances other goals not 
necessarily related to the concerns of accurate fact-finding – it empowers the judge to 
exercise his discretion in pursuit of judicial economy by filtering out information that 
could not rationally help fact-finding but would waste judicial resources.108  
 
Input controls can also be imposed on the format of evidence. For example, law can 
prescribe that court-appointed expert must prepare a written report that contains specific 
information to ensure the reliability of information by eliminating data loss through fading 
memory or careless recording. In conjunction with another rule that makes such reports by 
default admissible without the expert’s personal appearance, costs and time needed for 
trials would be reduced.  
 
Some input controls are procedural and prescribe specific actions that a procedural actor 
must take in order to ensure the reliability of information, such as the requirement that 
witnesses must be excluded from the courtroom so they cannot hear other witnesses 
testify.109 Depending on the role of pretrial investigation and the information gathered in its 
course, procedural controls may have to be imposed at an earlier stage than the trial itself. 
This is especially pertinent to those procedural designs where the results of the pretrial 
investigation carry over into the court procedure by means of reading out pretrial 
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investigation reports from the case file or by simply incorporating these reports into the 
trial record by reference. In these cases, controlling the “how” at trial stage is far less 
important than controlling the original compilation process.   
 
Input controls can also take the shape of rules mandating that information regarding a 
particular subject be presented to the fact-finders. For example, Section 226(4) of the 
Estonian Code of Criminal Procedure requires that the court be provided with the printout 
of the defendant’s criminal record in all cases where charges are filed with the district 
court. This type of control embodies the idea that certain information is inherently 
probative and must therefore be made available to the fact-finder regardless. 
 
 
Reasoning controls 
Reasoning controls aim to direct or guide fact-finders in drawing conclusions from the 
evidence. They, too, can take many different shapes and have a differing degree of 
specificity. As Nijboer explained about Dutch trials,110 the black letter of the law and the 
law in practice can be very different. While in some jurisdictions the official dogma denies 
that there even is such a discipline as the law of evidence, let alone constraints on the 
process of evidence evaluation, fairly specific instructions on how to evaluate evidence can 
be found in case law of higher courts.  
 
When it comes to making sense of the evidence, all contemporary Western criminal justice 
systems profess the principle of “free proof” – and have slightly different understandings 
of the concept.111 According to Alex Stein, this principle can be traced back to Jeremy 
Bentham and in its current doctrinal form holds that subject to certain limitations, law 
should not control the inferences that judges draw from the evidence about legally relevant 
facts. The validity of these inferences is a matter of evidential relevancy and weight, as 
determined by common sense, logic and general experience.112 The limitations would 
include policies regarding allocation of the risk of error (burdens and standards of proof), 
overriding objectives such as the protection of state secrets, free standing process values or 
provisions incentivizing certain conduct (such as having  written contracts). These 
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limitations are non-inferential and non-epistemic.113 To this day one of the main features of 
the jury system is the jury's freedom to evaluate evidence independently and in private 
without having to give reasons for its verdicts or being subjected to appellate scrutiny and 
this is sometimes regarded as the highest manifestation of the free proof principle.114  
 
On the European continent the principle of free proof emerged as a reaction to the Roman-
Canon system of legal proofs that was criticized for its rigidity.115 In 19th century French 
and German law, evidence was categorized into “full proof” and “half proof”. Where full 
proof of guilt (testimony by two eyewitnesses or a confession) had been presented, the 
judge had no choice but to convict.116 Where full proof was not available, the existing 
evidence had to be augmented with a confession sometimes obtained by torture.117 One can 
still spot occasional examples of similar reasoning controls in contemporary times: an 
example of this was Article 459 of the Chilean Code of Criminal Procedure in force as 
recently as in 2000: “The sworn testimony of two competent witnesses who have 
personally perceived the matter about which they testify and can give sufficient reasons for 
their knowledge is considered sufficient proof of fact unless the testimony is contradicted 
by an equally qualified witness.“ Or, Article 462 that stated “A witness will be presumed 
to have been drunk if he has been convicted of drunkenness at least three times during the 
last five years.”  
 
Removing the “evidentiary chains” paved the road to introducing lay juries to the 
continental courts but those were soon replaced by mixed tribunals consisting of 
professional judges with lay assessors in many jurisdictions. Freedom of proof, it was then 
emphasized, did not amount to a license to abandon the canons of rational inference or 
accepted maxims of experience.  
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Though widely accepted as the cornerstone of the rationalist tradition, freedom of proof 
has not escaped challenges. For example, commonsensical rationalist reasoning may not be 
enough to make sense of the scientific evidence anymore. Thus, the argument goes, the 
evidentiary process must either start paying more attention to educating fact-finders so they 
are able to understand the science, or defer more fact-finding to the scientists.118 Similarly 
the principle of free proof is under attack from the constitutional (rights) perspective. 
While the principle maintains that the fact-finder should be entitled to give any weight they 
feel is warranted to any evidence they get their hands on, from a constitutional perspective, 
some evidence may have to be excluded in order to protect the rights enshrined in the 
constitutional instruments.119  
 
Instrumentally, reasoning controls come into play once the fact-finders have been availed 
to evidentiary information and start working out a verdict. Roman Canon system’s rules 
were excellent examples of direct reasoning controls where the law expressly dictated how 
evidence is to be assessed. Direct reasoning controls can also take the shape of 
presumptions, burdens and standards of proof. As the three are closely related and will be 
covered in more detail in the chapter devoted specifically to the standard of proof, I will 
not discuss them here.  
 
There are also indirect reasoning controls – provisions in procedural law that do not dictate 
what inferences can or should be drawn from a given configuration of evidence but 
prescribe the questions asked and the form in which the decision must be rendered. Even 
though these rules do not directly relate to the epistemic foundations of the decision, they 
structure the deliberation process by either prescribing questions that must be answered120 
or demanding that the fact-finder deliver a reasoned written judgment121 or both.  
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European Court of Human Rights Decision in Taxquet v. Belgium, 86 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 613 (2011). 
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 See, for example, German Code of Criminal Procedure (StPO) Section 267 that specifies minimum 
requirements for a written judgment. 
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Making the controls work: the three topics examined in this thesis 
 
Whether to use professional judges, lay jurors or a mix of lawyers and non-lawyers as fact-
finders is a question primarily of choice (and the choice may be motivated by a number of 
factors, including the cost, and just the sheer question of political trend or a public 
sentiment). This choice is not carved in stone as history has shown time and again.122 Once 
made, it can have  profound implications in terms of the type and format of information the 
system can handle as well as the type and format of the output it can produce.123 Assume, 
for example, that lay jurors are, indeed, susceptible to overvalue statements made out of 
the courtroom and then offered into evidence to prove that the substance of the statement 
was true (hearsay).124 If lay jury is the fact-finder of choice, the rules would have to 
include controls to compensate for its shortcomings if the system were still to produce 
accurate results.125 Similarly, if one were to demand a written statement of reasons from a 
non-lawyer jury, the system would have to include measures to make this possible – 
perhaps  special verdict forms should be used or a specially trained scribe should prepare 
the document. Different fact-finders will likely mean different sets of competencies and 
backgrounds, and thus also knowledge base and values. The Russians must have learned 
their lesson about fact-finder profiles when they, shortly after introducing juries, removed 
political offences from the ambit of jury trials.126  
 
From the fact-finding accuracy point of view, I would argue that the choice of fact-finders 
is the most basic and most important one that dictates much of the rules of evidence and 
procedure as these must cater to the fact-finders’ cognitive needs and abilities. In devising 
actual rules, there are of course countervailing goals and considerations that moderate this 
ideal – cost, fundamental rights, demilitarizing of societal conflicts and other goals that 
criminal adjudication may be expected to support or serve. Nevertheless, the starting point 
should be the decision about who it is that the power of adjudication is vested in and a 
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 Jackson describes the history of procedure and evidence law on the European Continent in his Theories of 
Truth Finding, note 75. Nijboer points to radical shifts in the Netherlands as a result of the changes in general 
political situation – jury that was briefly transplanted as part of the French rule, was swiftly abolished in 1813 
as soon as the French rule abated – Nijboer, note 18, at 302. 
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 Damaška, note 104, at 119. Getting ahead of myself, we will later see that the differences may not be as 
huge as often assumed. 
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 Christopher Mueller, Laird Kirkpatrick, Evidence, 5th Ed., (Wolters Kluwer: New York 2012), 2. 
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 Simon, note 49, at 214. See also, Lisa Dufraimont, Regulating Unreliable Evidence: Can Evidence Rules 
Guide Juries and Prevent Wrongful Convictions?, 33 Queen's L.J. 261 (2008). 
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 See Gennady Esakov, The Russian Criminal Jury: Recent Developments, Practice, and Current Problems, 
60 Am. J. Comp. L. 665, 668 (2012). Apparently, their move was not really motivated by the concern that the 
jurors would not be able to make sense of the evidence but rather by the fear that they would – and might 
acquit in exercise of their nullification power. 
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careful study of the needs and abilities of this type of fact-finder.127 This also means that if 
different types of fact-finders actually have the same cognitive needs and abilities, 
different rules of evidence can only be warranted by the other goals and considerations. 
 
Not only would fact-finder profile determine the substance of information that needs to be 
controlled but choosing the type of control must also take the fact-finders into account. In 
jurisdictions that employ unitary tribunals (e.g. a single professional judge or a mixed 
panel made up of professional and lay members), for example, input controls can be 
difficult to implement. When the law demands that certain information must be presented, 
the fact-finder can direct the parties to present the information or procure the information 
sua sponte (e.g. do a database search). Exclusionary input controls are more troublesome, 
however. Unless the evidence is pre-screened by someone other than the fact-finder 
himself, exclusionary rules that for a bifurcated tribunal (such as a lay jury with a 
professional judge acting as the gatekeeper) would serve as input controls, in effect 
transform into reasoning controls. The imperative in the law then is that the fact-finder 
must not base their decision on the information even though the information has become 
known to the fact-finder. Empirical evidence, as we will see later, suggests that efforts to 
make these reasoning controls work may prove futile even when decision making is 
entrusted to legally trained professional judges.128  
 
Another consideration in selecting the appropriate control is the respective roles of the 
parties and the tribunal. When procedural initiative lies with the parties, they may seek to 
bring excludable information to the fact-finders’ attention to advance their cause. Prior 
gate keeping can reasonably work only if procedural design includes complete pretrial 
discovery of evidence by the parties if pretrial motions by the party opponent are to be the 
vehicle for limiting evidentiary excesses. Alternatively, Italians have opted for a complete 
prior screening of information by a separate magistrate based on the prosecutor’s file,129 
and the same idea is behind the regulation of the pretrial conference in Chile.130 
Conversely, where the parties have not complied with the requirement of the law that 
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 See John Leubsdorf. Presuppositions of Evidence Law, 91 Iowa L. Rev. 1209 (2006) for an interesting 
discussion of inconsistent assumptions and pervasive ambivalence about juries underlying American 
evidence law. 
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 But note the argument by Maartens and Schwikkard that reasoning controls are actually superior to input 
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 For a description as well as a critical account of Italian criminal procedure, see Elisabetta Grande. Italian 
Criminal Procedure: Borrowing and Resistance, 48 Am. J.Comp.L. 227, 244  (2000).  
130
 See Katherine Kauffman, Chile’s revamped criminal justice system, 40 Geo. J. of Int. Law 25 (2010). 
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certain information be presented, procedural law accords courts everywhere the power to 
compel the production of evidence via contempt proceedings. And finally, failed input 
control could trigger the application of one of the reasoning controls – the burden of proof.  
 
If, on the other hand, the fact-finder is expected to search, evaluate and process 
information independently of the parties, input controls that restrict information would 
have to be framed much more broadly or they might not work at all: the fact-finder must be 
able to spot the prohibited information without actually availing himself to it. In practice, 
this is difficult to achieve. While the law could put a general ban on, say, the use of prior 
convictions and the judge would actually refrain from viewing the criminal records 
database, the information about the defendant’s priors could inadvertently be revealed by 
police officers testifying at trial, for example. Arguably less important in guilt 
determination, prior convictions are certainly an important factor in sentencing and if the 
trial is for both guilt and punishment, a flat-out ban on information about prior convictions 
would not be possible. In this situation, the United States for example have opted for 
bifurcated trials – to keep information about prior convictions from tainting the 
determination of guilt, they first hold the trial on guilt only and proceed to hear evidence 
relevant to the punishment after the defendant has been found guilty. The use of input 
control without the appropriate procedural arrangement and a bifurcated tribunal would 
likely be less effective.  
 
This thesis will undertake the study of evidence law through three rubrics – evidence of 
prior convictions, hearsay evidence and standard of proof – that all represent important 
issues of evidence law. In addition to their representative qualities, these rubrics are easily 
tracked and in one form or another have a functional equivalent in most if not all 
jurisdictions as well as have a central enough role to have stirred up some discussion 
among both legal psychologists and legal theorists. The sometimes diametrically different 
regulation of the same issue across different jurisdictions only adds to the intrigue. My first 
question is how if at all this is connected to the rest of the procedural design or the fact-
finder profile. Then, looking at what is known about human psychology in the pertinent 
area and keeping in mind the common goal of accurate fact finding, I will explore whether 
there can also be a common “best arrangement” that is conducive to accurate fact-finding.  
 
The first two topics represent different kinds of information the fact-finder is called upon 
to process. Evidence of prior convictions represents one of the main concerns in evidence 
law – that the fact-finder may be unduly prejudiced by some evidence. Hearsay statements 
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are an example of another similarly prominent worry that fact-finder may not be able to 
adequately account for the lack of reliability of some evidence. In the following chapters 
we will see how control measures have been used and should be used in addressing these 
concerns in  different procedural settings and for different fact-finder profiles.  
 
The third rubric – standard of proof – is an example of a reasoning control that unlike the 
two other topics, is not directed at individual pieces of evidence but the final conclusion. 
The standard of proof presents the question of uniformly regulating and communicating to 
the fact-finders how they should go about their task in order to ensure optimal accuracy of 
the outcome of their endeavour. Here, too, different kinds of fact-finders and procedural 
designs may necessitate different approaches – or not.   
 
 
Sample jurisdictions: general characteristics and observations 
 
In order to illustrate the variety of ways different jurisdictions deal with my selected 
rubrics of criminal evidence, I will examine the following jurisdictions: England and 
Wales, the United States (federal jurisdiction only), Estonia, Russian Federation, Chile and 
Germany.  
 
These have not been picked at random but selected because they represent different 
combinations of fact-finder profile and procedural design thus going beyond a simple 
dichotomous approach. As we noted earlier, fact-finder profile is the choice that should at 
least very strongly influence the way evidence law deals with our three rubrics. So the 
sample jurisdictions feature a wide range of possible combinations of lay and professional 
fact-finders. We also noted that procedural design, in particular the allocation of initiative 
tends to have an effect on how effective different types of evidentiary controls are in a 
given jurisdiction. Two more systemic characteristics have often been said to impress on 
the state of criminal evidence law – the transition between pretrial and trial phase and the 
organization of the trial itself in terms of separating the decision making over guilt and 
sentence. As we noted earlier, these may sometimes transform the nature of evidentiary 
controls or render them ineffective altogether. The sample jurisdictions offer a wide variety 
of combinations for analysis and illustration of how the different features would or would 
not work in combination. In addition to serving as illustrative aids, the sample jurisdictions 
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will also be a source of inspiration in search of the universally suitable arrangement. 
Although exploration of Islamic or Indo-Chinese or African traditional criminal justice 
systems, for example, might prove very interesting as well, it will be an inquiry for another 
work and another time. Jurisdictions examined, albeit from different parts of the world, all 
belong to the modern Western rational criminal justice systems.131  
 
 
 
I shall begin by offering a quick introductory survey of the key factors shaping criminal 
procedure and its concomitant law of evidence in each of the sample jurisdictions under the 
following heads 
 
Fact-finder profile 
 
Fact-finder may be a unitary tribunal where all its members decide both issues of law and 
fact, or a bifurcated tribunal where there is a division of functions – usually the functions 
are those of deciding the factual issue of guilt, deciding the punishment, and gate-keeping 
(i.e. deciding the admissibility of evidence). As far as qualifications go, jurisdictions use 
both professional judges and lay fact-finders – either as part of a unitary tribunal as a 
“mixed panel” or in the form of a jury – there the jurors normally decide guilt and the gate-
keeper trial judge decides admissibility issues and the sentence. Not all jurisdictions use 
lay fact-finders. While lay judges are usually appointed for a longer term, jurors are picked 
ad hoc, normally through some vetting process (voir dire) where parties can exclude 
candidates who display bias and prejudice (challenge for a cause) – sometimes without 
indicating a specific reason for removal (peremptory challenges). 
 
The allocation of initiative between parties and the tribunal 
 
Prosecutors initiate criminal proceedings in most cases – and victims can, in some 
jurisdictions. Procedural initiative is most apparent in two aspects of trial process: who 
decides what evidence to present and does the presenting at trial, and whether parties can 
terminate the proceedings that have already been initiated (e.g. by dropping charges or 
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 Whereas these are the main considerations for choosing the sample jurisdictions, access to the relevant 
legal materials in a language understandable to me played a part in the selection process as well and thus 
there is no guarantee that some real gems have not been overlooked. 
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pleading guilty). We see that most jurisdictions have shifted procedural initiative to the 
parties with varying degrees of court control except for Germany where the presiding trial 
judge is in charge of examination of evidence.  
  
Functions of pretrial phase and trial and how information collected during the 
pretrial phase is used in trial phase 
 
The most telling feature here is the dossier – a case file compiled by the police during 
pretrial investigation phase that is supposed to be all-encompassing. While in some 
jurisdictions no such file is put together, others compile the file but do not send it to the 
court and only use for discovery and as a depository of documents, and yet others forward 
the entire dossier, sometimes hundreds of tomes, to the trial court along with the charging 
document.  
 
The organization of the criminal trial  
 
A criminal trial may be unitary or divided into different stages designated to deal with 
specific issues such as separate guilt and punishment phases (bifurcated trial).132 The 
rationale of bifurcation where it exists is to facilitate smoother logistics as well as to keep 
evidence that could only be relevant to the sentencing from contaminating the guilt 
determination. Sentencing may also be entrusted to the trial judge where the trial was by 
jury.  
 
The following table summarizes the different combinations in our model jurisdictions.  
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 A bifurcated trial does not necessarily mean a bifurcated tribunal: it is theoretically possible to have the 
same jury decide both guilt and punishment and leave the trial judge to decide only admissibility of evidence. 
And as we will shortly see, it is possible to have a bifurcated trial with a unitary tribunal. 
 Table 1. Basic Characteristics of Sample Jurisdictions 
 Fact-finder profile Allocation of Procedural 
Initiative 
Pretrial and Trial  Trial Organization 
England & 
Wales133 
• lay jury of 12  
• 3 lay magistrates 
• district judge  
 
Initiated and terminated by 
public prosecutor or in some 
cases, private parties. Evidence 
presented by parties. Guilty 
pleas  
No dossier, discovery of 
state’s evidence 
Bifurcated, magistrates may 
refer case to crown court for 
sentencing. 
United States 
Federal 
jurisdiction134 
• lay jury of 12 
• trial judge (district court 
judge or a magistrate judge) 
alone135 
 
Initiated and terminated by 
public prosecutor, sometimes 
charges subject to prior 
screening (e.g. grand jury). 
Evidence presented by parties. 
Most cases resolved by guilty 
plea136 
No dossier, mutual discovery 
at the request and initiative of 
defence, motions in limine137 
Bifurcated; in capital cases, 
jury must also determine if 
aggravating circumstances 
warrant death penalty138 
Estonia139 • trial judge alone, or 
• panel of one professional 
judge with two lay assessors 
Initiated and terminated by 
public prosecutor. Evidence 
presented by parties. Full trial in 
7 % of all cases140 
Pretrial dossier presented to 
the defence for discovery  but 
not forwarded to the trial 
judge, pretrial motions rare. 
Unitary 
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 Fed. R. Crim. Pro. Rule 16. 
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 Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002). 
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 Criminal procedure and criminal evidence in Estonia is governed by the code of criminal procedure – Kriminaalmenetluse seadustik (KrMS), available at 
https://www.riigiteataja.ee/akt/112072014008, link verified on 18AUG2014)  
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 Statistical overview of judicial business in 2013 in Estonian courts of first and second instance,  
http://www.kohus.ee/sites/www.kohus.ee/files/elfinder/dokumendid/i_ja_ii_astme_kohtute_menetlusstatistika_2013.a_koondandmed.pdf (link verified 08MAY2014). 
 Russia141 • lay jury of 12  
• trial judge alone 
• panel of 3 trial judges 
Initiated and terminated by 
public prosecutor. Evidence 
presented by parties. Guilty 
pleas in 60% of all cases142 
Pretrial dossier presented to 
the trial judge or the panel; 
pretrial motions hearing in 
jury cases 
Jury trials – bifurcated; 
otherwise unitary 
Chile143 • trial judge alone, or 
• panel of three trial judges 
Initiated and terminated by 
public prosecutor or in some 
cases, the victim.144 Evidence 
presented by parties.  
Pretrial dossier presented to 
the defence but not forwarded 
to the trial court; pretrial 
screening of evidence by a 
different judge. 
Unitary or bifurcated at the 
court’s discretion 
Germany145 • trial judge alone, or 
• panel of professional judges 
and lay assessors in various 
proportions146 
Initiated by public prosecutor, 
evidence examined by the 
presiding judge, court may 
direct parties to collect 
additional evidence or collect 
evidence itself. Plea agreements 
allowed. 147 
Pretrial dossier presented to 
the trial court forms the basis 
of the trial.  
Unitary 
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 Criminal procedure and evidence in Russian Federation is governed by the code of criminal procedure – УПК or Уголовно-процессуальный кодекс Российской 
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 German criminal procedure and regulation of evidence is in the code of criminal procedure – Strafprozessordnung (StPO), available at http://www.gesetze-im-
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 Thomas Weigend & Jenia Iontcheva Turner, The Constitutionality of Negotiated Criminal Judgments in Germany, 15 German L. J. 1, 81 (2014). 
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Summary 
To recap this chapter, a short summary is in order. We started by drawing a line between 
the law of procedure and the law of evidence – evidence law being the one that governs the 
collection, presentation and evaluation of information in order to ascertain what happened 
in the past. We then looked at two ways of discussing the comparative criminal evidence 
law – the divisive dichotomous approach and the defence rights approach but concluded 
that for our purposes a third approach would serve better – human fact-finders are the 
common element across all jurisdictions. We next examined the role of accurate fact-
finding and found it to be of central significance everywhere – and proceeded to discuss 
the interplay between procedural design, fact-finder profile and evidentiary regulation. 
Lastly, I introduced the six sample jurisdictions we will use as inspirational and illustrative 
aids throughout this thesis. Now is the time to turn to our selected rubrics of evidence law.  
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CHAPTER 2. EVIDENCE OF PRIOR CONVICTIONS 
 
Introduction 
The rounding up of the “usual suspects” has always been one of the investigative 
techniques resorted to if the culprit is not caught red-handed.148 The investigative process 
often proceeds in three directions simultaneously: the police follow the evidence found at 
the crime scene, work with people with obvious motive to commit the offence, and check 
the alibis of those having prior convictions and some situational link to the crime being 
investigated. The basis for this is the almost commonsense notion that possibly the most 
accurate predictor of future behaviour is the past conduct.149 Some legal scholars have also 
argued that this may lead to an early bias in the system against those previously 
convicted.150  
 
The extent to which evidence of defendant’s prior misconduct should be admissible at trial 
is a matter of disagreement amongst jurisdictions. On an imaginary axis, there are some 
jurisdictions where information about defendant’s prior criminal record is routinely 
included in the preliminary information packet that is sent to the court.  At the other end of 
the same scale are jurisdictions where the use of prior misconduct is prohibited, save for 
very limited purposes.  
 
Evidence of prior convictions is part of a broader notion of evidence of prior misconduct 
and that in turn relates to the broad topic of character evidence. Anderson argues that 
morality – the question of good versus bad is inherently present in any character evidence 
question and the main factor that sets character evidence apart from other propensity 
evidence such as evidence of habit. It is, according to Anderson, also the main reason why 
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character evidence would even deserve special regulation – non-moral propensity would 
not entail the threat of turning the fact-finders irrationally against the defendant.151  
 
Depending on the particular jurisdiction, the law may or may not treat prior convictions 
differently from other types of character evidence. As we will see, however, the main 
issues animating the debate and underlying the legal framework are not much different and 
thus our treatment at first will be of prior misconduct evidence in general with particular 
reference to prior convictions where appropriate.  
 
In this chapter, we will first examine how the problem of prior misconduct evidence has 
been conceptualized by legal scholars in order to understand what dangers and weaknesses 
have been identified with regard to the use of evidence of prior bad acts. We will then take 
a look at how the issue of prior misconduct has been addressed in our model jurisdictions 
and whether there are discernible patterns in relation to the fact-finder profile or procedural 
design. After looking at the sample jurisdictions, we will turn to see what the relevant 
psychological studies can teach us both about the problem and its potential solutions. 
Finally, I will offer some suggestions about how to manage the risks associated with 
evidence of prior convictions evidence.  
 
 
Evidence of prior convictions and accurate fact-finding: the current 
discussion 
Evidence of prior convictions is one of the issues that is still hotly debated where such 
debates have started. While evidence law is certainly also shaped by other policies and 
considerations,152 the bulk of the discussion regarding evidence of prior convictions 
revolves around accurate fact-finding. The main concern is that the fact-finder, upon 
learning of the prior misconduct, may be irrationally prejudiced by the information and this 
could lead to erroneous convictions. On the other hand, as Ho explains, most people would 
find it relevant that the defendant had committed similar acts in the past153 and depriving 
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 See Barrett J. Anderson, Recognizing Character: a New Perspective on Character Evidence, 121 Yale L. 
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Prejudice against Similar Fact Evidence, 5 Int'l J. Evidence & Proof 71 (2001). 
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the fact-finder of it may lead to false acquittals.154 The tension is thus between the 
perceived meaning and the rationally warranted effect of such evidence.155  
 
In addition, there are also ethical qualms that when prior misconduct is taken to prove 
subsequent acts, are we then not judging a man for his character instead of his actions (and 
this would in turn mean that we should not be punishing him at all for obviously he does 
not have the power to control his actions)156 or, in case of a prior conviction, are we not 
putting him to trial twice for the same offence?157  
 
Roberts and Zuckerman point to three different mechanisms by which prior misconduct 
evidence may derail the fact-finding process by inducing faulty reasoning: prejudicial 
reasoning by improper weight assessment, prejudicial reasoning by diversion and moral 
prejudice.158   
 
Prejudicial reasoning by improper weight assessment is a situation where prior conviction 
evidence is given inordinate weight by the jurors159 causing them to think that given his 
prior record, the defendant  must have done what he is being accused of.160 The problem 
with this type of reasoning is not that prior conviction is deemed to have probative value – 
if it had none, it would be logically irrelevant. The problem here is that the jurors accord to 
it more probative value than is rationally warranted.  
 
 “Diversion prejudice” is a subspecies of prejudicial reasoning where having heard of the 
defendant’s prior conviction, the jury gets sidetracked into discussions about the prior 
offence and delivers the verdict based on their decision about the collateral issue (such as 
whether the defendant committed the prior crime used as evidence against him in the case 
at hand etc.), while neglecting the facts of the case at hand. This kind of misdirection is 
hard to conceive as it assumes all 12 jurors can be manipulated into not considering the 
facts that make up the charge. In fact, research shows that jury deliberations process may 
offer some protection against such digressions through jurors disciplining their fellow 
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jurors’ arguments.161 Conceivably this kind of mental misdirection can be attempted by the 
parties, however, such ploys would normally be kept in check by the trial judge as causing 
confusion, needless presentation of cumulative evidence or waste of time.162 This of course 
if the judge is able to detect it.  
 
The third kind of prejudice stemming from the evidence of prior convictions is moral 
prejudice. It occurs where the fact-finder abandons the duty to decide the case based on 
evidence and renders a guilty verdict notwithstanding the lack of inculpating evidence. 
Roberts and Zuckerman describe a number of possible mental constructs that can lead the 
jurors to decide the case against the defendant mostly based on the evidence of defendant’s 
character. The jury may decide that the defendant is a bad person who deserves to be 
punished whatever the evidence in the current case. Perhaps the prior misconduct is such 
that the jurors deem the need to “put the dangerous offender behind bars” as being far more 
important than deciding the trivial case at hand. The jury may also effectively lower the 
standard of proof in their minds after having heard the evidence about prior misconduct.163 
Or, the moral prejudice could be blended with prejudicial reasoning in rationalizing along 
the lines of “he might not have done this one but there are undoubtedly many other crimes 
he has gotten away with.”164  
 
The concerns are not universally shared, though. As Nance and Damaška point out, 
discussions about prior misconduct evidence are much more intense in the Anglo-
American world165 and are much less interesting to jurists on the European 
Continent.166Damaška attributes this lack of discussion to the prevalent use of unitary 
tribunals and unitary trials – fact-finder is also the gate-keeper; procedure to determine 
guilt is also the procedure to determine the factors that are relevant to the sentence. As an 
additional reason, he cites the continental variety of the free proof doctrine according to 
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54 
which no evidentiary information should be summarily rejected by law.167 Nevertheless, it 
would apparently be doctrinally improper to infer guilt from prior crimes alone. The 
concern that the tribunal may be unduly prejudiced by the prior misconduct evidence rarely 
enters the discussion and the only remaining questions are those of the probative worth.168 
Similarly, one might argue that the whole issue of undue prejudice is blown out of 
proportion and there is not enough empirical evidence credibly pointing to the possibility 
of reasoning faults warranting any specific regulation of prior misconduct evidence. 
 
Having outlined the issue troubling the legal scholars, it is now time to look at how 
lawmakers in different jurisdictions have addressed the issue.  
 
Main features of the regulation of evidence of prior misconduct in the 
sample jurisdictions169 
England and Wales 
  
Section 101 of the Criminal Justice Act of 2003 (the CJA 2003)170 provides that "evidence 
of defendant's bad character" is admissible only in situations expressly enumerated in the 
law. Other than where the defendant agrees to the introduction of such evidence or is 
introducing this himself, the situations include the following 
a. important explanatory evidence (a vague clause more or less meaning that it 
helps the judge or jury to understand the other evidence in the case, also 
known as background evidence)171 
b. relevant to important issue between prosecution and defence (this includes 
propensity to commit similar crimes proven by convictions of similar (of 
same name or same type) crimes and propensity to be untruthful) 
c. substantial probative value in relation to an important issue between 
codefendants (only to refute a defence the substance of which seems to be 
shifting blame to codefendants. Convictions do not seem to be admissible 
under this section as only evidence adduced by the codefendant himself or a 
witness testimony can be used in this situation)  
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d. defendant has opened the door for character evidence by attacking another 
person's character or bolstering his own. 
 
The CJA 2003 is a product of a lengthy reform process that abolished many common law 
evidence rules, including those pertaining to bad character evidence.172 As a flip side, it did 
not touch the law as it stood regarding positive character evidence. What constitutes “bad” 
or “reprehensible”, is open to interpretation – Roberts and Zuckerman have a list of 
intriguing examples demonstrating that the answer to this question is far from clear and 
depends on the sensibilities of the trial judge.173 The CJA 2003 is applicable to all criminal 
trials regardless of whether it is before a jury, a professional judge or a panel of lay 
magistrates. In all cases, the restrictions on the use of bad character evidence have been 
effectuated through input controls – some evidence of bad character is declared 
inadmissible and should be excluded. Here, too, the law provides for judicial discretion: the 
court must not admit evidence of defendant’s bad character to prove propensity or 
untruthfulness if admitting such evidence would result in the defendant not having a fair 
trial.174 In addition, where the trial is by a jury, the judge must instruct the jury not to place 
undue reliance on previous convictions175 or, when the evidence has been contaminated, 
direct the jury to acquit the defendant or discharge the jury if a retrial is to be held.  
 
 
The United States federal jurisdiction 
 
According to the Federal Rules of Evidence (FRE) § 404 (b),  Evidence of a crime, wrong, 
or other act is not admissible to prove a person’s character in order to show that on a 
particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character. There is a number of 
significant exceptions to the rule: 
a. where defendant is accused of sexual assault, evidence may be introduced to 
prove that defendant committed any other sexual assault.  
b. Where defendant is accused of child molestation, evidence that he committed 
any other act of child molestation may be introduced. 
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c. Where defendant has introduced evidence in support of his claims of good 
character, the prosecution can offer evidence to rebut this claim. 
d. Prior crimes, wrongs or acts are admissible to prove motive, opportunity, intent, 
preparation, modus operandi, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, 
lack of accident and thus in essence, that the defendant acted in conformity with 
his prior misconduct. 
e. Where defendant has chosen to testify and 
a. The evidence pertains to a felony conviction not older than 10 years 
subject to a balancing test between “probative value and prejudicial 
effect”, or 
b. The evidence pertains to conviction of an offence involving falsity or 
dishonesty, 
c. Or the evidence pertains to a conviction older than 10 years but advance 
notice is given and balancing test is satisfied. 
 
The rules do not prescribe any specific form in which the evidence of prior conviction 
should be presented to the fact-finder. However, rule 405 (a) provides that evidence in 
chief about person’s character can generally only be introduced in the form of opinion or 
reputation. This restriction does not apply to cross-examination and to cases where 
character of the defendant is in issue – according to rule 405 (b) in those situations 
character may be proved by evidence of specific instances of conduct. Also notice that 
introducing evidence of prior convictions under rule 404 (b)(2) (to prove motive, 
opportunity, preparation, intent etc.) is not considered proving character and thus evidence 
of specific instances of conduct are admissible during the prosecution’s case in chief as 
well. In addition, Rule 406 provides for admissibility of habits and descriptions of routine 
practice in order to prove that at a given time, the subject followed the routine or 
performed habitually.  
 
Thus, the rules support wide impeachment use (i.e. for attacking the credibility of a 
witness) of prior convictions and generally keep the door open for use of prior convictions 
to prove anything other than propensity. Propensity use is allowed where the defendant 
himself has opened the door for it or the charge involves a sex offence or child 
molestation.176 Possibly the most controversial are rules 404(b)(2) and 406 – while neither 
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explicitly allows the presentation of evidence of character or prior bad acts to support the 
inference that the defendant is guilty, identity, intent, knowledge, lack of mistake and 
modus operandi come very close to it. In essence, in spite of their apparently limited 
applicability, all of these instances still operate the same way: by allowing parties to 
present information that does not immediately pertain to the case at hand but supposedly 
allows an informed inference about some element of the charges. Evidence of habit or 
routine is also controversial as it may be difficult to draw the line between prohibited 
character evidence, evidence of instances of prior misconduct (allowed in limited 
circumstances) and evidence of habit (always admissible).177  
 
The rules are framed in terms of input controls via admissibility and in jury trials, the judge 
will be responsible for keeping inadmissible evidence out. However, in bench trials the 
input controls will have to operate as reasoning controls because the same judge is both the 
trier of fact and law. Also, because at trials the guilt phase and the sentencing phase are 
separated, it may be easier to keep the inadmissible information out of the guilt phase.  
 
 
Estonia 
 
KrMS § 226 (4) (2) requires that a printout of the criminal record of the defendant be 
attached to the statement of charges when the prosecutor sends it to the court. Section 154 
(1)(5) of the code provides that the introductory part of the charging document must state 
whether the defendant has a criminal record. Section 5 (2) of the Criminal Records Act 
(karistusregistriseadus) sets forth that upon a period of time after serving the sentence (that 
period depending on the maximum punishment available for the offence) the record of a 
conviction will be expunged - “archived” Archiving means that the conviction cannot be 
the basis for a tougher sentence or for treating the defendant like a repeat offender.178 
Section 20 that regulates who can request archived data does not include the courts – but 
does include the prosecutor’s office and the police. The archival data is stored for 50 years 
in cases of felonies and 10 years in misdemeanour cases.  
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Although the law restricts courts’ access to the archived convictions, this information is 
routinely sent to the court along with the charging document or presented to the court at 
trial under the guise of the heading of “other information characterizing the defendant”.179 
Moreover, the Supreme Court’s civil chamber has muddied the waters by preferring a 
literal interpretation of Section 5(2) of the Criminal Records Act and holding that while 
archived convictions cannot be the legal foundation for a tougher sentence, where the law 
does not refer to “unexpired criminal punishment” but to the person “having been 
convicted of a criminal offence”, archiving constitutes no legal bar to taking the criminal 
record of a person into consideration.180  
 
KrMS § 68 (6) prohibits asking witnesses (and by virtue of KrMS § 294 also the defendant 
himself) about the defendant's prior behaviour unless the context of defendant's prior 
conduct is essential in determining the case at hand. The courts very rarely refer to the 
defendant’s criminal record as evidence of guilt even though the Supreme Court has on at 
least one occasion held that circumstantial evidence, and modus operandi of previous 
crimes in particular is admissible to prove guilt.181  
 
Estonia thus appears to be attempting to use a mix of input and reasoning controls in 
relation to prior misconduct evidence, however, the legal framework is unprincipled and is 
unlikely to actually complicate the admission of prior misconduct evidence. Whether the 
defendant’s prior (mis)conduct is relevant to the case at hand is a matter of argumentation, 
however, the law only restricts questions inquiring into the defendant’s prior conduct and 
does not provide that such information, if revealed, should not be considered by the 
tribunal. Similarly, while prior archived convictions should have no legal significance, the 
prosecutors have found creative ways of making the court aware of them, especially in 
cases where the archived convictions are for a similar offence. The latter information might 
still fall under the protection of a reasoning control measure suggested by the Supreme 
Court in its decision from 2001: there the court held that the expiration of a sentence 
should have the effect of releasing the individual from the adverse effects that having a 
criminal record entails.182 
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Russia 
 
The Russian Code of Criminal Procedure (УПК) is structured so that it first sets forth 
general conditions for trial procedure which is followed by special provisions for jury trials 
and trials by justices of the peace. In addition to the questions of guilt, Article 73 (1)(3) 
also stipulates that the character of the defendant is relevant in a criminal prosecution. 
Normally, therefore, evidence related to the defendant’s character, including evidence of 
prior misconduct is admissible subject to the general rules about the form of evidence. In 
relation specifically to jury trials, Article 335 section 8 provides that evidence of the 
character of the defendant is to be examined in the presence of the jury only to the extent 
necessary to establish specific elements of the charge at hand. It is prohibited to examine 
information regarding the defendant's prior criminal record, of his being declared a chronic 
alcoholic or drug addict as well as other data that may create bias in the jurors with respect 
to the defendant. Where the judge is the trier of both fact and law, there is no legal 
limitation set on receiving evidence of defendant's prior convictions, however, the law does 
not require that the criminal record of the defendant be revealed to the judge.  
 
Russian law thus appears to have distinguished between bench trials and jury trials in that 
for a bench trial, there are virtually no input controls placed on prior misconduct evidence, 
save for the need to receive evidence that could be the basis for sentencing. Since juries are 
not involved in sentencing more than having the power to recommend a more lenient 
sentence, the law uses an exclusionary input control to shield the jurors from character 
evidence that does not immediately pertain to the charge. In those cases, the trial would be 
bifurcated and the evidence relevant to sentencing decisions will be made available to the 
judge during the sentencing phase. 
 
 
Chile 
 
The Chilean Code of Criminal Procedure (CPPC) does not expressly prohibit the 
presentation of documents indicating prior convictions, nor does it require that the trial 
court be provided with a criminal record report for the defendant. However, it does require 
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that all evidence be pertinent to the case at hand.183 The trial is semi-bifurcated – the court 
may hold an additional sentencing hearing upon delivering a guilty verdict if such hearing 
is deemed necessary to receive evidence pertinent to sentencing.184 While this hearing is 
not mandatory, the option seems to indicate that at least the original intent was against 
using "bad person" evidence in trial.  
 
Chilean procedure appears to include no prohibition against the use of prior misconduct 
evidence, be it then in the form of prior convictions or other evidence of bad character. 
Nevertheless, given the structure of the procedure, one could argue that because sentencing 
is preceded by a separate evidentiary hearing, prior bad acts that pertain to the sentence or 
character rather than to the alleged crime at hand are not relevant during the trial and may 
be excluded under the relevance clause at the pretrial conference by the juez de garantia – 
thus there is a discretionary input control in place. The law explicitly renounces direct 
reasoning controls and declares that the assessment of evidence is free, constrained only by 
the rules of logic, maxims of experience and scientifically supported knowledge.185  
 
 
 
Germany 
 
According to he German Code of Criminal Procedure (Strafprozessordnung, StPO) § 
243(4), prior convictions of the defendant must be ascertained only to the extent that they 
are significant for the judgment. When the prior convictions are revealed, is for the 
presiding judge to decide. Lemke and colleagues explain that this provision is designed to 
protect the defendant against “unnecessary exposure and prejudice of the lay judges”.186 
Usually this means that the presiding judge shows to the defendant the printout of the 
criminal record and asks the defendant to confirm that the information in the document is 
correct. Like in Estonia, convictions expire after a certain time has passed since the 
sentence was served. Unlike in Estonia, expired convictions are not subject to being read at 
trial (this does not necessarily mean that the judge would be unaware of them). As Lemke 
and colleagues write, even though the presiding judge decides when exactly the prior 
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record should be revealed, it should be done as late in the trial as possible.187 In Germany, 
the trial court will receive the case file compiled as a result of the police investigation and 
is in charge of examining the evidence at trial. The file also contains the report of the 
defendant’s criminal record. Commentators like Lemke instruct that absent a 
criminological link between the prior offence and the one charged, as well as possible 
relevance of the prior record to sentencing, prior convictions should not even be published 
at trial.188 For practical purposes, however, there are no restrictions on the court’s access to 
such information. Moreover, since Germany has unitary trials where guilt and punishment 
issues are decided in the course of the same proceedings, evidence of prior misconduct 
would usually be relevant to sentencing decisions. Germany adheres to the principle of free 
evaluation of proof which is enshrined in StPO § 261. Nevertheless, as Damaška reports, 
the German Supreme Court has on several occasions held that while prior misconduct can 
reinforce inferences drawn based on the evidence adduced at trial that pertain to the charge 
at hand, it is insufficient to independently warrant a finding of guilt.189 Even though 
German evidence law does not impose input controls on prior misconduct evidence, the 
current doctrine with written reasoned judgments constitute a reasoning control. German 
law does not distinguish between impeachment use and substantive use of prior 
misconduct evidence.   
 
 
General observations and discussion 
 
This survey of different jurisdictions exposes a remarkable diversity in the regulation of the 
use of prior convictions. In some jurisdictions prior convictions  are subject to the same 
regulation as evidence of bad character in general. There seem to be five uses for the 
evidence of prior convictions: 
1. Propensity – to prove that the defendant committed a (similar) crime as in the 
past.190 The underlying assumption is that individuals who have been convicted 
of some crime are prone to repeat similar crimes (or to commit crimes in 
general) in the future regardless of punishment served – or, at least are more 
prone to criminal activity than those who have no prior convictions. 
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2. Bad character – to prove that the defendant is a "bad person" in a broader sense, 
i.e. a criminal as opposed to a law abiding decent citizen; someone who is 
capable of (and inclined towards?) committing crimes. This use of prior 
convictions evidence may be generally permissible (as in jurisdictions where 
“personal character of the defendant” is specifically on the list of things to be 
proven) but may also become permissible once the defendant has either attacked 
someone else’s character or attempted to embellish his own thereby putting his 
character in issue (e.g. so-called tit for tat rule).  
3. Truthfulness – to prove that the defendant is untrustworthy. In jurisdictions 
where this is distinguished from other "bad character" evidence, this is 
applicable only where the defendant has elected to testify. The prior convictions 
used for this purpose can be limited to convictions that involve dishonesty (e.g. 
perjury or fraud). The underlying rationale here is that a person who has acted 
dishonestly in the past is likely to do so again and his testimony should 
therefore not be believed. 
4. Specific elements of the charge. Some offences include a prior conviction as a 
necessary element of the charge (mostly in the form of attendant circumstances, 
e.g. being a felon in possession of a firearm). Prior convictions can also be used 
to prove a variety of matters – intent, knowledge, modus operandi, absence of 
mistake or accident etc. 
5. Preventive prognosis – prior criminal record is relevant and admissible to help 
determine the proper sentence if the defendant is convicted. Courts generally 
punish repeat offenders more harshly. 
Not all sample jurisdictions recognize all five uses. There is virtually no restricting the use 
of prior convictions for sentencing or establishing specific elements of the charge, unlike 
proving propensity or character. The latter two are often subject to restrictions. 
 
Our sample jurisdictions also show a colourful picture in terms of the types of control 
measures they impose on the use of prior convictions evidence and some of the choices are 
hard to explain. Take, for example, input controls imposed on a single-judge court in the 
United States or England and Wales. Given that neither jurisdiction requires their judges to 
write a reasoned judgment detailing their evaluation of evidence, input control as a choice 
is probably right – reasoning control would not be verifiable. Nevertheless, having the 
same judge act as the gatekeeper and then the decision-maker appears to assume that the 
judges are able to deliberately disregard the information they have ruled inadmissible. For 
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all practical purposes, an input control measure in this situation transforms into a reasoning 
control measure.191  
 
While none of the sample jurisdictions have a flat ban on evidence of prior convictions, 
some treat prior convictions similarly to all other evidence of bad character but others have 
given prior misconduct that has culminated in a conviction a special status. An example of 
this is Estonia where the printouts of criminal records database must always accompany the 
charging document sent to court. Yet presenting evidence of other prior misconduct seems 
somewhat restricted.192  
 
In some jurisdictions we can see reasoning controls coupled or reinforced by input 
controls: evidence of prior conduct can be admissible for limited purposes. This means that 
as a reasoning control, the court is directed to refrain from drawing inferences from the 
prior conduct evidence regarding certain issues; and where the proponent cannot 
successfully argue a legitimate purpose of the prior misconduct evidence, the court will 
also use the same provision as an input control and refuse to admit the document or hear 
the witness.  
 
And then there are jurisdictions where there are no restrictions or controls imposed on 
character evidence, save for prevailing doctrine. Such is the case in Germany. There the 
default action is to defer to the discretion of the trial judge (judges) and not to regulate 
prior misconduct evidence by rules. While on the face value Estonia appears to restrict the 
use of prior misconduct evidence, the provision is only an extension of the general 
requirement that questions put to witnesses should remain within the limits of relevance, 
and there is no direct reasoning control imposed on Estonian judges either.  
 
Our survey also shows that the regulation of evidence of prior misconduct has little to do 
with the adversarial-inquisitorial dichotomy or with the fact-finder profile. American and 
English law attempts to shield jurors from some prior misconduct evidence and directs 
judges to exclude evidence that is considered unduly prejudicial. Chilean judges have 
bifurcated trials and pretrial conferences held before a judge other than the trial judge but 
                                                
191
 Murphy argues that even though in a unitary tribunal the judge becomes aware of the inadmissible 
evidence, input control in the form of making an admissibility decision and excluding it right away is still 
beneficial as it avoids contamination of the entire trial by constant references to the disputed piece of 
evidence; it also helps keep the trial more focused and manageable. See Peter Murphy, No Free Lunch, No 
Free Proof, 8 J. Int'l Crim. Just. 539, 540 (2010). 
192
 Note that the restriction applies only to questioning witnesses, defendant and the victim; written 
documents are apparently admissible as are spontaneous statements by the witness. 
64 
no rules requiring that prior misconduct be excluded or any rules regarding the inferences 
to be drawn from it. Germany uses both mixed tribunals and professional judges – and the 
use of bad character evidence is virtually unrestricted. In this sense, only Russia seems to 
be following the traditional assumptions: where trial is by jury, bad character evidence is 
generally excluded, however, there are no restrictions on receiving such evidence in bench 
trials where a unitary tribunal presides over a unitary trial. It also appears that neither the 
allocation of procedural initiative nor the existence of a “dossier” has any controlling 
influence over how prior misconduct evidence is handled – Germany (dossier, trial is 
controlled by the judge), Chile (no dossier, initiative with the parties), Russian bench trials 
(dossier, initiative with the parties) all come with a virtually unfettered freedom to admit 
and evaluate prior misconduct evidence. 
 
This multifarious and puzzling picture may become a little bit more explicable in light of 
the history of these legal systems. Estonia, for example, decided in favour of the party-
driven no-dossier setup fairly recently193 and their judges have much more experience in 
the department where Germany is today.194 Besides, the prior convictions are delivered to 
the court even without the dossier. The previous version of the Chilean code of criminal 
procedure195 prescribed a classical 19th century inquisitorial procedure complete with the 
Roman-Canon style direct reasoning controls. No wonder then that like the pendulum 
effect, in the new code the legislature got rid of all rules that purported to prescribe how 
evidence should be evaluated.  
 
From the fact-finding accuracy vantage point, however, history is not of much help. 
Clearly all jurisdictions agree that evidence of prior misconduct has some probative force. 
The disagreement is about whether such evidence can be accurately evaluated by the fact-
finder or should be somehow regulated in order to ensure or enhance the accuracy of fact-
finding. 
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Relevant discussion and findings of psychological research 
Goals and concerns animating the regulation 
 
The accuracy of fact-finding with regard to making sense of and drawing accurate 
conclusions from the evidence of prior misconduct can be reduced to a few questions and 
corresponding assumptions animating the rules or the lack of any regulation. These are all 
empirical questions that cannot be answered through political statements or argumentation. 
Nevertheless, as evidenced by the vivid description of legislative debates over FRE 609, 
they can certainly be neglected or dismissed as irrelevant based on some policy 
declaration.196 The first assumption is that prior acts in fact are predictive of future 
behaviour. Additionally, in order to make use of this, we should ideally also know the 
predictive power (for all practical purposes, this is what is meant by the oft-used phrase 
“probative force”) of prior conduct and our fact-finders should be able to accurately 
appraise these probabilities and factor them into their evaluation of evidence. If these two 
conditions are met, there is no need for any further discussion – all prior convictions should 
be made available to the fact-finders so they could reach an informed verdict. Estonian and 
German law seems to have been created with these assumptions in mind as they for all 
practical purposes do not impose any controls upon the use of prior convictions evidence 
(or any other prior misconduct evidence).  
 
Suppose, however, that the probative force of prior misconduct is not known, we 
immediately run into problems: there is arguably no empirically substantiated normative 
basis for statements about what the fact-finders ought to make of such evidence or 
comparisons against their actual performance.  Alternatively, however, considering the  
prospect of having someone convicted based solely on the evidence of one instance of prior 
misconduct (or some less gross overvaluation of prior convictions evidence of any variety 
described earlier), one would have to tackle both moral and epistemic problems by either 
introducing reasoning controls or input controls. Our model jurisdictions included 
examples of both approaches. For example, in the United States, there are several 
restrictions in place purporting to shield the fact-finder from prior convictions evidence by 
having the trial judge exclude it before it even reaches the jury (input control). Yet in some 
situations (including where the trial is by the judge alone) the law provides for a reasoning 
control – it prescribes what inferences from the prior conviction are permissible and directs 
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the judge to give the jurors a limiting instruction. A special case of this is the use of prior 
conviction evidence to undermine the credibility of the testifying defendant where the 
policy behind it is that the fact-finders are supposed to use the evidence of the conviction 
for credibility determination but not for any other purpose – like under FRE 609.197 These 
regulation options entail the assumption that the fact-finders are able to compartmentalize 
their reasoning to use the evidence for the permissible purpose only; and to disregard it 
altogether when so directed by law. These assumptions pertain to the cognitive abilities of 
the fact-finders and must therefore be answered by empirical data as opposed to legal 
commentary or political wishful thinking.198 We will now proceed to examine these 
assumptions.  
 
The probative value of prior convictions 
 
The question whether and to what extent prior conduct is predictive of subsequent actions, 
has been of interest to psychology for quite some time. As Edward Imwinkelried explains, 
in the 20th century, the psychological thinking about the probative value of prior conduct 
has evolved through three stages – the trait theory, situationism and interactivism.199 The 
trait theory postulated that humans develop stable elements of personality that determine 
behaviour. The theory was proposed by a contemporary of Wigmore’s, Gordon Allport.200 
Linked to this is the generality theory which posits that individuals are not only likely but 
very highly likely to behave in accordance to their character traits across many different 
situations. Consequently, one who lies in one situation is highly likely to lie, cheat, steal 
and not feel guilty in other situations.201 As Lawson points out, this take on human 
character clearly underlies the rules allowing evidence of prior acts of dishonesty for the 
purposes of attacking the credibility of witnesses, including the testifying defendant.202  
 
In late 1960s, when it turned out that empirical studies failed to confirm the main 
assumption of the generality or trait theory, situationism or specificity theory became the 
new majority view. According to this theory, it is not character traits but the specific 
circumstances of the situation that determine human behaviour. Therefore, predicting 
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behaviour based on past events would be an effort in vain as situational factors are 
different. Especially dangerous is predicting behaviour based only on a small sampling of 
prior occurrences, as “[e]ven seemingly trivial situational differences may reduce 
correlations to zero”.203 In the face of empirical research, even Allport himself had to admit 
that the trait theory lacked appreciation of the ecological and social factors that according 
to the empirical data were obviously relevant.204 By the late 1970s, situationism enjoyed 
widespread support among psychologists.205 
 
Extreme situationism did not fare much better than did pure trait theory. Re-evaluation of 
research results pointed to flaws in situationist research and suggested that while not by 
any means definitive, personality should still not be completely disregarded as one factor 
influencing behaviour. This new theory was dubbed interactionism and it rejects both trait 
theory and situationism as extreme and outlandish positing that human behaviour is a 
function of the situation and the person’s psychic structure.206 In other words, neither 
situation alone nor character alone are good predictors of behaviour but there is an 
enduring consensus today that the interactive interplay of both stable personality traits as 
well as situational factors have the strongest predictive power. Thus, Imwinkelried 
concludes, the interactionist theory represents the most widely accepted and empirically 
supported understanding of the relationship between past and future behaviour.207  
 
This interactionist perspective means that character traits cannot be conceptualized without 
a situational component as they are not universal but rather dispositions of the person in a 
particular situation208 – traits are situation-specific.  
 
As regards the narrower issue of prior convictions, the law authorizes their admission for 
the purpose of supporting an inference about the person’s character, be it then the character 
of truthfulness or that of violent predispositions or that of sexual misconduct, for example. 
The inference is then, that the crime once committed is indicative of the person’s character 
– and character is probative of the person’s behaviour in the instance under examination. 
As Lawson explained back in 1975, this is one instance where both situationists and trait 
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theorists are in agreement: the proposition that one instance of conduct can be a reliable 
predictor of future behaviour is unsound beyond question.209 As Imwinkelried summarizes 
the state of affairs in 2008, contemporary psychologists have evidently completely 
abandoned any efforts to do precisely what [Federal] Rules [of Evidence in the United 
States] 413-15 authorize lay jurors to do.210  
 
A similar issue is presented by, for example, evidence of prior convictions being offered to 
suggest untruthfulness of the testifying defendant.211 Not only is the fact-finder authorized 
to infer general character of untruthfulness based on just one instance, the law212 also 
authorizes fact-finders to infer untruthfulness from crimes that do not even involve 
dishonesty thereby endorsing the view that there is a character trait of general immorality – 
a generic bad character. This regulation takes already extreme trait theory one step further 
– commingling all character traits into just “good” or “bad” and completely disregarding 
any situational variables. As Berger notes, upon surveying the studies some of which 
specifically dealt with the issue of lying, cheating and stealing, the only kind of conviction 
that should be admissible to show propensity to perjury, is one of an earlier perjury as there 
is no such thing as a general character of untruthfulness. Other convictions, while not at all 
indicative of credibility, will spill over and contaminate the rest of the trial.213 
 
Whereas interactionist psychology emphasizes that both the situation and traits must be 
taken into account – which is why a single prior instance of conduct would not be 
probative of anything – in his 2000 article “The relevance of bad character” Mike 
Redmayne challenges this approach.214 Based on the crime statistics and in particular the 
recidivism studies he argues that there is a common element to criminal behaviour and that 
a previous conviction makes it much more likely that a  defendant is guilty – for example, a 
previous conviction for burglary within the past two years made the defendant 125 times 
more likely to have committed the burglary in question, and the odds went up for all crimes 
in double digits. He also argues that the psychological studies of behavioural predictability 
do not accurately capture the reality in criminal adjudication: the studies assume that a 
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prior instance of conduct is all the information there is available. In a criminal case, the 
prior conviction is but one piece of the total body of proof against the defendant. 
Criminals, he points out, tend not to be narrow professionals but generalists215 which 
means that conviction of any crime increases the probability of reoffending regardless of 
the specific offence. One should not, however, jump to the conclusion that the concern for 
undue prejudice is completely unfounded. While certainly satisfying the criteria for logical 
relevance, there are several problems associated with the use of prior convictions at trial. 
First, Redmayne argues, the crime statistics while impressive at the first blush, are also 
susceptible to several limitations. Even if evidence of prior convictions is excluded from 
trial evidence, it will nevertheless affect decisions by the police about who to pursue, 
possibly because of the tendency to start an investigation by rounding up the usual suspects 
or because of the enforcement efforts targeting repeat offenders. This may contribute to 
higher recidivism rates.216 Secondly, Redmayne fears that we may not know enough about 
the reasoning process employed by the jurors in order to be confidently relaxing rules 
regarding prior convictions. On a more conceptual level, according to Redmayne, the 
problem is moving from the general propensity probability to the specific offender. Even if 
we had reliable statistics showing that a particular offender type has a 20 per cent greater 
chance of re-offending within two years of being released from prison, there is a huge 
variety of factors that may influence the particular offender and his situations that may 
either increase or decrease his chance of re-offending (e.g. rehabilitation programs 
undergone while in prison, different situational variables that cannot be accounted for but 
that may well affect the decision to re-offend).217  
 
This last thought is also supported by the current thinking in psychology: a “situation” is 
not just easily described as “getting a good grade at school” or “being nagged by wife” but 
it is an associated complex of memories, physiological reactions, emotions and sensations 
that are the result of the individual’s past experiences – these complexes are called 
cognitive- affective units (CAU).218 Thus, when one argues that there must be a “character 
trait of crime” because criminals not only tend to seek out the crime-inducing situations but 
also offend in seemingly divergent situations, one has misunderstood the concept of 
“situation.” A situation that, coupled with a trait of character, would produce behaviour is 
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not necessarily an external phenomenon but it is the cognitive-affective unit(s) that has 
been activated and then triggers the behavioural response.219 Thus, Redmayne’s example of 
someone convicted of a violent crime being more likely to steal as well misses the mark: 
the situation may seem different only to an outside observer. Moreover, we are also led to 
assume that criminal law prohibitions and overstepping these legal boundaries are part of 
either the situation or character trait that trigger individual’s behaviour. The same CAU-s 
may be activated in other situations as well but those are simply not covered by criminal 
law and thus slip under the radar. If there was a way to map the CAUs this could be just 
what is needed to reconcile the seemingly irrational evidence law restrictions with the 
current thinking in psychology.  
 
The special rules for sexual offences in place in the United States, however, do not make 
much sense at all. We earlier mentioned that the congressional discussions were not that 
much concerned with psychological science as they were with competing political views; 
the rules are not supported by recidivism studies either. Redmayne’s English data squarely 
identified burglaries as the crime with the highest comparative recidivism figure. Rose 
reports the same: theft and burglary as well as drug crimes lead the list of the  top 
recidivating offences. Sexual offences are at the bottom of the list.220 An Estonian 
recidivism study shows the same trend: the most recidivism-prone are individuals 
convicted of theft and drunk driving. Sexual offences had the lowest recidivism rate.221 
Given this dynamic, a conviction for theft or burglary seems to have higher probative value 
than a conviction for a sexual offence – yet in the United States, a single conviction for a 
sexual offence is admissible to prove propensity to commit similar acts; a burglary 
conviction, on the other hand is not.  
 
In conclusion, both psychological experimental research and the studies of recidivism 
support the proposition that evidence of multiple similar convictions has probative value to 
prove a subsequent similar act. However, there is no proof of a generalized character trait 
of “crime” and the notion of character traits independent of situational variables runs 
against what is currently known about human behaviour. Similarly unscientific are claims 
that an individual’s character or propensity to act in certain ways can be ascertained by a 
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single instance of conduct even in the face of recidivism studies, or that the commission of 
any crime is probative of perjury. Nevertheless, studies in recidivism tend to indicate at 
least a scintilla of probative force even in a single conviction – possibly because most 
criminal convictions actually represent several instances of such misconduct. 
 
 
Prior convictions through the eyes of the fact-finders 
 
We saw that there may be some probative value to even one conviction (which may be just 
the tip of the iceberg and represent a behavioural pattern – but then again, it may also be 
just that – the first event of the kind ever) – and much more if the convictions are recent, 
numerous and for the same type of crime. This seems to suggest that there is nothing 
wrong with admitting evidence of prior convictions to prove that the defendant has a 
propensity to commit such acts. There is, however, the other side to the equation: how do 
the fact-finders perceive such evidence? As we saw earlier, there are two major concerns 
about prior convictions: that their probative value is overestimated, and that they may 
cause the fact-finder to convict based on the defendant’s bad character rather than the 
evidence pertaining to the current charge.222  
 
There are a number of studies examining how jurors react to prior conviction evidence and 
several will be examined below. Studies that focus on professional judges are unfortunately 
scarce. Much of the jury research has been conducted using mock juries and the degree of 
realism in those studies is varied.223 Most of mock jury research just like much of 
psychological experimental research in general has been conducted using college students 
who are easily accessible for research. Also problematic is frequently seen focus on 
individual rather than group decision making.224 While some researchers have also argued 
that individual jurors’ pre-deliberation votes are an accurate indicator of the outcome of the 
                                                
222
 There are other reasons advanced in support of curbing the use of character evidence such as the logical 
consistency argument by Peter Tillers – if we view character evidence as proper basis for an inference of guilt 
then we tacitly reject the notion of personal autonomy and freedom of will and choice. This, however, also 
runs against the core principles of criminal responsibility. See Peter Tillers, What is Wrong with Character 
Evidence?, 49 Hastings L.J. 781 (1998). 
223
 See Shari Diamond, Illuminations and shadows from jury simulations, 21 Law & Hum. Behav. 561 (1997) 
or Norbert L. Kerr & Robert M. Bray, Simulation, realism and the study of the jury, in Neil Brewer & 
Kipling Williams (eds)., Psychology and the Law: An Empirical Perspective (2005) 322 for discussion of 
mock jury research. 
224
 Valerie Hans & Anthony Doob, Section 12 of the Canada Evidence Act and the Deliberations of 
Simulated Juries, 18 Crim LQ 235 (1975). 
72 
first ballot and that the first ballot is an accurate indicator of the likely verdict225, the social 
interaction between jurors should not be underestimated. Sandys and Dillehay report that 
while the first ballot is largely indicative of the ultimate verdict, the individual jurors’ pre-
deliberation votes do not always accurately predict the division of votes at first ballot. 
Some research designs have involved entire actual mock trials but due to the logistical 
difficulties and the need for controlling the conditions, most make use of videotaped 
evidence or even just written materials that are then presented to the subjects. There are 
some studies that also use post-trial surveys of jurors in real cases but those are from the 
United States as in England and Canada such surveys and other kinds of research with 
jurors in real cases are barred by the law.226 The criticism against mock jury research tends 
to focus on three factors: whether the “stimulus case” materials resemble the actual trial 
stimulus; whether the mock jury pool resembles the demographics of real juries; and 
whether the psychology of deciding a fictional case sufficiently resembles that of deciding 
a real case.227 Bornstein has addressed the first two in his analysis and concluded that there 
is no indication the difference in the way the case is presented or the demographics of the 
mock jury pool systematically influences research conclusions.228 As for the latter 
dimension, MacCoun concludes that there are many theories why real and mock juries’ 
decision making process might differ, however, no research clearly supports the idea that 
mock jury experiments do not reflect the reality of jury decision making process. Not to 
mention that mock jury studies are the only way scientists can manipulate specific 
variables and study their effects on jury decision making.229 MacCoun also argues that in 
order for the social science research to have more pull in policy making, it may be more 
important to make a good argument rather than defend arguably strong data.230 
 
The early jury studies on the effects of prior conviction evidence were mostly focusing on 
decision making by individual jurors. One of those specifically addressing the effect of the 
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evidence of prior convictions was published by Doob and Kirshenbaum in 1972.231 In this 
study, a total of 48 subjects were presented with a hypothetical case where a man was 
charged with burglary. The case had four variations: one with no information regarding 
prior convictions; one with no information about prior convictions but where the defendant 
refused to testify; one where the defendant testified, gave no important evidence but was 
impeached by 5 previous burglary convictions; and one similar to the last but with added 
instruction by the judge to only consider the evidence of prior convictions for credibility 
assessment. Each variation was presented to 12 randomly selected subjects. The subjects 
were then asked to indicate on the scale of 1 (guilty) to 7 (not guilty) the likelihood of the 
defendant’s guilt. While the first two scenarios produced mean results of 4 and 4.33 
respectively, the information about prior convictions lowered the score to 3.25 and the 
added limiting instruction by the judge knocked an additional 0.25 points off the average. 
As the authors noted, the presence of the criminal record had a “dramatic effect”. The 
authors also pointed out that the limiting instruction, while it should have produced similar 
results as where no criminal record was mentioned, actually moved the score towards 
conviction (although the change was statistically insignificant). This was attributed to the 
halo-effect (the tendency of people to attribute other negative characteristics to a person 
upon learning of one such characteristic. The same has been observed to work with 
positive characteristics).232   
 
Hans and Doob conducted the first study that attempted to explore the ways knowledge of 
prior convictions influences jury deliberations and probability of conviction. Their study233 
was the first one done with groups, not individuals. As they explained, attempting to 
explore decision making processes of a group through individual decision making 
processes may not be entirely appropriate.234  
 
The study made use of 160 randomly selected people and two variations of a burglary case. 
In addition to the written summary of the evidence, the test group was also informed that 
the defendant had one prior burglary conviction and they were also given the judge’s 
limiting instruction telling the jurors to only consider the conviction to assess the 
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truthfulness of the defendant and not to infer guilt. Some of the participants were asked to 
take part in mock jury deliberations in groups of four. Others were asked to reach their 
verdict individually. The researchers were not only interested in the effect the prior 
conviction had on the verdict but they also compared the verdicts of individual jurors 
versus juries of four and analyzed the content of jury deliberations.  
 
Hans and Doob reported that in individual decisions the single prior conviction did not 
produce a significant raise in conviction rate. They compared this result to the Doob and 
Kirshenbaum’s study and opined that while in the 1972 study the test condition was five 
prior convictions, their study mentioned just one and this may have been too weak of a 
manipulation. Yet, in group decisions this “weak” manipulation turned into a strong one 
producing guilty verdicts.  
 
The analysis of the deliberation process revealed that in the group where prior criminal 
record was known to the jurors, the deliberations started in a more negative way and 
evidence tending to indicate the defendant’s guilt was brought up more frequently than in 
the no record group. The researchers also observed several misrepresentations of factual 
information that was not corrected by other members of the group and was generally 
consistent with the argument favoured by the speaker. The group that had no information 
of the prior record also tended to discredit other evidence against the defendant more 
frequently than members of the record group. This seems to indicate that jurors tend to pay 
more attention to evidence pointing towards conviction where they have information about 
the defendant’s prior convictions. This effect is consistent with Dan Simon’s more recent 
studies about coherence shifts.235  
 
Hans and Doob seem somewhat disappointed that although the jurors were instructed to 
consider the prior conviction only for credibility, the jurors paid very little attention to that 
and the difference in the frequency of discussing credibility was only marginal not even 
being statistically significant. This correlates with what Lloyd-Bostock, Wissler and Saks 
and Eisenberg and Hans studies found later – prior convictions have little significance for 
discussions about credibility and will be used to judge propensity even in the face of 
judge’s instructions to the contrary.  
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Wissler and Saks236 hypothesized that perhaps the nature of the prior conviction is a 
determining factor in juror decisions about the credibility of the defendant and through this 
mechanism might contribute to higher conviction rates. Their study involved 160 randomly 
selected subjects who were presented with a two-page summary of a hypothetical case. 
There were four basic variations of the case – with a similar prior conviction, with a 
dissimilar prior conviction, with a conviction for perjury and with no prior convictions. 
The study produced some interesting results. First, while in all cases the “jurors” were 
instructed to consider the prior conviction for credibility only, the jurors deemed defendant 
witnesses to lack credibility regardless of any information about the defendant’s prior 
convictions. In fact, while other witnesses’ credibility was rated 7.3 on a 10-point scale, the 
defendant received a mean credibility score of only 3.18. As feared, the prior similar 
conviction also significantly increased the conviction rate in spite of the instruction not to 
use the prior conviction to decide guilt. In fact, 13 per cent of those mock jurors who 
decided to convict, also stated that the prior conviction was the critical factor in reaching 
their verdict (this in spite of the instruction by the judge that they should not even consider 
the prior conviction as evidence of guilt). Also consistently with other similar studies, 
jurors were much more prone to convict where the prior conviction was for a similar 
offence as opposed to perjury or a dissimilar offence. Notably, the effect of prior 
conviction of burglary in a murder case was less significant than the effect that a prior 
murder conviction had in a burglary case. The researchers opined that this may be because 
the jurors viewed the prior burglary conviction (a relatively insignificant offence in a 
murder prosecution) as an obvious attempt to create bias and were thus able to consciously 
discount it.237 It may, however, be also due to the intuitively appealing idea that murder 
being the most severe offence, necessarily includes readiness to commit lesser offences 
(and this is straight out of the “crime as character trait” box).  There are a few weaknesses 
in the Wissler-Saks study. As the authors themselves note, in a real trial the ratio of prior 
conviction evidence to other evidence is greater and the decisions will not follow 
immediately after hearing the evidence. The Wissler-Saks study also deals with individuals 
as decision makers, not groups. As the study by Hans and Doob indicates, this may be an 
important factor either amplifying or dampering the effect of prior conviction evidence. 
The main gist of the study, however, is well in line with the previous studies: prior 
conviction evidence increases the probability of conviction, does not lower the already low 
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credibility of the defendant as a witness, and its effects cannot be controlled by a limiting 
instruction. 
 
At the request of the English Law Commission, Sally Lloyd-Bostock conducted an 
experimental jury study into the effects of prior conviction evidence. 238 The focus of the 
study was to explore how jurors actually used information about defendants’ prior 
convictions and how different variations of the information about the prior convictions 
could change the outcome and the reasoning. The Lloyd-Bostock study made use of 24 
mock juries of twelve who were presented a video of a specially designed trial. The 
different variations of using prior convictions included information about a prior similar 
conviction, prior dissimilar conviction, prior conviction of indecent assault on a child (all 
three in two variations – from 13 months ago and five years ago), specific mention that the 
defendant had no prior convictions, and then the variant with no information given about 
prior convictions. The jurors were surveyed individually immediately after viewing the 
trial, and asked not only to indicate whether they would vote for conviction or acquittal but 
also indicate the perceived strength of evidence on a 100-point scale. Thereafter the jury 
deliberated and delivered a verdict according to the rules of procedure.  
 
The Lloyd-Bostock study confirmed what had come out of previous studies: recent similar 
conviction significantly increased the probability of a guilty verdict. Unsurprisingly old 
convictions had less effect on the outcome than recent convictions. However, a dissimilar 
prior conviction was found to reduce the probability of conviction compared to the “base 
version” (no information regarding prior convictions given) and even compared to the 
version where evidence of good character had been introduced (specifically mentioned that 
defendant does not have a criminal record). The latter result is quite startling.  
 
 Apparently, the most favourable information was not that about “good character” but 
about prior dissimilar convictions. This, Lloyd-Bostock points out, contradicts the findings 
of the earlier study by Wissler and Saks. The initially counterintuitive result that 
information about an old dissimilar conviction was more favourable to the defendant than 
when no information was given and even more favourable than explicit information about 
defendant having no criminal record had an explanation, though. To the question whether 
in the absence of any information about prior record they would assume prior convictions 
anyway, nearly 65 per cent of jurors answered in the affirmative. This does not explain 
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why specifically mentioning the lack of criminal record was also less favourable than an 
old dissimilar conviction. Perhaps this too is due to some pre-conceived notions about 
stereotypical criminals and the sentiment that a person who has no prior convictions is 
much like a wild card whereas defendants with previous convictions can be more 
accurately judged based on what kinds of crimes they have committed in the past. This 
possible conclusion is alluded to by Lloyd-Bostock as well.239 
 
Where the Lloyd-Bostock and Hans and Doob studies agree is that prior convictions have 
little effect on the credibility of the defendant and considerable effect on jurors’ assessment 
of defendant’s propensity to commit the crimes he was charged with. One major point that 
Lloyd-Bostock study exposes is the dramatic effects of sexual assault convictions, 
regardless of whether old or recent. While convictions for dangerous assault and handling 
of stolen goods had no effect on the credibility of the defendant, prior convictions for 
indecently assaulting a child or a woman reduced the defendant’s credibility. When 
participants were told the defendant had a previous conviction for indecently assaulting a 
child, his testimony was least believed, he was perceived as most likely to have committed 
the kind of crime he was on trial for (which in no case was indecent assault on a child), 
most deserving of punishment, most likely to have committed crimes he had gotten away 
with, and most definitely not given a job where he would look after children; as well as 
most likely to tell lies in court.  
 
Participants in the Lloyd-Bostock study were also asked to rate the likelihood that the 
defendant would commit specific offences in the future. The offences included each of the 
offences used as previous convictions, i.e. handling stolen goods, indecent assault on a 
woman, indecent assault on a child, and malicious wounding. In keeping with the rest of 
the results, a previous conviction for a similar offence clearly had the strongest effect; and 
a previous conviction for a dissimilar offence can be favourable possibly due to the belief  
apparently held by jurors that criminals are specialists. In addition, however, a previous 
conviction for indecently assaulting a child again produced a consistent and for some 
offences statistically significant increase in ratings of likelihood that the defendant would 
commit dissimilar offences.240  
 
                                                
239
 Id., at 753.  
240
 Id., at 749. 
78 
This phenomenon has been more thoroughly described by Neil Vidmar in his article 
Generic Prejudice and the Presumption of Guilt in Sex Abuse Trials.241 Vidmar argues that 
in sex offence cases jurors often exhibit a generic prejudice directed not towards a 
particular individual but towards anyone associated with a particularly odious offence. 
Vidmar’s survey of Canadian sexual offence trials reveals that some one-third of all jurors 
harbour such prejudice against child sexual abusers and admit that they would not be able 
to impartially judge a child molestation case if one were to be presented to them. This 
generic prejudice may be a product of personal experiences (e.g. a potential juror had been 
abused or an abuser) or a similarity between the victim and a family member of the juror. 
Vidmar also argues that there is evidence that mass media coverage of sexual assaults can 
inflame the prospective jurors to the degree that it creates a generic prejudice. It is thus 
conceivable that the dramatic effect of a sexual assault conviction in the Lloyd-Bostock 
study could easily be triggered by any other offence provided sufficient media coverage 
and societal awareness. 
 
A different kind of study was conducted by Eisenberg and Hans. Unlike studies involving 
mock juries, this study used surveys of judges and jurors involved in over 300 actual cases 
in the United States. The study specifically addressed the relationship between three 
factors: the defendant’s decision to testify, jurors’ knowledge of defendant’s prior criminal 
record and the decision to acquit or convict. The judges were surveyed before the jury 
verdict and after the verdict had been delivered or mistrial declared; jurors were asked to 
complete a survey after the verdict had been delivered. Among other questions, judges and 
jurors were asked to assess the strength of the prosecution’s evidence on a 1 to 7 scale. The 
study shows that prior conviction evidence has almost no effect on the conviction rate 
where the perceived strength of evidence is very low or very high but produces a 30 per 
cent increase in conviction rate in cases where the perceived strength of the evidence is 
medium (3...3.5 on a 7-point scale). Thus, in the strongest of the weak cases, prior criminal 
record can cause a jury to convict. Eisenberg and Hans also suggested that the prior 
convictions did not cause the whole body of evidence to be reevaluated in the light of the 
defendant’s past but that the prior conviction effectively lowered the standard of proof for 
defendants who had been convicted of previous crimes. What Eisenberg and Hans call 
’troubling’ is that although one of the rationales for admitting evidence of prior convictions 
is to attack the credibility of the defendant witness, in their study for jurors and judges 
alike the prior conviction did not affect the defendant’s credibility but increased the 
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likelihood that the defendant committed the crime he was charged with.242 This is in 
contravention of the current scientific knowledge about character and also indicates that 
jurors are not capable of bending their mental processes to fit the law’s instructions. 
Realization that fact-finders cannot restrict the significance of prior convictions to just 
credibility assessment casts in doubt the wisdom of the rules regarding the use of prior 
conviction evidence for undermining the credibility of the defendant as a witness. 
Eisenberg and Hans also point out that the decision about whether to testify is at least to 
some degree determined by the existence of prior record as evidence of prior convictions is 
often revealed to the jury during cross-examination for impeachment purposes.  
 
Moreover, the study implies that in some cases evidence of prior convictions may actually 
be considered twice: once by effectively lowering the standard of proof,243 and then the 
same prior conviction is also one piece of evidence supporting the finding of guilt by way 
of showing propensity to commit the offence. The prior record effectively leverages the 
existing evidence over the threshold needed to support conviction.244 In other words, even 
though jurors regard evidence weaker than average, when a prior conviction is in the mix, 
they are significantly more likely to convict than where there is no evidence of prior 
conviction.245  The phenomenon at work here appears to be the Fundamental Attribution 
Error – the tendency of fact-finders to associate behaviour with personality and drawing 
conclusions about the person’s general dispositions or character traits based on even a 
single instance of conduct, situation notwithstanding.246 
 
Laudan and Allen remark247 that although some of the mock jury studies support the 
conclusion that prior convictions increase the conviction rate, others do not. Even if one 
were to believe that there is a reliable correlation, the design of the studies usually involves 
a borderline case where arguably the extra force in the form of the prior conviction should 
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increase the conviction rate and there is nothing wrong with this as it certainly has some 
probative value. In fact, two large scale studies of real life trials they surveyed indicate that 
prior conviction increases the conviction rate by about a third. More interestingly, this 
dynamic worked regardless of whether any evidence about prior convictions had been 
admitted or not. The jurors, Laudan and Allen argue, were able to fairly reliably infer the 
existence or non-existence of prior convictions probably by observing the trial tactics 
employed by the defence. What is more, the studies also indicate that where the defendant 
without prior convictions elected not to testify and no information was given about the 
defendant’s prior record, the conviction rate was comparable to that of defendants who had 
a prior record248 – possibly because the jurors had assumed that the decision not to testify 
was due to prior criminal convictions. This, Laudan and Allen argue, creates a strong 
prejudice against those defendants who choose not to testify in spite of having no prior 
convictions – jurors would assume prior convictions anyway, factor that into their calculus 
and possibly convict some people who are actually innocent. Laudan and Allen’s solution 
is to make prior criminal record available in all cases. This would eliminate guesswork and 
the somewhat perverse consideration driving the tactical choice about taking the stand. In 
addition to more reliably identifying serial criminals, this move, they argue, would likely 
also protect those who do not have a criminal record yet do not want to testify. 
 
The studies about the psychology of jurors can thus be summarized as follows. 
Experimental mock jury studies tend to show that a prior criminal conviction is accorded 
some probative value and studies of actual trials put the increase of probative value to 
about thirty per cent. Prior conviction evidence may also effectively lower the standard of 
proof (i.e. create the understanding that the charge against the particular defendant does not 
need to be subjected to the same scrutiny as that against a defendant who has no priors). 
Evidence of prior convictions (with the exception of prior convictions for sexual offences), 
while increasing the conviction rate, does not generally affect the credibility assessment of 
the defendant as a witness (and by extension, probably would not affect the credibility of 
any witness). In many cases, prior record is apparently assumed by the jurors even when no 
evidence to that effect is presented. Failure to take the stand seems to be the chief factor in 
making this determination. Conviction for a sexual offence, however, is a trump-ace for the 
prosecutor as it, regardless of the nature of the charge, not only undermines the defendant’s 
credibility but also increases the likelihood of conviction for the offence charged through 
the operation of generic prejudice.  
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The effect of limiting instructions 
 
Where the law restricts the use of prior conviction evidence and the trial is by jury, there 
are two ways of effectuating the restriction. The first is through an input control – a gate-
keeper judge will exclude the evidence and it will not be presented to the jurors. 
Sometimes the law also attempts to make a more nuanced use of prior convictions – the 
Federal Rules of Evidence 609 and 404 (b) are examples of this: while evidence of prior 
convictions is inadmissible to prove the defendant’s propensity to commit the crime he is 
charged with, the same evidence may still be admissible for another purpose, such as a 
credibility assessment or to prove motive, intent or lack of mistake or accident. The control 
measure used then to achieve this is a direct reasoning control: the judge instructs the jury 
to consider the evidence for a particular purpose and not for other purposes.249 The 
question here, of course, is whether this can really work. An argument has been made at 
the highest level that it does not and that limiting instructions are but a legal fiction.250  
 
Psychologists have proposed several theories to explain why people tend not to follow the 
instructions to disregard certain information.251 Those theories are motivation (reverse 
psychology – rebellious attempt to regain decision making freedom), ironic process (the 
more one focuses on disregarding the information, the more one is thinking about it), 
mental contamination (different items of information are processed in light of what is 
previously known, “holistically”. Once forbidden information has entered the mind, it 
taints all related processes either by way of contaminated processing or belief perseverance 
– essentially coherence shifts as explained by Dan Simon).252 David Myers opines that 
deliberate disregarding does for the most part not work253 and several studies discussed 
above appear to confirm this. Not only are the jurors not able to delete part of their 
memory, apparently evidence is not processed in separate pieces where one could easily 
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pull one out but it forms an entangled and non-articulable compact where the meaning of 
pieces of evidence is constructed much like in a learning situation. As Edwards and Bryan 
demonstrate, limiting instructions can not only prove useless (a point made over and over 
by many researchers) but may even incur a boomerang effect in that the limiting instruction 
in fact underlines the piece of evidence the jurors are commanded to ignore and thus the 
instruction proves counterproductive.254 Rules on having discussions about admissibility of 
evidence outside the hearing of jurors are given credence by these results – the more 
emotionally charged the excluded piece of evidence, the less likely the limiting instruction 
is to have the desired effect.  
 
While the studies that were so far examined generally suggest that jurors use prior 
conviction evidence for propensity and not credibility even in the face of the judge’s 
limiting instruction, there is some evidence that suggests that limiting instructions are not 
universally powerless in affecting the way juries evaluate evidence. Fein, McCloskey and 
Tomlinson conducted a study to test the hypothesis that given the right reason, jurors may 
be able to erase the effects of inadmissible evidence that had come to their attention or the 
effects of pretrial publicity.255 Their article describes two studies, one about pretrial 
publicity and the other about inadmissible hearsay testimony. Both studies manipulated the 
contents of the limiting instruction by the judge. In both studies the inadmissible 
information had the effect of increasing the conviction rate significantly where no limiting 
instruction was given as well as where a standard instruction to disregard was given to the 
jurors. This result is well in line with the previous studies reporting similar reaction to 
limiting instructions. In the third variation of the scenario the limiting instruction was 
modified to include an explanation why the jury would have to disregard  the information. 
The result was interesting: whereas a plain limiting instruction completely failed to limit 
the effects of inadmissible information, the scenario where the motives behind the 
inadmissible information or the source’s credibility were questioned led to a conviction 
rate similar to the condition where no inadmissible information had been introduced at all 
indicating that the jurors were able to disregard the information they perceived suspicious.  
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This prompted Kassin and Sommers to hypothesize about reasons for selective compliance 
with limiting instructions. Their 1997 study256 confirmed that jurors were able to comply 
with instructions to disregard where evidence was held inadmissible because it was 
unreliable, however, compliance was much lower where evidence was ruled inadmissible 
because of due process concerns. Kassin and Sommers’s study also examined the 
perceived incriminating value of evidence introduced prior to introducing an inadmissible 
wiretap and after it had been introduced. Their findings confirmed that evidence was 
processed assimilatively: evidence introduced after the incriminating wiretap evidence was 
rated as more incriminating than the evidence presented before it. This two-way process 
confirms what Eisenberg and Hans later described as the inadmissible evidence leveraging 
the otherwise weak evidence past the standard of proof hurdle and what Dan Simon has 
dubbed coherence shifts. No similar leveraging effect was present where the wiretap was 
held inadmissible because of lack of credibility. Kassin and Sommers’s study also seems to 
suggest that jurors tend to disobey judges’ instructions where the instructions are motivated 
by what can be termed “legal technicalities” but are able to follow limiting instructions 
where the instructions imply that there is something wrong with the evidence in terms of its 
reliability or credibility. As the same authors express their argument in a follow-up article 
– the jurors are motivated by the desire to reach the “just” result.257 
 
A meta-analysis of juror instruction compliance studies conducted by Steblay and others258 
summarized that inadmissible evidence has a statistically significant and consistent 
influence on verdicts and that instructions to disregard have some mitigating power but not 
enough to completely negate the influence of the inadmissible evidence. This has led 
Sklansky to argue that while it is clear that the limiting instructions do not work perfectly, 
they still work somewhat – in some situations more than in others.259 His main point is that 
since instructions work imperfectly, one should take a more nuanced approach to using 
them in evidence law. One should, where possible, consider whether the instructions are 
given in the optimal way in terms of timing and wording. One might also want to consider 
whether the input control that the instructions is supposed to troubleshoot as reasoning 
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control should be retained at all – especially when no sensible explanation for the rule can 
be given to the jury in support of the instruction.260 Where exposure to inadmissible 
evidence would constitute a harmless error in that it would not sway the outcome, a 
limiting instruction would be sufficient even though it may not work perfectly – or it could 
be omitted altogether. Where inadmissible evidence has the potential to cause a serious 
miscarriage of justice, the imperfect “curative” instruction should be replaced by declaring 
a mistrial. Sklansky’s take on the issue is refreshingly principled. Whereas there may not 
be enough information to fashion perfectly working reasoning controls (and indeed, 
Sklansky argues that since jury trial is a human affair, by definition, nothing about it can be 
perfect), the law should nevertheless not settle for maintaining the illusion of working 
while at the same time (sometimes even not so) tacitly admitting it actually does not work. 
Mistrial is of course a fairly drastic measure so it would be limited to only those cases 
where failure to control the fact-finding process would mean more than just a harmless 
error. It may also have to be backed up by other procedural levers to dissuade the parties 
from causing mistrials for tactical reasons.  
 
The impact of prior conviction evidence on judges 
 
The preceding discussion focused on lay fact-finders and often there is the argument that 
professional judges are more adept at handling evidentiary information in a way that does 
not pose the danger of irrational inferences.261 Procedurally, judges are usually left to 
decide both admissibility and the issues of fact. This makes input control unattainable and 
means that fact-finding by unitary tribunals can only be subjected to reasoning controls 
unless a separate judge is tasked with deciding admissibility of evidence prior to the trial. 
The question begging for an answer is thus the one about the supposed judicial 
“superpower” to deliberately disregard. 
 
Judges have been much less researched. This may be because judges are busy professionals 
who normally do not avail themselves to social science research projects. One may also 
wonder whether the somewhat mystical nature of judicial decision making is a value in 
itself that would be destroyed by looking into the thought process of judges (and perhaps 
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discovering that they lack the mental powers often attributed to the judicial office). The 
most telling is a recent study by Guthrie, Rachlinski and Wistrich who explored not only 
the effect that evidence about a prior conviction would have on judge’s decision but also 
probed the judges’ ability to ignore inadmissible evidence.262 Their study was conducted 
on 265 federal and state trial judges in the United States. The research included 7 
hypothetical cases where the test group was presented with evidence that included clearly 
inadmissible and damaging piece of evidence, and the control group received same cases 
without the inadmissible evidence. The results of the study showed that in general judges 
were unable to ignore the inadmissible information even where it was logically irrelevant 
to the case. The test case for prior convictions involved a lawsuit against a lawnmower 
manufacturer by a man who had been injured by the mower but who also had a criminal 
conviction for fraud from 14 years ago. Judges excluded the clearly irrelevant prior 
conviction but nevertheless awarded less damages than those who were not made aware of 
the prior conviction. This indicates their inability to ignore the evidence they had just ruled 
inadmissible. The only exceptions where judges were able to ignore tainted evidence were 
a case where a confession was obtained from the defendant in violation of his right to 
counsel, and a case which involved an illegal search. The two exceptions are somewhat 
unexpected as jurors were unable to disregard information that was inadmissible on due 
process grounds. The authors are not sure about the mechanism that produced this result 
and speculate that judges might be less reluctant to ignore highly incriminating evidence on 
policy grounds in real cases.263 Perhaps this is due to judges having a different notion of 
what it means to make a “just” decision?  
 
Further evidence that judges have trouble ignoring inadmissible evidence is a study by 
Rakos and Landsman.264 In their study, they compared the effects of inadmissible evidence 
on jurors to the effects it had on judges in a civil case. Even though judges themselves 
confidently claimed not to be biased by inadmissible information, the numbers indicated 
otherwise: significantly more judges decided the case in favour of the plaintiff in the group 
that was exposed to the excluded prior remedial measure by the defendant. The effect on 
jurors was similar.  
 
In short, it appears that despite being scant, the current empirical research does not support 
the idea that judges are consistently more capable of ignoring inadmissible evidence.  
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Conclusions and recommendations 
Whereas different jurisdictions take a different view on whether prior convictions can be 
used as evidence of increased likelihood that the defendant is guilty, the fact-finders, both 
lay and professional, generally view prior convictions as relevant factors increasing the 
probability of guilt. Recidivism studies also clearly indicate that there is a correlation 
between offending and prior conviction. Even though the current thinking in psychology 
rejects extreme reliance on “character traits” as well as exclusive reliance on the situation 
as a predictor and determinant of behaviour, both traits and situation are recognized as 
factors acting together to cause behaviour. Thus, given similar situations, a person’s 
behaviour is likely to be similar. In conjunction, it then appears that empirical evidence 
supports admitting prior convictions for exactly the purpose that it is often deemed 
unsuitable for – to prove propensity. Studies also show that jurors actually take a fairly 
nuanced approach to calculating the effect of prior convictions; that they account for the 
similarity of the charge and the age of the conviction. And where no information is given 
about prior convictions jurors will, rightly or wrongly, assume them anyway.  
 
Sexual offences seem to pose a more serious problem though. While with other convictions 
the reasoning process seems to remain rational, sexual offences apparently shut the rational 
assessment of evidence down in favour of irrational character assassination. So whatever 
the regulation regarding character evidence, it should have a control built in to counter 
character attacks like this. 
 
In searching for a workable solution that would satisfy different procedural arrangements 
as well as be in line with psychology, England and Wales may offer a good starting point. 
Their approach is to admit relevant prior convictions through fairly broad “gateways” 
except when the judge determines that admitting prior conviction evidence would 
jeopardize the fairness of the proceedings creates a framework that is liberal and flexible 
yet equipped with a discretionary input control.  
 
R v. Hanson,265 one of the leading cases on bad character evidence demands that propensity 
evidence under CJA should be subjected to a two-pronged analysis before being admitted:  
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a. does the history of offences establish a propensity to commit offences like 
the one charged; and  
b. does that propensity make it more likely that the defendant committed the 
offence charged).  
Additionally, the jury should also be instructed “not to place too much weight on 
propensity evidence.” Hanson certainly limits what can be admitted and guides the trial 
judge in the exercise of his discretion. Most importantly, it directs the judge to weed out 
evidence that is obviously designed for irrational character assassination – and this should 
not be determined according to a catalogue akin to what can be found in the Federal Rules 
of Evidence but will be time and place-specific. On the other hand, evidence that is clearly 
relevant can be introduced and will be assessed by the fact-finder.  
 
Once evidence of a prior conviction has been found admissible, there may still be the 
concern that prior convictions may be given too much weight or that the fact-finders may 
draw conclusions based on their own misguided common sense instead of taking a more 
scientifically solid approach. These issues can be counteracted by educating the jury and 
substantiating the instructions with the reasoning behind it. Furthermore, prior convictions 
evidence should not be presented simply by noting that they exist but they should be 
accompanied by more specific detail so the jurors would get a more complete basis for 
assessing the significance of the prior conviction. This may have to take the form of an 
inclusionary input control: once the judge has found the prior conviction evidence 
admissible, he will make sure that the jury has the necessary background information for 
assessing the significance of the prior conviction evidence.  
 
Another commendable feature of the English approach is that it does away with the 
dubious distinction between “normal prohibited propensity use” and the “special 
permissible back door propensity use” as well as the need to demand that the jury only 
consider the prior conviction to prove, for example, the intent or the modus operandi but 
not the propensity to commit the crime. This distinction is doubtful even in theory, and in 
practice it is just a pre-text for admission of propensity evidence. As Redmayne remarked, 
not recognizing propensity evidence for what it is would mean that proper analysis is 
skipped and proper jury instructions omitted.266 When the instructions or the underlying 
rule is confusing, jury is likely to disregard the instructions and the intended reasoning 
control would not work. Thus, we should opt for input controls instead or simply abandon 
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the rule that makes no sense. As I proposed before, forcing in more details about the prior 
conviction would do away with the need for a catalogue of permissible uses and better 
manage the danger that the jurors might over- or underestimate the significance of the prior 
conviction.  
 
Impeachment by prior convictions is where the law at least in the United States has it 
backwards. The rule allowing prior convictions to be presented to undermine the credibility 
of a witness is based on the now disproved idea of general negative character traits. 
Empirical science does not support the idea that a person’s propensity to tell untruths could 
be ascertained based on the fact that he has prior convictions, let alone convictions not 
related to lying. Empirical studies also show that when evidence of prior convictions is 
presented, fact-finders tend to accept it as proof of guilt but not of diminished credibility 
even in the face of instructions by the judge to the contrary. This distorts the entire 
procedural design: it provides the defendant with a strong incentive not to testify which not 
only deprives the defence of one of its witnesses but also deprives the fact-finders of a 
source of evidence that might otherwise be available to them. Granted, the defendant’s 
choice to testify is influenced by many other factors as well, not to the least by the answer 
to the simple question whether the fact-finder will like him or not.267  
 
Nevertheless, as Jeffrey Bellin argues268, perhaps the law should encourage defendants to 
testify in order to increase the accuracy of fact-finding at criminal trials. Laudan and 
Allen’s argument referenced earlier269 supports the same position. Of course, the 
encouragement should not take the form of compulsion as this would run against many 
important constitutional principles such as the presumption of innocence or the privilege 
against self-incrimination – the encouragement means first and foremost removing the 
potential for adverse consequences. Bellin also touches on some measures to make it 
happen. He recommends completely outlawing impeachment by prior convictions except 
when rebutting defendant’s direct statement to the effect that he does not have any previous 
convictions. Bearing in mind that the impeachment use of prior convictions has little effect 
on assessment of credibility and in fact goes straight to propensity, Bellin’s 
recommendation sounds sensible, especially in conjunction with the approach taken 
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towards prior conviction evidence above. This would remove the dubious incentive not to 
testify as well – the admissibility of the defendant’s prior convictions would be subject to a 
legal standard not related to the defendant’s choice to testify. At the same time, convictions 
that would be otherwise inadmissible would still be a fair game if the defendant himself 
makes the false claim of having a clean record – but here the prior convictions are not 
being presented to show his character but to rebut the specific factual allegation. 
 
So in summary, what I propose is a two-pronged input control: 
(a) exclude prior conviction if clearly not relevant or insufficient to establish propensity or 
jeopardizing the fairness of the proceedings; 
(b) if admitted under (a), ensure sufficient detail to facilitate adequate evaluation of the 
prior conviction evidence.  
Finally, educate the jury about the science and caution them not to place too much value on 
the prior conviction. 
 
Would this England-inspired approach also work for bench trials or trials with mixed 
tribunals? Research about judges, as we saw previously, points towards the conclusion that 
they, too, can overvalue prior convictions and once aware of their existence, would have 
difficulties disregarding them. More than with jurors, judges’ problems could be mitigated 
by education - not necessarily within the framework of the criminal trial but perhaps 
through continuing legal education programs that are in place in all surveyed jurisdictions. 
While jurors are transient figures, judges enjoy long terms of office and the task of 
educating them can be placed elsewhere in the system. Still, unitary tribunals also pose 
some specific challenges. The most obvious problem is the enforcement of input controls: 
while a jury would have the judge as a gatekeeper, for a unitary court, this role would have 
to be played by a different judge if input controls were to work as intended. Fortunately, 
prior criminal record is easily ascertainable ahead of time as are the particulars of the case. 
A pretrial motion regarding the admissibility of the prior record would thus be quite 
feasible and could be heard by a judge other than the one presiding over the trial. Chile, for 
example, has the necessary procedural framework in place already. My proposed regime is 
workable and warranted regardless of whether the procedural initiative lies with parties or 
the judge as long as the impermissible prior convictions are screened out before the 
preliminary investigation materials reach the trial judge and detailed information about the 
admissible priors is made available to him. 
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CHAPTER 3. HEARSAY 
Introduction 
 
One of the most well known yet also most controversial segments of the law of evidence is 
the hearsay rule. While the general design of this research is attempting to look at themes 
and topics that are common among the various jurisdictions, the hearsay rule does not seem 
to be one of them. One should nevertheless avoid falling victim to the labelling disease and 
instead of looking for the name track the phenomenon itself.  
 
Closely related to the hearsay rule are the principle of orality, right to confrontation and the 
principle of immediacy. The relation is so close that sometimes the concepts are confused 
for one another. Lumped together, hearsay rule and the principles of confrontation, orality 
and immediacy are sometimes all regarded as an English creation only recently imposed on 
the rest of Europe, however, apparently the roots can be traced back to the Roman law and 
while under different names and shaped by different historical trends and events, the 
problems have been known across the entire spectrum of Western rational criminal justice 
systems.270 
 
This chapter is structured so that first, I will explain the essence of the problem that 
underlies the hearsay rule – the need for the best available evidence balanced against the 
reality of having to do with what can be obtained even if miserably far from the best. 
Although the problem is common in all jurisdictions surveyed, the solution, I will 
demonstrate, can take different shapes even to the point that some jurisdictions do not have 
particular rules on hearsay and in those that have one, the scope and operation of the 
hearsay rule can be very diverse. I will look at different jurisdictions to see how they have 
dealt with the same issue.  
 
Getting ahead of myself, there is again a variety in the approaches taken by different 
jurisdictions that is not easily explained. Once again, I will then look at the cognitive needs 
and abilities of the fact-finder as well as what contemporary psychology knows about the 
meaning of particular repeating themes in evidence with the goal of developing a solution 
most conducive to fact-finding accuracy that can be applied across jurisdictions. 
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The dangers of second-hand evidence and longer chains of gossip  
 
Edmund Morgan has described the hearsay problem in his article in 1948271 so well, that 
even today his article is cited for the statement of the issue far more often than for his 
discussion and proposed solution to it. Morgan explains that in terms of processing the 
information coming from a witness, a fact finder would have to go though a number of 
steps and make a number of interrelated conclusions.  
“What Proponent expects Trier to do, and what Trier must do if he is to make the 
desired finding, is consciously or unconsciously to draw from his hearing of these 
sounds [that the witness makes on the stand] the inference that Witness seems to be 
saying that he saw or heard or otherwise perceived X. Until Trier determines what 
Witness seems to have said, he has no basis for giving any value to it. If he 
concludes that Witness seems to have expressed the proposition that he perceived 
X, Trier must make the following additional inferences, each of which, after the 
first, depends upon the one preceding it: (1) that Witness actually said what he 
seemed to have been saying; (2) that he intended thereby to express the proposition 
which Trier would have intended had Trier uttered the sounds; (3) that Witness then 
believed that he had perceived X, that is, that Witness believed the proposition to be 
true; (4) that this belief of Witness was due to an actual experience of Witness 
which at the time seemed to him to be the perception of X, that is, that Witness is 
remembering and is not reconstructing or attributing to himself the experience of 
another or otherwise unconsciously indulging his imagination; and (5) that what at 
the time seemed to Witness the experience of perceiving X was in fact the 
perception of X, that is, that the sense impressions of Witness corresponded with 
the objective fact.”272  
In making these inferences, the Trier will utilize his own perception of the witness as the 
witness is testifying under oath and pursuant to the applicable regulations. However, if the 
witness is not testifying from his personal experience but merely states that he heard 
another person claim to have perceived X, the testimony can properly be used to confirm 
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the fact that such claim was made and the true witness to X is the declarant. And as 
Morgan puts it,  
“Reception of Declarant's utterance, therefore, would render nugatory most of the 
regulations imposed on witnesses. On what possible theory can Proponent be 
allowed to avoid the imposition of these conditions upon Declarant by the device of 
presenting his testimony through Witness? Consistency would require the rejection 
of all such hearsay utterances.”273  
Hearsay is thus an out-of-court statement offered as evidence to prove the matter 
asserted.274 
 
Essentially, the problem lies within the chain of communication between the fact-finder 
and the event or circumstance to be proven. Statements offered into evidence should 
preferably be based upon personal perception by the person making the statement. This is 
as close as witness testimony can bring the event or circumstances to be proven to the fact-
finder.275 The reason for this desire is the need to ensure some basic measure of reliability 
of the statement – the likelihood that the statement is an accurate description of what the 
witness perceived. The lack of reliability does not in itself mean that the statement is 
inaccurate. It simply means that there is no way of ascertaining just how accurate or 
inaccurate the statement is. Similarly, having the witness testify to what he personally 
perceived does not necessarily mean that the witness’s account of the circumstances is 
accurate. The conditions for perceiving may have been less than perfect (the witness did 
not have his glasses or hearing aid, objects obstructed his view, speech was masked by 
ambient sounds, it was dark and the witness was observing from far away), the witness 
may have had trouble interpreting what he saw (misidentified persons or objects, could not 
understand the language well), the witness may suffer from poor memory (or, perhaps it is 
just that a long time had passed before someone discovered that he knew something of 
relevance), have a vivid imagination, or he may be lying on purpose. In trial procedure, 
examination of witnesses helps contain these problems and ascertain the possible reliability 
issues.  
 
When the actual witness is not there to be examined, however, the problems go unchecked. 
Morgan sums these concerns up in his famous four “hearsay dangers”: misuse of language, 
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the lack of sincerity, defects in memory and defects in perception.276 In spite of his article 
having been written more than 60 years ago, this still seems to accurately sum up the 
instances where witness statements may fail.277 In its report278, the English Law 
Commission listed nine “justifications of the hearsay rule.” Most justifications are actually 
easily traced back to the four hearsay dangers Morgan was pointing out or refer to 
considerations that are not related to the accurate fact-finding objectives.  
 
The easiest way to mitigate the dangers is to shorten the chain of communication - 
eliminate all intermediaries and have the person who perceived the relevant information be 
present and testify live at trial. Wigmore explains this in possibly the plainest terms: there 
are two sides to the rule against hearsay – a requirement that the extrajudicial speaker be 
called to the stand to testify, and that a witness who is already on the stand should speak of 
his own personal knowledge.279 This eliminates possible distortions and data loss that 
would likely happen if the witness’s account of the events were to reach the fact-finder 
through some medium such as writing or another person. Authors also mention other 
reliability-enhancing devices such as the oath a witness would have to take, a face-to-face 
confrontation with the accused, and the process of cross-examination through which the 
testimony will be probed and its accuracy verified. Today most courts and scholars 
consider cross-examination rather than oath the most important reliability-ensuring 
instrument280 and the fading of memory over time its main problem.281 
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Related to the evidence rules dealing with hearsay is the right of confrontation and the 
principles of immediacy and orality. In a broader sense, they too are aimed at eliminating 
extra links in the chain of information and increasing the reliability of witness 
statements.282 However, these principles also have additional underlying rationale and 
broader application restricting the use of statements by anonymous witnesses or witnesses 
testifying through special arrangements, for example. And although in some jurisdictions 
confrontation rights work like a broader, more principled rule against hearsay, other 
jurisdictions claim adherence to the principles of orality, immediacy and confrontation but 
have no rule against admitting hearsay into evidence – the focus there is not so much on 
the source of the knowledge that the witness possesses but on the way it is relayed to the 
fact finder.283 The justification for the immediacy and orality principles as well as the 
confrontation rights does not spring so much from the need to ensure reliability of evidence 
as it has to do with the moral reasons. The focus of this thesis, as already explained, is on 
accurate fact-finding and thus the reliability of evidence. We will now proceed to take a 
closer look at how different jurisdictions have dealt with hearsay in their legislation.  
 
 
Main features of the regulation of hearsay evidence in the sample 
jurisdictions  
 
England and Wales 
 
England and Wales is the home of the rule excluding hearsay as we know it.284 The rule 
against hearsay did not develop until mid-18th century where court records quote judges 
saying things along the lines of “what you heard from another is not evidence. Is that 
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person in the courtroom?”285 Arguably driven by the introduction of defence counsel into 
criminal proceedings, this marked the advent of the rule excluding hearsay as an input 
control. Prior to that, historians agree, hearsay was routinely admitted with judges only 
occasionally commenting on its proper weight.286 From its inception onwards the courts 
developed a complicated set of exceptions to the general rule excluding hearsay.287 This in 
turn prompted calls for a radical overhaul and simplification of the law on hearsay 
evidence in criminal proceedings in England and Wales,288 and pressure mounted 
especially after the hearsay rule was practically abolished in civil proceedings in the Civil 
Evidence Act 1995.289  
 
A product of several years of consultations and a number of earlier failed attempts to fine-
tune the complicated maze of hearsay law, the CJA 2003 wiped the slate clean by 
abolishing the common law and enacting Chapter 2 of Part 1 containing a new set of rules 
on hearsay.290 
 
The central provision of the English hearsay law is section 114 of the CJA:  
 
114.  Admissibility of hearsay evidence 
(1)In criminal proceedings a statement not made in oral evidence in the proceedings is 
admissible as evidence of any matter stated if, but only if— 
(a)any provision of this Chapter or any other statutory provision makes it admissible, 
(b)any rule of law preserved by section 118 makes it admissible, 
(c)all parties to the proceedings agree to it being admissible, or 
(d)the court is satisfied that it is in the interests of justice for it to be admissible. 
 
This general provision is complemented by section 117 that sets forth an exception for 
business records and other documents, and section 118 that contains a list of specific 
exceptions to the hearsay rule. Section 116 enumerates the situations in which the 
admissibility of the out-of-court statement is based on the unavailability of the declarant – 
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unavailability itself is the sole condition for admissibility of the declarant’s hearsay 
statements and the statements need not satisfy any additional conditions. The declarant is 
deemed unavailable when he is dead, when his mental or physical illness prevents him 
from testifying, when he is located out of the country and his attendance is not practicable, 
or his location is unknown in spite of reasonable efforts. Where a person out of fear refuses 
to testify, his out-of-court statements may be read into evidence at the court’s discretion. 
The consideration animating section 116 is necessity as the choice is between admitting a 
hearsay statement (albeit perhaps less reliable than live testimony would be) or doing 
without the statement altogether. As Roberts and Zuckerman concede, the mere fact that 
the witness is unavailable, makes his statements no more reliable, therefore the admission 
of the statements by an absent declarant must be carefully considered in light of the fair 
trial requirements. One of these safeguards prescribed in Section 116 (1)(b) is that in all 
instances, the declarant must be satisfactorily identified.291 The other safeguard is enacted 
in Section 124 that permits introduction of additional evidence relevant to the credibility of 
the statement.   
 
The exception for documents in section 117 is also fairly broad, admitting most business- 
or occupation-related documents as long as they were compiled based on personal 
knowledge. Recognizing the especially precarious position of “criminal process 
documents,” the law includes an additional provision regarding the admissibility of those: 
the person who supplied the information contained in the statement found in the criminal 
process document and who had or may be reasonably supposed to have had personal 
knowledge of the matters must be unavailable within the meaning of Section 116 in order 
for the statement to be admissible.292 The rationale behind the documents exception is the 
notion that anyone keeping records as part of their profession or trade or official duties is 
likely to do so accurately – more so than in the occasional note in one’s diary or a similar 
private setting. This supplies the added reliability of statements found in the business-
related documents.293  
 
Section 118 has retained eight common law exceptions to the hearsay rule. Roberts and 
Zuckerman are not too keen on the English Parliament’s law making here:  
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“This rag-bag list of special pleading for particular kinds of hearsay is a relic of time, 
[…]when judges were prepared to invent new exceptions to the exclusionary rule almost 
whenever probative value and convenience might dictate.”294  
 
The exceptions are based on a variety of assumptions. The confidence in public records 
and registers seems reasonable and the admission of such documents saves a lot of time 
and money without generally jeopardizing the reliability of evidence. The exception for 
reputation as to character and the exception for reputation as to family tradition or history, 
however, are old common law relics based on the assumption that reputation is the product 
of the individual knowledge of many and therefore more reliable. The idea is that it is hard 
if not impossible to hide one’s character traits from the community. Similarly, reputation as 
to family tradition or history being the sum of the knowledge by many people has 
undergone sifting among the members of the community and its survival as the common 
reputation is testimony of its truth. Roberts and Zuckerman pull no punches when 
discussing these three exceptions that are in their words “useful restatements of common 
law” but otherwise simply archaic.295  
 
The res gestae exception covers a number of different kinds of statements – excited 
utterances, composite acts, statements describing physical sensations and those pertaining 
to mental states of the declarant. The rationale underlying the exception for excited 
utterances has been described in R v. Anderson296 as being based on the circumstances of 
making the statement being “so unusual or startling or dramatic as to dominate the 
thoughts of the victim so that the utterance was an instinctive reaction to that event thus 
giving no real opportunity for reasoned reflection”. The rationale for admitting the 
statements regarding physical sensations is quite similar – especially where the “statement” 
resembles an exclamation.297 Simply put, the res gestae exception is based on certain 
assumptions about human psychology and interaction (and we will take a closer look at 
them later).  
 
The law also preserved the exceptions for confessions and admissions by the defendant, the 
defendant’s agents or other persons who the defendant has authorized to speak for him. 
Probably the most important reason for admitting these statements is that a damaging 
statement coming from the defendant himself is less likely to be false than one purporting 
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to work in his favour. Admissions and confessions can sometimes also constitute res 
gestae. The CJA also preserves the exception for admitting co-conspirators’ statements. 
This had originally been developed by judges to make it easier to prosecute criminal 
conspiracies that are often clandestine and difficult to prove otherwise. While the 
underlying rationale and probative value of co-conspirator’s statements may be questioned, 
the exception itself has become firmly rooted.298 
 
As regards witnesses who do testify, Sections 119 and 120 permit the admission of their 
prior out-of-court statements for their substance as well as to attack the credibility of the 
witness. This effectively abolishes the dichotomy of purpose concept that is still found in 
the United States and will therefore be further explained in the next section. 
 
The relatively broad exceptions are topped off by a “catch-all” provision of Section 
114(1)(d) that is designed to give trial judges the legal authority to admit evidence that 
does not fall under any of the hearsay exceptions but conforms to the mostly reliability and 
necessity-related factors listed under Section 114(2). 
 
At one point, this “catch-all exception” almost wiped out the entire rest of the hearsay 
regulation: Lord Justice Hughes in the Court of Appeal case R v. Y299 insisted that Section 
114(1)(d) should be given its “ordinary natural meaning” irrespective of its drafting history 
– and there was nothing in the statutory language to suggest that Section 114(1)(d) was 
somehow subordinated to sub-paragraphs a, b, or c. What Hughes suggested was 
tantamount to leaving the rest of the framework of hearsay rules without effect as the 
courts could simply apply 114(1)(d) in all cases and not even bother with the rest of the 
analysis. The Court of Appeal did remark though that the provision should be cautiously 
applied lest the provision circumvent the regulation of Section 116. Subsequent appellate 
decisions have affirmed the “cautious application” holding.300 
 
There are three significant provisions that are meant to act as counterbalance to the 
generally liberal tenor of the hearsay rule: Section 124 provides for attacking and 
supporting the credibility of the hearsay statement, section 126 empowers the judge to 
exclude evidence subject to a separate balancing test “the case for excluding the statement, 
taking account of the danger that to admit it would result in undue waste of time, 
                                                
298
 See Keith Spencer, The Common Enterprise Exception to the Hearsay Rule, 11 Int'l J. Evidence & Proof 
106 (2007).  
299
 R v. Y, [2008] EWCA Crim 10. 
300
 See, for example, R. v. Horsnell, [2012] EWCA Crim 227. 
99 
substantially outweighs the case for admitting it, taking account of the value of the 
evidence”. Finally, Section 125 directs the judge to acquit the defendant or discharge the 
jury if the case against the defendant is based wholly or partly on hearsay, and “the 
evidence provided by the statement is so unconvincing that, considering its importance to 
the case against the defendant, his conviction of the offence would be unsafe”.  
 
The CJA 2003 hearsay law has been challenged on confrontation grounds301 a few times, 
most notably and quite recently in the twin cases of Al-Khawaja  and Tahery.302 The case 
of Al-Khawaja was an indecent assault case where one of the victims had made a statement 
to the police but later, before trial, committed suicide for unrelated reasons. At trial her 
statement was read to the jury because the trial judge found the statement vital for the 
prosecution’s case. The defence could cross-examine other witnesses in the case and the 
judge instructed the jury to bear in mind that the dead victim had not been cross-examined. 
The jury found the defendant guilty and the claim brought to the ECtHR was that Al-
Khawaja had been deprived of his confrontation rights under ECHR Article 6(3)(d). 
Tahery was found guilty of assault based primarily on the pretrial statement of a witness 
who had later not appeared at trial because he was too scared to do so. A similar 
confrontation clause violation claim was raised by the defendant. While the ECtHR has 
always maintained that admissibility of evidence is generally an issue for the national 
courts and national legislation,303 the court’s jurisprudence also emphasizes the need to 
avail witnesses against the accused to questioning by the defendant himself or his counsel 
at some point in the proceedings. The Al-Khawaja and Tahery cases presented the ECtHR 
with a situation where there had been no questioning by the defence, the witnesses were 
unavailable at the time of the trial and their prior statements were admitted with cautionary 
comments from the judge about the relative credibility of the un-cross-examined 
statements. 
 
Initially, the fourth chamber of the ECtHR held304 that Article 6 was always violated when 
hearsay evidence was the sole and decisive evidence against the defendant. Later, after the 
UK Supreme Court in R v. Horncastle305 had declined to follow the ECtHR’s holding in 
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Al-Khawaja, the case was referred to the Grand Chamber to be reconsidered. The Grand 
Chamber’s judgment306 was unsurprisingly ambiguous. The ECtHR affirmed the “sole or 
decisive” standard and forcefully defended it against the UK Supreme Court’s concerns 
that such a retrospective standard would be difficult to apply at trial level. The Court then 
explained that even if a conviction is solely based on hearsay statements by a declarant that 
had never been subjected to examination by the defence, the trial as a whole was not 
necessarily unfair as long as there was sufficiently substantiated necessity for the 
admission of the statement and there were sufficient counterbalancing measures in place, 
including strong procedural safeguards.307 Thus, the ECtHR concluded, in the case of Al-
Khawaja, admission of the dead victim’s statement was not a violation of the confrontation 
clause (the victim was dead, thus objectively unavailable). Tahery’s rights to confront 
witnesses against him, however, had been violated – mostly because the witness was 
objectively available and excusing him from attending the trial was a choice, not a 
necessity, especially since the fear was not a direct result of the defendant’s actions.308  
 
 
The United States 
 
The hearsay rule in the United States federal law is found in Title VIII of the Federal Rules 
of Evidence (FRE). Not unlike in England and Wales, the law on hearsay was first 
developed by judges on a case by case basis.309 The difference in history is that the United 
States inherited English common law at the point where the hearsay rule had already 
crystallized.310 Since then a major influence on the development of evidence law in the 
United States was John Henry Wigmore – possibly the most famous writer and influential 
legal scholar on evidence law in the world. His multi-tome treatise311 on evidence helped 
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make sense of evidence law and constituted a significant preparatory work for the several 
codifications of evidence law that culminated in the adoption of the FRE in 1975. The FRE 
were last edited in 2012 – then primarily to clarify and improve the language without 
making any changes in the substance. 
 
According to FRE 801(c), hearsay is a statement that the declarant has not made while 
testifying in the current trial or hearing and that is offered to prove the truth of the matter 
asserted. In general, under Rule 802, hearsay statements are inadmissible except when they 
fall under an exception. The exceptions are enumerated in rules 803 and 804, and Rule 807 
provides a so-called catch-all exception. According to Rule 801(a), a “statement” under the 
rules includes oral, written as well as non-verbal assertions. 
 
By definition, certain types of verbal communication are excluded from the operation of 
the hearsay rule as not being ‘assertions’, such as imperatives and interrogatories (although 
a question by form may in it have a premise that amounts to a statement – consider most 
leading questions, for example). Also excluded are “verbal acts” or words of independent 
legal significance such as those forming an oral contract – they are not assertions but 
events in their own right. Another group of statements that are not considered hearsay 
because they do not satisfy the definition are various statements that are not intended to 
prove the matter asserted but are offered for some other purpose such as proving the 
declarant’s state of mind, his memory, his literacy, or the fact that the declarant was still 
alive at the time of making the statement. This creates a dichotomy of purpose – a 
statement may be inadmissible to prove its own substance but admissible for some other 
purpose. Excluded from the hearsay category are also a declarant’s own prior inconsistent 
statements (and consistent statements for the purpose of refuting allegations of recent 
fabrications) and statements consisting of identification. Also excluded are statements that 
are being offered against the party and were made by the same party or its agents or 
coconspirators (the party admission rule). The rationale for admitting party admissions is 
rooted in the common law sentiment that the party should always be responsible for the 
truth of his own statements and those of his agents. As the Advisory Committee notes, the 
exclusion of the party admission from the operation of the hearsay rule is based on the 
theory of adversary system rather than some extra measure of trustworthiness.312 
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The exceptions to the hearsay rule are divided into two broad categories: those where the 
availability of the original declarant is immaterial (i.e. hearsay statements can be 
introduced even if the original declarant could be called to testify at trial) and those that 
only apply if the declarant is unavailable for the purposes of Rule 804(a).313 The principal 
rationale underlying the hearsay rule is that hearsay is unreliable and should thus be 
excluded from evidence. The statements that fall under an exception, however, are for 
some reason deemed reliable enough to warrant consideration.314 By framing the rule in 
terms of a general ban on hearsay and enumerated exceptions based on specific 
circumstances, the hearsay rule with its exceptions creates a minimum standard of 
reliability315 for admissible statements.  
 
The exceptions under Rule 803 are applicable regardless of whether the original declarant 
is available or not. In the necessity-reliability scale, therefore, these types of statements are 
deemed so reliable that they can be freely admitted even if the declarant could attend in 
person. Many of the exceptions have easily recognizable English counterparts. For 
example, Rules 803 (1) “Present sense impression” and 803(2) “Excited utterances” are the 
offspring of English res gestae doctrine, and rules 803 (19) thru 803(21) on the 
admissibility of reputation evidence can be traced directly back to the common law rules in 
their scope as well as the rationale. For the majority of the exceptions, the underlying 
rationale represents certain assumptions about cognitive processes. For example, present 
sense impressions are deemed more trustworthy because of the contemporaneity of the 
event and the statement made by the observing declarant; excited utterances are admitted 
based on the theory that the excitement stills the capacity of reflection and thus negates the 
possibility of fabrication; statements made for medical diagnosis and treatment (Rule 
803(4)) are considered more reliable because the declarant would presumably tell the truth 
in order to receive proper treatment and this is why only statements pertinent to the 
medical issues are admitted under this exception.316 As Mueller and Kirkpatrick explain, 
the “business records exception” found in Rule 803(6) rests in part on the necessity in the 
age of huge data masses that no individual could remember, and in part also on the notion 
that records kept for the business are more trustworthy because of the regularity and 
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routine involvement of record makers in the practice, and “in the commercial context, 
market pressure and individual responsibility for job performance also reduce the risk”.317  
 
Notice that the application of the exceptions to the law enforcement reports in criminal 
cases is limited.318 The exception under Rule 803(14) for statements in tombstones, family 
bibles, burial urns or the like is admittedly one of the most arcane and bizarre,319 and is 
based on the assumption that not only are these places significant for the family members, 
the inscriptions in them are also less likely to remain uncorrected if accessible to other 
family members, including those they may pertain to. In contrast to these, Rule 803(16) - 
the ancient documents exception - is justified by the Advisory Committee on historical 
grounds with reference to Wigmore and McCormick but no basis for the added 
trustworthiness is offered other than the age of the document. As Mueller and Kirkpatrick 
explain, the real reason for the exception is that of necessity – age does not make any 
document more credible or the person who once compiled it more reliable, however, the 
twenty years will have caused the witnesses to have forgotten much of what they may have 
once known, or to die or disappear. Thus the old document may simply be the best 
evidence available.320  
 
While Mueller and Kirkpatrick in their commentary clearly look at both added guarantees 
of trustworthiness as well as a measure of necessity321 as ideally coexistent justifications 
for any one of the hearsay exceptions under Rule 803, several exceptions, as we noted 
before, do not seem to spring so much from necessity in its strict sense but rather a measure 
of convenience. Similarly, some exceptions seem devoid of any added guarantees of 
trustworthiness, but are clearly the children of necessity (especially the variation of the 
ancient documents exception found in the FRE – other jurisdictions have made the 
admissibility of such documents contingent upon a finding that the document has 
previously generally been relied on).322 The exceptions under Rule 803 supposedly possess 
the kind of trustworthiness that warrants the admission of respective statements regardless 
of the availability of the original declarant. The Advisory Committee argues that the theory 
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is justified by many exceptions developed by the common law and that Rule 803 is to a 
large degree a compilation of these rules. Whether the rationale underlying the various 
exceptions are also justified today, is a matter for discussion that I will address later.  
Rule 804 provides an additional list of exceptions to the general rule against hearsay. These 
exceptions are applicable where the declarant is unavailable to testify. As the Advisory 
Committee notes, evidence admitted under Rule 804 is inferior to live testimony by a 
witness but nevertheless preferred to complete loss of evidence when the witness is 
unavailable. Thus, while the trustworthiness factor is admittedly lower, the necessity factor 
justifies admitting the statements even in the face of lower trustworthiness. One of the most 
notable exceptions is that of Former Testimony.323 The trustworthiness of this kind of 
statement is similar to trial testimony. In fact, statements admitted under this exception are 
akin to trial statements in every respect except that the trier of fact will be deprived of the 
opportunity to observe the demeanour of the witness. The Advisory Committee notes that 
in terms of reliability, the former testimony by a witness appears to be the strongest of 
hearsay statements, however, it is precisely the lack of demeanour evidence that robs 
former testimony of the depth and meaning derived from the oath and cross-examination. 
The exceptions under Rule 803, the Advisory Committee argues, cover statements the 
significance of which does not depend that much on the possibility to observe the 
declarant’s demeanour while making the statement – an argument that is loaded with 
several very broad and quite possibly misguided assumptions. Rule 804(b)(2) carves out an 
exception for the dying declarations. This exception is based on a traditional common law 
exception which in turn apparently proceeded on the assumption that “one preparing for 
meeting his creator is unlikely to lie”.324 The Advisory Committee concedes that the 
original religious justification may have lost its conviction for some persons over the years 
but offers no other justification besides remarking that “it can scarcely be doubted that 
powerful psychological pressures are present”. The “forfeiture by wrongdoing exception” 
in Rule 804(b)(6)325 is one of the more recent additions to the rules and is not based on the 
added trustworthiness theory but was enacted as a prophylactic rule to deter “abhorrent 
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behaviour that strikes at the heart of the system of justice itself.”326 The Advisory 
Committee remarks that although the standards for establishing the forfeiture by the party 
have been somewhat different across circuits, a similar equitable solution had been adopted 
in most circuits. Mueller and Kirkpatrick point out that the forfeiture by wrongdoing 
exception would also survive a confrontation clause challenge based on the reasoning that 
confrontation rights are extinguished by the wrongdoing.327 
Added to the “catalogue” exceptions is the “catch-all” exception set forth in Rule 807 that 
purports to make admissible all statements that are not covered by a hearsay exception but 
possess equivalent guarantees of trustworthiness, are offered as evidence of material fact, 
are the best available evidence on the issue and their admission is in the interests of justice.  
As I mentioned above, in addition to the rules of evidence there is another player in the 
scheme to be taken into account: the Confrontation Clause in the Sixth Amendment.328 
While the Federal Rules are applicable in civil and criminal cases, the Sixth Amendment 
provides fundamental rights for those on trial for a criminal offence. The scope and 
application of the confrontation clause has been subject to development by the Supreme 
Court with the most recent major development coming in the landmark cases of Crawford 
v. Washington329 and Davis v. Washington.330 Before Crawford and Davis,  the controlling 
precedent was Ohio v. Roberts331 where the Supreme Court had held that an out-court 
statement by an unavailable witness can constitutionally be admissible against a criminal 
defendant even without cross-examination as long as the statement falls under a firmly 
rooted hearsay exception or bears particularized guarantees of trustworthiness. In 
Crawford, the court noted that Roberts produces unpredictable results and allows the 
admission of “core testimonial statements” without there ever having been cross-
examination. This, the Court reasoned, made the Roberts rule unacceptable. The court in 
Crawford held that the confrontation clause guarantees the right to cross-examine those 
making testimonial statements against the defendant, i.e. instead of being a minimum 
standard of  reliability of the statement, the confrontation clause is a procedural guarantee 
that the reliability of the statement is tested in a particular way – through cross-
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examination.332 While the court in Crawford did not clearly draw the line between 
testimonial and non-testimonial statements, it ruled that only testimonial statements are 
subject to the confrontation clause while non-testimonial statements are governed by the 
rules of evidence. In Davis v. Washington, the Supreme Court considered the question that 
had been left undecided in Crawford: what constitutes a testimonial statement. At issue 
was a recording of a 9-1-1 call where the caller had reported an assault by her former 
boyfriend who had just left the scene. In Davis, the court held that a statement was 
testimonial when the primary purpose of making it was to assist in an investigation or to 
prove past events rather than obtain help in an ongoing emergency. This holding was 
reaffirmed and further explained in Bryant v. Michigan.333 The Court emphasized that the 
inquiry into the primary purpose of the statement was an objective one and that an 
“ongoing emergency” would negate the possibility that the primary purpose of the 
interrogation and the statement is to assist in investigation or prosecution. This because an 
ongoing emergency is like the startling event in an excited utterance situation that would 
preclude fabrication.334 The latter discussion seems very much like the Court is composing 
a separate catalogue of  “confrontation exceptions”  that would function much like yet 
another filter of admissibility before the hearsay rule. Judging from the reasoning of the 
court in Bryant, it also seems that the filter will be based on a theory that is a mix of the 
supporting rationale of the excited utterance exception and the statements for the purposes 
of medical diagnosis and treatment exception. In its discussion of confrontation rights, the 
court has been focusing on statements made to law enforcement officials – the police. 
Authors have opined that while certainly causing a fair amount of confusion, the Crawford 
line of cases have not strengthened335 but have actually weakened the protection afforded 
to criminal defendants by  the confrontation clause by exempting non-testimonial 
statements from its ambit.336 
                                                
332
 “Admitting statements deemed reliable by a judge is fundamentally at odds with the right of  
confrontation. To be sure, the Clause’s ultimate goal is to ensure reliability of evidence, but it is a procedural 
rather than a substantive guarantee. It commands, not that evidence be reliable, but that reliability be assessed 
in a particular manner: by testing in the crucible of cross-examination.” 541 U.S.36, 61 (2004). For an 
analysis of the relationship between the hearsay rule and the confrontation clause after Crawford, see David 
A. Sklansky, Hearsay’s Last Hurrah, 2009 Sup. Ct. Rev. 1. 
333
 131 S.Ct. 1143 (2011). 
334
 Id., at 1161. 
335
 Brooks Holland, Crawford and Beyond: How Far Have We Traveled from Roberts after All?, 20 J.L. & 
Pol'y 517 (2011-2012). 
336
 See, for example, Fred O. Smith, Crawford's Aftershock: Aligning the Regulation of Nontestimonial 
Hearsay with the History and Purposes of the Confrontation Clause, 60 Stan. L. Rev. 1497 (2008) or Liza 
Karsai, The Horse-Stealer's Trial Returns: How Crawford's Testimonial - Nontestimonial Dichotomy Harms 
the Right to Confront Witnesses, the Presumption of Innocence, and the beyond a Reasonable Doubt 
Standard, 62 Drake L. Rev. 129 (2013). 
107 
Mechanically, the hearsay rule purports to operate as an input control barring the 
presenting of hearsay statements. In practice, however, there are several instances where 
the rule cannot effectively function as an input control because the fact-finder will be 
aware of the statement before its admissibility is contested by one of the parties in the form 
of an objection. If the objection is sustained, the jury will be instructed to disregard and the 
judge in a bench trial will be expected to disregard. Moreover, unlike English hearsay 
rules, the American rules still have the dichotomy of purpose concept that works as a 
reasoning control directing the fact-finder to consider the statement for one purpose but 
disregard it for the other.  
 
Estonia 
When Estonia regained its independence in 1991, the Soviet Code of Criminal Procedure 
was not immediately abolished but underwent gradual changes over the years in order to 
accommodate the new challenges of a different kind of society and legal order. In 1996, 
Estonia ratified the European Convention of Human Rights. When Estonia adopted its new 
Code of Criminal Procedure (kriminaalmenetluse seadustik, KrMS) in 2004, one of the 
main objectives behind the reform was to move away from the Soviet model so the new 
code was the product of a pendulum effect of sorts and was fashioned after Italy’s code of 
criminal procedure. The next seven years developed a certain consensus that the Italian 
model, while an intriguing mix, has a number of deficiencies, not only in terms of the rules 
of evidence but also in terms of procedural design: the two were not mutually supportive. 
The latest major overhaul project of 2011 was openly motivated by the goal of 
incorporating elements of Anglo-American procedure to create a more effective and 
workable model for Estonia.337 The current Estonian version of the hearsay rule is a 
product of political compromise and also a compromise with the principle of free 
evaluation of proof that the code of criminal procedure still currently includes. The rule as 
it stands in KrMS § 66 (21) states that testimony by a witness is inadmissible if the witness 
has learned the substance of his statement from another person. This general rule is 
accompanied by four exceptions. Firstly, second-hand testimony will be admissible if the 
declarant with personal knowledge is not available to testify due to death, refusal to testify, 
serious illness, inability of being located despite reasonable efforts, or other reasons that 
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would make procuring his attendance unreasonably costly or otherwise impracticable 
beyond reasonable measures taken by the proponent. Secondly, the statement is admissible 
if the declarant had made the statement while perceiving a startling event or immediately 
thereafter while still feeling startled. The third exception covers statements that were 
clearly against the declarant’s interests such as an admission of criminal offence. The 
fourth exception is the coconspirators’ exception – a statement made by the out-of-court 
declarant regarding a jointly committed crime is also admissible. Since the provision 
expressly applies to only witness testimony that is not based on personal knowledge, this 
rule does not exclude writings regardless of what the writings are based on. The rationale 
underlying the exceptions is normally ascertainable through the Explanatory Letters338 
accompanying the acts submitted to the Parliament for consideration. Curiously enough, 
while the first and broadest (and also the oldest) exception was motivated by the 
confrontation requirement in the ECHR and the spontaneous declarations exception is, 
according to the Explanatory Letter, brought on board as an English loan,339 the other two 
have appeared in the text of the bills in the course of the legislative process without any 
official explanation. The bill was withdrawn after it met resistance in the parliament and 
redrafted – which is when KrMS § 66 was also amended – but the Explanatory Letter 
accompanying the modified bill makes no mention of these added hearsay exceptions. 
Nevertheless, the Explanatory Letters’ abundant references to English and American 
evidence law leave a clear breadcrumb trail that allow the coconspirator’s exception and 
declarations against interest exception to be traced back to their respective counterparts.340 
This also lends credence to the conclusion that adopting the exceptions, the Estonian 
legislation also adopted the underlying reasoning.  
 
Written documents under Estonian evidence law fall into four broad categories: written 
statements made to and interview transcripts prepared by the police in the course of 
investigation, reports made by the police in the course of pretrial investigation, deposition 
testimony, and all other written documents. Reports prepared by the police are admissible 
under a special provision of KrMS § 63(1). This is based on the notion that the police 
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officer is not the source of evidence but merely a recorder of evidence and the report thus 
prepared is not derivative of the officer’s perception but rather akin to an objective 
reflection of reality.341 The Supreme Court has repeatedly affirmed that the investigative 
officers are normally not allowed to testify as witnesses but instead must prepare properly 
formatted written reports of their observations.342 Written statements made to the police by 
witnesses during a pretrial investigation are admissible for attacking the credibility of the 
witness but not for substantive purposes as KrMS § 289 is interpreted by the Estonian 
Supreme Court.343 Only in circumstances where the witness is unavailable due to death, 
serious illness or refusal to testify can the statement to the police be offered as substantive 
evidence, and even then the statement would have to pass a special balancing test set forth 
in KrMS § 291 (3). The rationale here is that in these instances the court is able to at least 
verify that the witness really existed or still exists.344 Deposition testimony can be 
introduced for substantive purposes as well as for impeachment regardless of whether the 
witness is available or not. The status of all other documents that contain someone’s 
statements is unclear. While KrMS § 296 seems to place them in the same category as 
statements made to the police in the course of pretrial investigation, the courts rarely 
exclude written documents even though most of them contain someone’s out-of-court 
statements. This may be attributable to the relative novelty of the hearsay rule or a sense 
that written evidence is inherently more reliable. The hearsay rule in Estonia does not even 
purport to be an input control as the rule is directed to the judge deciding the case. This 
does not mean that objections against hearsay statements cannot be raised at trial, however, 
their practical significance is that of avoiding wasting of court’s time rather than shielding 
the fact-finder against impermissible evidence. 
 
Estonia has ratified the European Convention of Human Rights with its Article 6(3)(d) 
stating that in criminal prosecutions, the accused must have the right “to examine or have 
examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses 
on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him.” The hearsay rule and its 
exceptions were fashioned with an eye on the case law of the European Court of Human 
Rights and the Estonian version of the hearsay rule is viewed as an extension of the 
ECHR’s confrontation right.345 Whether the broad definition of unavailability and thus the 
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wide scope of the exception would actually satisfy the ECHR confrontation clause 
requirements, is a question not easily answered in the abstract. 
 
 
Chile 
Chilean law does not have a rule excluding hearsay but it does include some fairly specific 
provisions regarding evaluation of witness testimony as well as statements found in written 
documents.  
 
CPPC Article 309 provides that in criminal procedure, there are no incompetent witnesses 
but the parties may nevertheless question witnesses regarding their credibility and their 
affinity to the parties that may affect their impartiality, and witnesses must state whether 
the basis of their testimony is their personal perception, deduction or something learned 
from another.346 This provision in combination with the ones declaring freedom of proof 
indicates that Chile, while aware of the hearsay issue, has opted for a different type of input 
control – a legal obligation to present information detailing the foundation of the statement 
to be introduced. CPPC Article 331 specifies the situations when prior statements of a 
witness can be introduced at trial. This provision expressly applies to written statements 
and police reports and operates to admit the prior written statements in four situations: 
where the declarant has become unavailable, when the parties agree to the admission of the 
statement, when the declarant has failed to appear to court due to the actions attributable to 
the defendant, and where the statement was made before a preliminary investigation judge 
by a noncompliant (i.e. has left the country or is otherwise evading prosecution) 
codefendant. Article 334 expressly prohibits admission of police reports but Article 333 
makes no mention or special provision for reception of documents leading to the 
conclusion that while transcribed pretrial witness statements are subject to special 
provisions, other documents are not and statements contained therein are admitted without 
hearsay analysis. The Chilean approach is a mix of input controls and reasoning controls. 
Since trials in Chile are by a unitary tribunal, use of exclusionary rules may seem 
impracticable, however, with the pretrial conference held before the juez de garantia, 
exclusionary input controls are actually feasible. The specific provisions excluding law 
enforcement reports as well as prior official witness statements can be attributed to the 
pendulum effect: CPPC, as I noted before, is a decidedly sharp move away from its 
inquisitorial predecessor where official pretrial statements were the main evidence. 
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Russia 
 
The УПК 347 does not include a hearsay rule and unlike that of Chile, it does not even 
imply awareness of the doctrine. Article 240 sets forth that “[i]n court proceedings all 
evidence in the criminal matter must be examined by the court directly unless otherwise 
stated elsewhere in the code. The court will hear the testimony of the defendant, the victim, 
witnesses and experts; inspect physical evidence, disclose police reports and other 
documents and conduct other activities in examining the evidence.” Article 240 (2) further 
stipulates that disclosing the testimony by witnesses given in the pretrial proceedings is 
allowed only in cases expressly provided by law. The reading into record of pretrial 
testimony is provided for in articles 276 and 281. According to Article  281, witness 
statements can be read into record if the witness has failed to appear and the parties agree 
to the disclosure of the pretrial interview report. Without the agreement of the parties, 
pretrial statements may be read into record in situations enumerated in the law: if the 
witness has since died, become severely ill or refuses to testify, or a force majeure prevents 
the witness from attending the trial. Upon the motion of a party, the court may also allow 
pretrial statements of a witness whose trial testimony is in substantial contradiction with 
their pretrial statements. There is no mention anywhere in the code of the dichotomy of 
purpose and it must thus be surmised that an inconsistent pretrial statement is admissible 
for its substance as well.  
 
  
Germany 
 
StPO § 244(2) provides that the trial court must ex officio extend its inquiry to all facts and 
evidence that are relevant for the judgment. As Lemke and his colleagues explain, this 
means that the court must seek out the best available evidence. As regards witnesses, this 
obligation means that the court must examine eyewitnesses whose testimony can directly 
establish whether a fact relevant to the charge exists or not.348 Nevertheless, the 
commentators continue, examination of the eyewitness does not rule out the concurrent use 
of police interview reports or documents, especially when the witness is unreliable 
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(unzuverlässig). German law does not preclude the use of hearsay witnesses (Zeugen vom 
Hörensagen) but only if witnesses who possess firsthand knowledge of the matter are for 
some reason unavailable. An example of this would be undercover police officers or 
confidential informants whose cover would be blown and security possibly threatened if 
they were to testify in open court. Instead, courts accept the testimony by the agent 
handlers and where appropriate, Section 247a allows testimony via CCTV.349 Whenever 
second-hand derivative evidence is used, it is to be carefully evaluated.350 
 
German courts also have at their disposal all police reports, including pretrial witness 
interview transcripts and other written documents that have been collected in the dossier. 
Section 250 nevertheless as a rule prohibits the use of written statements in lieu of live 
testimony by a witness with personal knowledge. This rule does not preclude the use of 
such written materials to jog the witness’s memory, complement the trial testimony or for 
proving not the content of the document but its existence.351 The reason for the general rule 
barring the reading out of written pretrial statements, as the commentators explain, is that 
examination of the witness at trial provides for enhanced reliability through questioning by 
the parties352 and a threat of criminal punishment for giving a false statement. This is an 
expression of the principle of immediacy (Unmittelbarkeitsprinzip).353  
 
In general, there are two kinds of exceptions to this rule. Some documents, much like the 
verbal acts and words of independent legal significance, do not contain a “statement of 
one’s perception” and thus are not covered. While pretrial interview transcripts are 
generally not permitted in lieu of live testimony, transcripts of judicial examination are 
permitted when the declarant is unavailable or when the parties agree.354 Similarly, 
transcripts of other pretrial interviews are permitted to take the place of a live examination 
when the parties agree or when the person examined has since died.  
 
German law is certainly aware of the hearsay problem and has a complex set of rules 
designed to mitigate the hearsay dangers. The text of German procedural code is fairly 
laconic and many of the nuances described above are of judicial or scholarly creation.  
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Some general conclusions and observations 
 
The examination of the study jurisdictions allows for some generalizations to be made but 
also raises some questions. 
 
The issue of secondhand statements is at least at a theoretical level known in all sample 
jurisdictions. In very broad terms, there seem to be two ways of dealing with them: either 
their secondhand nature is considered as a factor that undercuts reliability or it is taken to 
influence the weight of the statement. Where hearsay is a matter pertaining only to the 
weight of the evidence, no exclusionary input controls are imposed and the fact-finder is 
free to evaluate hearsay statements together with any other evidence in the case.  
Conversely, where hearsay is considered less reliable than firsthand accounts, there is a 
variety of controls, including exclusionary and inclusionary input controls as well as 
reasoning controls. Additionally, some hearsay may be covered by constitutional 
confrontation clauses and even where not subject to input controls derived narrowly from 
the operation of the hearsay rule itself, may nevertheless incur control measures that are 
imposed in order to implement constitutional provisions. We will, however, not get into the 
specifics of the constitutional right to confrontation here and must therefore keep the 
hearsay rule and confrontation clause separated.   
 
The United States is a good example of a jurisdiction that considers hearsay evidence of 
lower reliability and imposes both input and reasoning controls upon hearsay evidence. 
England and Wales looks more liberal at first sight but their approach is not fundamentally 
different in spite of the wide inclusionary discretion possessed by the trial judge. At the 
other end of the spectrum we find Russia and Germany that have no special provisions for 
hearsay evidence. As regards the types of controls used, the law purports to have input 
controls in place in Estonia,355 the United States and England and Wales, however, all three 
jurisdictions employ unitary tribunals in at least some cases, which makes actual exclusion 
virtually impossible. Similarly, even in jury trials hearsay statements may appear suddenly 
in the midst of other testimony and then the exclusionary input control would normally 
turn into a reasoning control taking the shape of an instruction to disregard. The United 
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States and Estonia in also use reasoning controls to enforce the dichotomy of purpose 
regulation.  
 
Whereas the earlier quoted general hearsay definition encompasses oral and written 
hearsay, the definition in our sample jurisdictions that have one may be different. The 
approach of the United States and England and Wales follows the classical all-inclusive 
definition and includes secondhand oral as well as written statements. Still, statements 
contained in written documents are often subject to different treatment such as the 
exceptions for business records or public records, for example. Estonia stands out from the 
lineup for its treatment of written hearsay statements. Whereas oral hearsay is normally 
filtered out, written hearsay, including most police reports, is freely admitted without even 
raising the issue of hearsay dangers. In contrast, Chile has no hearsay rule but police 
reports are specifically subject to an exclusionary input control. The German take on 
“documentary evidence” is also somewhat restrictive: witnesses must be examined orally 
in court and their written accounts will generally not suffice.356 This, of course, does not 
mean that police reports or other documents are not admitted even though they, too, 
actually contain statements by their authors about their observations.  
 
One might expect the choice of controls to be related to the fact-finder profile as it has 
been posited quite a few times that the hearsay rule is the child of the jury system.357 The 
survey of jurisdictions does not support this assumption – while England, the United States 
and Russia all have juries, Russia does not have a hearsay rule. At the same time, Estonia 
does not use juries has adopted a legal framework where hearsay statements are not left to 
the fact-finder for free evaluation but are excluded unless they conform to specified 
criteria. Exclusionary input controls there, however, are not feasible and turn into 
reasoning controls, the feasibility of which is a matter for empirical inquiry not unlike the 
deliberate disregarding of prior convictions we looked at in the previous chapter. 
 
One might also expect that the hearsay rule is related to the division of procedural initiative 
between the court and the parties. Historically, the increasing role of the parties has 
sometimes been blamed for emergence of the hearsay rule.358 Here too, there seems to be 
no clear divide. Germany, while putting the procedural initiative on the judge, has no 
hearsay rule. Yet neither do Russia or Chile where the parties are in charge of presenting 
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evidence. Recent developments are also interesting – England has moved towards a more 
discretionary approach and abolished the dichotomy of purpose,359 federal evidence law in 
the United States has been somewhat stirred up by the confrontation clause 
jurisprudence,360 and Estonia has tightened the screws and enacted rules to curb judicial 
discretion. If anything, this indicates the convergence of the different systems in terms of 
their treatment of hearsay evidence: those traditionally very relaxed have become 
somewhat stricter; those traditionally having strict rules excluding hearsay have relaxed 
their standards.361 
 
Even in jurisdictions that do not have a rule excluding “derivative testimony” or “hearsay”, 
there is often a rule requiring that witnesses be produced at trial for questioning. Examples 
of this include Russia and Germany. The effect of this regulation may not be very different 
from a straight hearsay rule in many cases – witnesses will have to appear at trial and 
testify and their personal appearance cannot be substituted by reading their pretrial 
statements. The orality and immediacy rule, however, does not necessarily require that the 
testimony be based on the personal perception of the witness and while it does bar some 
forms of written hearsay such as statements made to the police or notarized affidavits, it 
does not prevent secondhand live testimony. Furthermore, the orality and immediacy rule 
may be circumscribed by exceptions based on procedural economy. For example, in 
Germany, StPO § 251 allows for reading out pretrial deposition testimony of a witness if 
the personal attendance of the witness is too costly as compared to the value of his 
testimony. Additionally, when the defendant is represented by counsel and all parties 
agree, pretrial statements of a witness given at a police interview may also be substituted 
for live testimony. 
 
This being said, the Estonian example illustrates that even where both hearsay rule and the 
orality and immediacy requirements are in place and the confrontation clause of the ECHR 
applies, written out-of-court statements may nevertheless be admitted without any 
difficulty under the heading of “documentary evidence” – a class of evidence defined 
through its form rather than its substance or creation process. Whereas certain documents 
(such as business records)  enjoy special status in the United States or in England and 
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Wales and can be presented in lieu of live testimony, Estonia, Russia and Germany all 
admit documents as if they were somehow separate and independent of their creators. 
 
As already briefly mentioned, the rule about producing witnesses for trial is often 
augmented (or necessitated) by some constitutional provision or a provision in some 
international treaty guaranteeing a right to confront witnesses against oneself. While the 
United States Constitution, for example, is interpreted to guarantee a face-to-face 
confrontation with the prosecution’s witnesses,362 the right to confrontation under the 
ECHR is interpreted only to guarantee a right to question the prosecution witnesses at 
some point during criminal proceedings363 (and even there the ECtHR, if driven into a 
corner, will balk and be ready to approve the proceedings as fair in spite of  no 
confrontation with the main prosecution witness at any stage).364 This being the minimum 
standard, individual member states may well still require a face-to-face encounter. The 
confrontation rights and the hearsay rule may come from different sources and be framed 
in different terms but they nevertheless often accomplish the same outcome – questioning a 
witness at trial (or before the trial if procedure allows). The confrontation right could also 
render inadmissible writings and other media that contain out-of-court statements offered 
into evidence in cases when the hearsay rule does not extend to derivative statements not 
offered through a live witness.365 The curious question still not answered in spite of the 
survey of different jurisdictions is this: if all jurisdictions recognize the superiority of live 
in-court direct testimony by eyewitness, why do some attempt to exclude the inferior 
evidence altogether but others seem content admitting it? While the reasons may have to do 
with historical tradition, we will next examine what would be the better way of handling 
the issue from the accuracy of fact-finding viewpoint. 
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The psychology of evaluating hearsay evidence 
Is hearsay a weight or reliability problem? 
 
The main argument justifying the rule excluding hearsay goes like this: fact-finders (and 
juries in particular) are unable to adequately appreciate the limitations of hearsay evidence 
and tend to overvalue it. Because hearsay is inherently and objectively unreliable, rules of 
evidence must impose exclusionary input controls to keep such dangerous information 
from the fact-finders, or must impose reasoning controls in order to prohibit any reliance 
on this unreliable evidence.366 Hearsay problem may also be viewed as one of weight 
rather than reliability and so the alternative position is that hearsay might be less weighty 
than firsthand testimony but it nevertheless has probative value and its precise weight in a 
given case is for the fact-finder to assess. The latter notion also reflects the doctrine in 
some jurisdictions where asking the weight vs. reliability question may make little sense 
(such as Estonia until recently or Germany).  There, the term ‘reliability’ seems to not even 
exist outside scholarly writing, or mean anything other than believability or the weight of 
the evidence. There is also some confusion as to what reliability means even where the 
term is used.367  
 
Lumping weight, credibility and reliability together as is done in some jurisdictions, creates 
an undesirable ambiguity, especially if decisions about admissibility of evidence are to be 
made separately from the decisions regarding the ultimate findings of fact (the evaluation 
of evidence in its stricter sense). I will therefore adopt the definition of reliability used by 
the United States Supreme Court in Dutton v. Evans.368 While the court in Dutton never 
expressly stated what reliability is, it did explain how sufficient reliability for admission 
should be determined. The court in Evans looked at four different factors which were, not 
at all surprisingly, the opportunity of the declarant to observe and perceive, the possibility 
of misrepresentation, the possibility of faulty memory, and the substance of the statement. 
Thus reliability can be defined as a degree of certainty that the statement accurately 
conveys the events or circumstances it pertains to. Defined this way, reliability can be used 
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as a criterion for an input control measure. If reliability were to be defined through the 
statement’s subjective believability, weight, or through the degree of corroboration by 
other evidence, it would be of no use in input controls.369  
 
Our inquiry here is not as much concerned with the labels but their implications and the 
real question is – are fact-finders able to adequately evaluate hearsay statements or should 
the rules of evidence impose either reasoning controls or input controls in order to enhance 
the accuracy of fact-finding? Paul Milich is right when he argues that fashioning a rule on 
hearsay that is conducive to accurate fact-finding must take fact-finders’ cognitive abilities 
into account.370 
 
 
How do juries deal with hearsay? 
 
Unlike eyewitness (identification) testimony and even propensity evidence, hearsay and its 
effect on the fact-finding process has not been subject to many studies.  
 
Probably the first371 published study devoted to exploring the effects of hearsay statements 
on jurors was the study conducted by Landsman and Rakos in 1991.372 The study involved 
147 student subjects and a hypothetical case file of a criminal case. There were twelve 
different combinations of hearsay of various strength and other evidence of various 
strength levels. Each of the subjects was assigned to one of the 12 conditions. Upon 
reading the hypothetical trial transcript, they were each asked to complete three 
questionnaires: the trial decision questionnaire (asking for their verdict and an evaluation 
of their confidence in the verdict), the trial reaction questionnaire (asking to assess the 
defendant’s character, the importance of the different pieces of evidence and five criteria 
pertaining to the integrity of the trial procedure) and a questionnaire on sources of personal 
judgment that sought to explore what kind of information and derived from what sources 
the subjects would normally base their decisions on. The analysis of the data indicated that 
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the hearsay manipulation had no influence on the outcome of the case and that the verdict 
was based on the strength of the evidence (77 per cent conviction rate when evidence was 
strong versus 48 per cent when evidence was weak). The study also showed that those 
jurors who in their everyday interactions would rely on hearsay, viewed hearsay evidence 
as more important than those who normally would not rely on it in their everyday dealings. 
However, even strong hearsay (where the statement was that of an eyewitness-declarant 
whose credibility had been bolstered by the fact that he subsequently became a police 
officer373) failed to influence the verdict in the face of other evidence in the case being 
weak. Landsman and Rakos offer two explanations: either the jurors evaluate evidence in 
its totality without assessing the individual parts specifically or they really acknowledge 
that hearsay is a weaker form of evidence and accord less weight to it. The latter 
assumption is supported by the answers to the sources of information questionnaire where 
the mock jurors consistently held personal interaction to be more important than hearsay.  
 
Landsman and Rakos’s study leaves a lot of questions unanswered and their research 
design is rudimentary at best, warranting all the criticism mock jury research usually 
attracts – after all, the study involved only college students and there was not a single 
attempt to liken the setting of receiving the information to an actual criminal trial. 
Landsman and Rakos also recognize that the study and their inferences are “suggestive at 
best” and that more research in the area is needed before making any conclusions.374 In 
fact, their essay devotes an entire chapter on suggestions for follow-up research and 
improvements in research design. 
 
The next year saw the publication of some other studies exploring the impact of hearsay 
statements and their impact in comparison to live testimony. The study by Kovera, Park 
and Penrod375 used a more elaborate research design involving a set of videotaped 
interviews that had been staged for the purposes of the study. The interviews related to a 
particular scene in a motion picture that the students playing witnesses in the interviews 
had either watched themselves or been told about by other students who had viewed the 
movie. Some “witnesses” were interviewed just a day after they had learned the 
information, others were interviewed after a week had passed. This created a number of 
statements with differing degrees of closeness to the events being related. The study 
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indicated that not only were the statements that were closer in time to the events more 
accurate, they were also perceived as more accurate by the mock jurors and this both for 
eyewitnesses and hearsay witnesses. In terms of accuracy and quality, the mock jurors 
(undergraduate students again) rated direct eyewitness testimony higher than hearsay 
testimony. Juror ratings of witness character, usefulness and the sufficiency of evidence the 
witness provided were also higher for eyewitnesses.376 The authors note that the study 
refutes an earlier concern that exposure of jurors to hearsay testimony of any quality may 
cause the jurors to doubt the legitimacy of the trial process in general377 – the mere 
introduction of hearsay evidence did not have any such effect.  
 
The study also showed that witness testimony is of higher quality the closer in time the 
witness is called to testify, and that the higher quality of an eyewitness account is also 
reflected in the quality of the hearsay testimony relating this original declarant’s statement 
to the fact-finder. This link can hardly be described as ground-breaking or surprising: that 
passing of time causes memories to fade is a well known fact of life that virtually everyone 
has experienced. What is more important about this incidental by-product is that it allows 
us to say something about the actual accuracy of the testimony as opposed to just settling 
for the assumption that hearsay is an inferior type of evidence. Roger Park has repeatedly 
criticized other studies for neglecting what he considers to be the main issue in hearsay 
research – whether hearsay helps or hurts the accuracy of fact finding.378 To answer this 
question, he posits, the research design must not only replicate the trial process as closely 
as possible but should also be based on actual events and measure the accuracy of the 
verdicts.379 Park’s point about the need to achieve greater ecological validity is dead-on: 
opening and closing statements, the judge’s instructions and most significantly, cross-
examination will hopefully have an effect on the outcome of the trial (if not, why have 
them?). On the other hand, introducing all these factors into the research design makes it 
that much more difficult to control for them and identifying the precise cause of effects 
observed will become more difficult. It is also hard to disagree with the argument that 
cross-examination has potentially a very profound influence on the impact of witness 
testimony, whether that of an eyewitness or a hearsay witness. The problem, however, 
remains: the research design would have to control for the tradecraft of the cross-
examining attorney (and quite possibly the same issue is present with the direct 
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examination – it does not appear that the hearsay studies have controlled for different 
examination techniques). Park quite astutely remarks that cross-examination of an 
eyewitness would be different from that of a hearsay witness as the foundation of their 
testimony is different and also recognizes the near-unfeasibility of the type of research he 
would be satisfied with.380 
 
In 1992, Miene, Park and Borgida published a study on the impact of hearsay evidence.381 
In this study the researchers had used a videotaped trial based on real events that had been 
staged for the purposes of conducting this experiment (a purported theft observed by some 
people later used as eyewitnesses and then related to others who would later become 
hearsay witnesses). The study involved four different sets of evidence: circumstantial only, 
circumstantial evidence with hearsay, circumstantial evidence with eyewitness testimony 
and circumstantial evidence with both hearsay and eyewitness testimony.  The 
undergraduate mock jurors were shown a videotaped trial and asked to reach a verdict as 
well as provide other assessments. The circumstantial evidence only condition produced a 
36 per cent conviction rate. Where hearsay testimony was added to the circumstantial 
evidence, the conviction rate went up by four per cent. Coupling circumstantial evidence 
with eyewitness testimony yielded a conviction rate of 62 per cent but having the jurors 
view all available evidence only rendered a conviction rate of 55 per cent. As the 
researchers conclude, hearsay evidence did not significantly affect the mock juror 
verdicts.382 Also interesting is what the study revealed about the reasoning process of the 
jurors. Instead of the expected “discounting” of hearsay after acknowledging it, most jurors 
did not even mention the hearsay testimony as an influencing factor in their decision 
making process. Instead, the universally top-ranked piece of evidence was the statement by 
defendant’s landlord who testified that he found the stolen computer in defendant’s 
apartment. Where jurors were exposed to eyewitness testimony, in the majority of cases it 
was ranked second in terms of comparative importance. In the hearsay group, 75 per cent 
of those who voted for a guilty verdict regarded the lack of eyewitness testimony as the 
most important evidence supporting a finding of not guilty. In the eyewitness group, the 
poor description of the defendant turned out to be the most important factor in favour of the 
defence. The study also tentatively concluded that the jurors discounted hearsay 
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independently of judicial instruction to that effect because of its perceived lack of 
reliability and usefulness.383 
 
There are also studies, however, that tend to show that in some situations jurors do not 
discount hearsay and instead actually even regard it as more influential than first-hand 
testimony. One example of this is the study by Ross, Lindsay and Marsil.384 This study 
involved two experiments. In one experiment, the mock jurors were shown a highly 
realistic videotaped child sexual abuse trial where, in the eyewitness condition, the child 
testified as to what was done to her. In the hearsay condition, the child’s mother related to 
the jury what the child had told her. Conviction rates were much higher in the child 
condition versus the hearsay condition, consistently with other similar studies. In the 
second experiment, jurors read a trial summary of a sexual abuse case where either the 
child testified or the child did not testify and hearsay testimony was given by either the 
child's mother, doctor, teacher, or neighbour. Conviction rates were significantly lower in 
the child condition versus each of the hearsay conditions but not when the neighbour 
testified as the hearsay witness. Researchers offered several explanations for this result, for 
example that the reliability of the hearsay statement depends on the prestige and status of 
the hearsay witness who is testifying. The second experiment also used a different medium 
– a trial summary which does not convey the trial context fully (most notably missing is 
the opportunity to listen to the precise words of the witnesses and to observe their 
behaviour, not to mention the opening and closing statements or judicial instructions to the 
jury). The researchers recognized the issues posed by this difference in stimulus and 
hypothesized that it may have become an additional variable that influenced the outcome 
of the case. They also opined that all hearsay vs. live testimony situations are not equal and 
that child witness testimony is evaluated differently from that of adult witnesses.385   
 
An earlier study involving testimony of children was conducted by Golding, Sanchez and 
Sego and published in 1997.386 The study also made use of written trial summaries and 
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looked at the comparative effects of hearsay testimony and firsthand testimony by an 
alleged child victim. The results of the study indicated that the adults testifying as to what 
the child had told them about the alleged sexual assault were generally believed as much as 
the children themselves. The researchers propose several reasons that could explain this 
result but one seems especially significant as it also appears to explain why in certain cases 
jurors are able to follow judicial instructions to disregard certain evidence: it is supported 
by common sense. In this particular instance, potential jurors are able to rationalize why 
the alleged victim does not appear in court to testify about the assault. I cannot help but 
wonder whether a good commonsense explanation could also reduce the impact of “no 
eyewitness testimony” in a theft case like the one Miene and his colleagues experimented 
with. The results described by Golding, Sanchez and Sego (as well as Ross, Lindsay and 
Marsil) also support the hypothesis that fact-finders treat child abuse cases and child 
witnesses differently from cases involving adults. So one should be very cautious in 
proposing more general theories based on these studies. Let us also not forget that while in 
some instances the fact-finders were able to withstand the urge to draw irrationally 
prejudicial conclusions from prior convictions, if the prior conviction was one of child 
sexual abuse, the conviction rate skyrocketed regardless of the charge or other evidence 
against the defendant. One possible and very uncomfortable explanation is that a child 
molestation charge, whether subject to the present trial or successfully (or perhaps even 
unsuccessfully) fielded against the defendant in the past creates a bias to convict and this 
not only stills the rational discourse regarding the probative force of a prior conviction but 
also skews the reasoning process for all other evidence. A research design to explore this 
possibility should vary not only the mode of presenting prosecution’s evidence but also 
evidence favourable to the defence. It appears that hearsay studies to date have not 
considered or explored this.387 
 
Schuller and Paglia explored the impact of hearsay evidence from yet another angle – what 
if the hearsay statement is presented by an expert witness who is called to testify about his 
opinion and its basis?388 The participants were presented with a written summary of a 
murder trial and asked to assume the role of jurors. In all cases, the defence presented an 
expert witness – a psychiatrist who opined that the defendant was unable to form the 
necessary criminal intent. The opinion was based on the psychiatrists’ interview with the 
defendant who elected not to testify. To varying degrees, different variations of the case 
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included statements by the expert about what the defendant had told him during the 
interview. In some variations, the jurors were also instructed that the hearsay portion of the 
expert’s testimony should not be used as substantive evidence. In control conditions, the 
hearsay statements were either otherwise independently admitted or omitted altogether. 
The study showed that the jurors were sensitive to the second-hand nature of the 
information underlying the expert testimony and, where a limiting instruction was given, 
viewed the expert testimony as less credible as compared to where there was no limiting 
instruction or where the evidence had been admitted independently. Nevertheless, 
compared to where no information was given, jurors were more inclined to convict the 
defendant of murder when hearsay statements had been related to them by the expert 
witness.  
 
Based on these studies, I tend to agree with Professor Park when he argues that the few 
studies regarding hearsay and its effects and impact do not paint a clear picture of what the 
value of hearsay is nor do they demonstrate conclusively how hearsay evidence is 
processed by the fact-finders.389 The evidence does suggest, however, that the early 
commentators complaining that the jurors are primitive, tend to indiscriminately take 
hearsay evidence for face value and be unable to recognize the dangers in this, may not be 
correct. At least some studies indicate that jurors are able to tell a good hearsay witness 
apart from a poor one and appreciate the added reliability gained through eyewitness 
testimony. The studies taken in conjunction with what we know about juror reactions to 
prior convictions also indicate that fact-finders may be less prone to rational or logical 
reasoning in certain types of cases (such as those involving sexual offences) but this too 
requires more specific probing.  
 
Judges 
 
Hearsay, like in all other areas, when it has been explored, it has tended to be in relation to 
juries and jury decision making process rather than that of judges. I agree with Frederick 
Schauer390 when he points out that this disparity is regrettable and that the judicial decision 
making process certainly deserves a closer look. Schauer also argues based on studies on 
specialist confidence in decision making that judges are most likely no better at properly 
evaluating hearsay evidence and may actually turn out to be worse because of their overly 
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confident attitude. That judges’ confidence in their superior cognitive ability may be 
misplaced, is further augmented by studies conducted by Wistrich, Guthrie and 
Rachnlinski.391 Their conclusion there was that judges are often not able to ignore 
inadmissible evidence even after they had ruled it inadmissible themselves.  
 
Paul Robinson and Barbara Spellman make a similar point about fact-finding in general: 
current studies do not indicate that judges are better fact-finders than juries; not only are 
they similarly prisoners of their personal backgrounds and biases, the trial judge often also 
sits alone which means that he is confined to his own life experience and insights.392 
Although Schauer, Robinson and Spellman are right in that the comparative effectiveness 
of juries and judges as fact-finders merits more research (and also that current empirical 
research does not directly address this question), it also appears that the assumption that 
judges are better fact-finders is not warranted. Thus, at least tentatively one can extrapolate 
the results of jury research to judicial fact-finding as well (and according to Robinson and 
Spellman, if anyone receives undeserved credit from this extrapolation, it is the judges). 
 
The scientific research pertaining to the hearsay dangers 
 
Focusing on how fact-finders use hearsay evidence in their reasoning process and what 
impact if any it will have makes sense in the context of the urge to liberalize the use of 
hearsay evidence. Some scholars have already hailed the results of the few experimental 
studies as providing the necessary empirical support for abolishing the hearsay rule. This 
approach, however, seems a bit unsophisticated – its logic often being something like 
“hearsay is an inferior kind of evidence but just how inferior, we cannot measure so let us 
admit it all and throw it at the fact-finders and have them figure it out case-by-case because 
we have seen that they are able to discount its value.” One can but only wonder whether 
the different hearsay dangers have different “discount rates” attached to them in jurors’ 
minds and precisely what moves the jurors (and judges?) to accord hearsay evidence less 
weight or disregard it altogether. The present state of research does not allow for any solid 
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conclusions about the cognitive abilities or the precise thought processes of the fact-finders 
in relation to hearsay evidence.   
 
What about the actual reliability of hearsay evidence though? Roger Park seems to be the 
only legal scholar complaining that the designs of the hearsay experiments often only look 
at the perception of evidence by the fact-finder but do not attempt to compare and contrast 
this perceived reliability with the actual reliability of hearsay statements. It seems, 
however, that the empirical research about actual reliability of hearsay statements is in part 
supplied by studies dealing with the individual hearsay dangers - memory, perception, 
sincerity and language use. We will now take a closer look at the four hearsay dangers 
from the point of view of cognitive psychology. 
 
 
Perception 
 
Perception, one of the four main hearsay danger areas, is actually a fairly complex matter. 
While lawyers tend to casually talk about “sensory perception” or the lack thereof, 
psychologists often view sensation and perception as two adjacent and related but still 
discrete disciplines.393 Sensation, Johannes Zanker explains, normally refers to the low-
level signal processing that is not available to higher functions and is inarticulable. 
Perception on the other hand is the “high level stuff” that is available to consciousness and 
can therefore be communicated to others. Zanker abandons the distinction as impractical. 
However, for the purposes of making sense of the different stages where information 
processing394 may go wrong (the hearsay dangers), it is helpful to keep sensation and 
perception distinct and separate. Sensation refers to the ability of sensory organs to detect 
various forms of energy (light waves or heat, for example); perception is the process of 
constructing a description of the outside world based on the sensations. It is easy to see 
how defects in sensory organs affect the information that the witness possesses. A colour 
blind person might not be able to describe the colour of the car that caused an accident in 
terms other than dark or light. A witness who has trouble hearing would not be able to 
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confirm (nor deny if his disability is exposed in time) that shots were fired in a location 
sufficiently close to a witness for a gunshot normally to be audible. A witness who 
normally wears glasses but was not wearing them at the time could not identify the license 
plate number of a suspect vehicle. Examples could go on and on and lawyers routinely 
explore such deficiencies during cross examination.  
 
Perception, the process of making sense of the sensations, is equally relevant in the context 
of the witness statements. In fact, there are two kinds of perception – perception for action 
and perception for recognition – that involve different neural mechanisms and apparently 
run concurrently (albeit the channel for action-related perception is said to receive 
information faster and the channel for recognition-related perception is said to be more 
accessible to consciousness).395 Perception for action is a bottom-to-top processing 
mechanism answering the question “where?” while perception for recognition also 
involves the use of pre-stored information (allowing one to answer the what-question).396 
The legal process is much more interested in perception for recognition and rightfully so: 
there is evidence that the answer to the “what”- question is often a result of incomplete 
sensory data interpreted and supplemented in light of the pre-stored or externally supplied 
information. So, for example, the declarant may have only seen a human figure from a long 
distance in the dark of the night but because of the clothes worn by the individual, 
automatically concluded that he saw a woman (whereas actually it may have been a man 
wearing a kilt). When relating this experience to another, the actual data would be lumped 
into this convenient conclusion and our hearsay witness would swear that he heard the 
declarant speak about a woman – and the witness would be correct.  
 
There are two more concepts of cognitive psychology that lawyers fit under the label of 
perception: attention and recognition. The main function of attention is to be a mechanism 
to help us focus on a particular segment of the sensory data being collected while filtering 
out the rest. Perception requires attention. As Peter Naish puts it, attention is the process 
which gives rise to conscious awareness.397 Attention also is a vital factor in joining 
together the features that make up an object and collecting related data from different 
senses. As Naish explains, there is a great deal of parallel information processing going on 
in the brain but the conscious information processing is happening serially. For example, 
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visual data is captured in parallel (one sees everything within the visual field) but the 
assembly of this data is a serial process (one only becomes consciously aware of the 
objects one looks at). Psychologists also distinguish between episodic (the external 
characteristics of an object and its position) and semantic (the object’s identity/meaning) 
information in visual data. Attention therefore means binding the two together. Episodic 
detail alone is easily forgotten or confused. Semantic information alone, however, does not 
reach conscious awareness unless linked with episodic detail.398 As far as auditory 
information goes, psychologists report a similar pattern: the listener is normally unable to 
report significant details about auditory data that he is not attending to and only the most 
recent unattended information is available for a short period of time in the echoic memory. 
This suggests again parallel acquisition of all available auditory data with subsequent serial 
processing to determine the meaning of one attended message. Nevertheless, the 
information that is not attended to is not completely blocked out but only “shadowed” and 
meaning is extracted even from the unattended material.399 Questions to the witness about 
what he was paying attention to or was primarily occupied with while allegedly observing 
the legally relevant events are thus very much to the point: it is likely that any account 
given by a witness of an event he was not paying attention to will not be very accurate.  
 
Recognition is primarily of interest in terms of facial recognition. Although eyewitness 
accounts and in-court identifications are powerful evidence, there is a number of studies 
showing that not only are people relatively unreliable at recognizing unfamiliar faces but 
that the conditions of both the first encounter and identification have a great effect on the 
accuracy of facial recognition.400 For example, a meta-analysis of 19 studies about the 
weapon-hypothesis (claiming that the accuracy of identification declines when a weapon is 
involved in the commission of the crime as attention is diverted and focused on the 
weapon) found that the weapon makes a small but statistically significant difference in the 
accuracy of identification thus confirming the hypothesis.401  
 
Poor perception by the declarant is one of the four main dangers associated with hearsay 
evidence and the foregoing overview illustrates that there are all sorts of things that can go 
wrong. The potential for misperception is also involved in the hearsay witness perceiving 
the statement as it is made by the declarant. While the latter instance of misperception can 
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be explored through cross-examination when the hearsay witness is in court, the possible 
misperceptions by the declarant will quite probably remain hidden from the fact-finder if 
only the hearsay statement is presented. Psychological research involving the different 
aspects of perception reveals that there are a number of questions one should always ask of 
the witness in order to verify that the statement is adequately reflecting what was actually 
perceived. The study of perception also reveals that some of the common hearsay 
exceptions such as the ones for excited utterance, present sense impression, public records 
or police reports where such blanket provision exists that purport to provide for admission 
of especially reliable statements actually fail to control for errors in perception. The 
pioneers of “psychology-driven evidence scholarship, ” professors Hutchins and Slesinger 
argued back in 1928 that the excited utterances exception to the hearsay rule is based on 
incorrect assumptions and an incomplete picture of human psychology.402 The 
requirements of near contemporaneity and excitement, Hutchins and Slesinger argued, may 
contribute to the sincerity of the statement as the self-interest would not have had time to 
kick in. However, what little the speed and excitement help gain in terms of sincerity, is 
lost due to poor perception of the events by the eyewitness who is startled and excited. 
Hutchins and Slesinger cite several by now classic studies in psychology of perception and 
attention in support of their argument that stress and excitement have devastating effects on 
the ability of witnesses to accurately observe and reproduce the startling events. This in 
turn means that while perhaps even justified in regards to some hearsay dangers, admission 
of such statements under the categorical exceptions may lull the fact-finder into believing 
the statement’s enhanced overall reliability which may not in fact be true. The lack of 
cross-examination in these situations prevents the fact-finder from appreciating the 
reliability problems. The situation is further exacerbated if the hearsay statement is 
presented in written form and no cross-examination takes place. 
 
Memory 
 
Morgan listed memory as another of the four hearsay dangers because the lack of cross-
examination would not allow the fact-finders to see just how much the declarant really 
remembers of the events in question.403 Lawyers and psychologists mean the same thing by 
memory – the encoding, storage and retrieval of information. This process is of course 
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closely linked to attention, perception and recognition and therefore also often discussed 
together with these phenomena. Psychologists draw a broad distinction between working 
memory and long-term memory. Depending on the issue at hand, evidence law may also be 
interested in working memory404 but more often it is long-term memory and its accuracy 
that concerns evidence law. Theorists also talk about different memory systems – most 
well known is the distinction between episodic and semantic memory – but some argue 
there is more, and that there may be as many as five main memory systems.405 Research 
indicates that memory is not a static store of information akin to a desk drawer as often 
thought by people,406 but a dynamic process of construction and reconstruction.407 This 
means memories are vulnerable to distortion and, as is well known, first deteriorate at a 
rapid pace and then continue deteriorating more slowly. Memories can also change as a 
result of exposure to other similar experiences, talking about the event and obtaining 
additional information about it.408 Bornstein and others cite several studies in their article 
about the effects of emotions on memory – emotional arousal at the time of perception and 
encoding apparently enhances the memory of the central event (such as the crime itself) but 
inhibits the memory of events both before and after the emotionally arousing event.409 
 
In terms of the hearsay rule, memory factors act as a double-edged sword. It would be 
desirable to have the witness present at trial for cross-examination about the limits of his 
memory and to explore any information the witness may not have been previously asked 
about. On the other hand, testimony at trials taking place several months or years after the 
events in question will be subject to any number of those distorting forces mentioned 
above – this all in addition to the natural fading of memory that happens over time anyway. 
Experiments show that people integrate subsequently acquired information into their 
memories, either supplementing their memory or altering or adding to their memories.410 
People are particularly susceptible to having their memories modified when the passage of 
time allows the original memory to fade, and will be most susceptible if they repeat the 
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misinformation as fact. There is apparently no consensus whether over time subsequent 
interfering information completely obliterates the original memory or merely obscures it so 
it is still retrievable under the right conditions.411 Thus considering the memory-related 
hearsay dangers alone, the passage of time is quite possibly the greatest danger that may 
not be mitigated by cross-examination.412 Of course, the memory issues are not limited to 
second-hand testimony but plague eyewitness testimony too. The realization of the frailty 
of memory makes it very clear how important it is to have the trial as quickly as possible or 
to somehow reliably preserve the testimony as soon as feasible after the event and not only 
in hearsay situations. Specifically in the hearsay context, however, the studies regarding 
memory certainly lend credence to the rules that provide for admission of various records 
and statements made at or near the time of the observed event (such as the recorded 
recollection exception under Federal Rule of Evidence 803(5), the business records 
exception or the rule admitting excited utterances). Yet once again, while these rules 
appear to have it right in terms of ensuring that memory problems are kept to a minimum, 
they control less successfully for the other hearsay dangers.413 Moreover, as Haber and 
Haber explain in their excellent overview of memory-related issues,414 even early accounts 
by eyewitnesses may be subject to several distorting forces emanating from police 
procedure or other factors related to the making of the statement. Knowing the different 
problems and pitfalls related to the encoding, storing and retrieval of information in human 
memory at least enables the fact-finder to be more sensitive to possible issues posed by 
them, and relevant instructions to counteract the often held false beliefs about memory415 
might be a simple way to mitigate the potentially grave results of ignorance.416  
 
Language use 
 
It seems that while Morgan mentioned defects in narration and misuse of language as 
hearsay dangers, he himself too caused a fair amount of confusion leading some scholars to 
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believe that such issues are in practice only present in statements by people not proficient 
in the language and thus fairly negligible.417 Others became convinced that Morgan 
confused misuse of language with insincerity and thus did not even consider the ambiguity 
inherent in language use.418 Psychologists researching language, however, can tell us that 
ambiguity is not only common but near inescapable and that all people, not just small 
children with undeveloped vocabularies or foreigners with insufficient language skills, are 
susceptible to ambiguity in verbal communication. Paul Bergman explains that lexical (use 
of words that have multiple meanings) and syntactic (lack of clarity due to unclear sentence 
structure) ambiguities, even though troubling to linguists, are not of particular issue in the 
legal world because lawyers offer into evidence not isolated sentences to be analyzed but 
entire stories that offer clarifying context for both kinds of ambiguities or alternatively 
afford two competing inferences to be drawn – which is normal in the legal process.419 A 
more relevant ambiguity is derived from the use of abstract terms – for psychologists an 
issue of concept formation and categorization.420 Some words are inherently more 
ambiguous than others because their connotations are abstract – examples of those are 
emotions and feelings which in their subjectivity have a meaning more related to the 
listener’s personal experiences than those of the speaker. Other examples of this would 
include words pertaining to broad categories of objects such as ‘vehicle’, for example – it 
can mean any number of things and without clarification or additional context the listener 
may have in his mind a picture quite different from that of the speaker. Another 
categorization and concept-forming problem is posed when words are used to convey a 
non-standard meaning – when the declarant is a member of a social group that uses 
particular slang or jargon, or comes from a specific region where words or colloquialisms 
are used differently from the fact-finders, for example. The lack of opportunity to cross-
examine the declarant about the true meaning in standard language means that this actual 
meaning could be lost for the fact-finder.  
 
Bergman argues that another relevant ambiguity for the legal process is the polarity of 
language – lack of vocabulary to describe the middle ground between the opposite ends of 
a spectrum. He argues421 that in English, things tend to be either good or bad, people stingy 
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or generous, our life either safe or dangerous and our endeavours either a success or a 
failure with no room for the “grey shades”. While it may be true that people tend to 
generalize and express their assessments of affairs in the extremes, it seems that there are 
actually words and expressions available and often used to convey the middle ground 
(improvable, fair, OK, average or satisfactory in between good and bad, for example) and 
if not with a single word, the position between the extremes of the scale is often expressed 
using one of the modalities (somewhat, rather, fairly, sometimes, and in modern usage by 
adding the suffix –ish to indicate leaning towards one end of the scale). The danger of 
polarizing of course calls for clarifications during cross-examination. For example, if a 
witness states that it was dark outside, the examiner could ask additional questions to elicit 
information about just how dark it was. Or if the witness states that his relationship with 
another person was “good”, the examination would explore just what the witness had in 
mind. Assuming that Bergman is right about people’s tendency to describe things in 
extremes, however, it is easy to see how the lack of live witness examination can deprive 
the fact-finder of the detailed, accurate account of what the declarant really had in mind. 
 
There is also the phenomenon of filling – an insidious kind of ambiguity as it both 
potentially creates distortions in meaning and covers them up. Bergman demonstrates this 
through a simple exercise: assume all that is known is that “Jones robbed Smith at 
gunpoint” yet nevertheless one would have no difficulty telling a longer story or even 
drawing a picture of the event – all due to the tendency of one’s own mind to fill in the 
blanks based on one’s own knowledge and prior experience. The special danger here is that 
while the ambiguities are arguably fairly easy to recognize in the other instances, filling 
does not create the feeling of lacking knowledge but quite the opposite – it makes the fact-
finder – or the hearsay witness retelling a story heard from the declarant – feel like he 
knows and understands what happened.422  
 
One category of ambiguities not covered by Bergman in his article is the ambiguity related 
to mixed message.423 A famous example of this is type of ambiguity is in the motion 
picture Presumed Innocent where the prominent prosecutor accused of murdering his 
colleague answered the question “did you kill her” with “yeah, right” and this was 
subsequently offered into evidence as his confession. The trial judge in that case explained, 
“If Mr. Sabich was from where I come from, he would have said, “yo mama” but where he 
comes from they say “yeah, right” which means the same thing – you are wrong.” While 
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language of course can be reduced to words and written text is arguably even more 
ambiguous than spoken language, there are instances in spoken language where the words 
say one thing and the intended meaning as is obvious from the facial expression, 
intonation, gestures and the situation is quite the opposite. In the legal process, this type of 
ambiguity is most problematic when hearsay is not presented by a live witness who can be 
examined about the circumstances of hearing the statement from the original declarant but 
instead hearsay statement is contained in a written document or an audio recording. Both of 
these media severely restrict the information being transferred and thus have a potential of 
obscuring the real meaning of what was said. 
 
All in all, ambiguity in language is a very real danger. Even where the witness testifies of 
personal knowledge, the examiner has a daunting task to perform: to paint the picture in the 
fact-finder’s mind through the words of the witness. This means that the examiner must 
recognize possible ambiguities and have the witness clarify them. At least supposedly the 
witness has the knowledge that enables him to do this. When the witness is not testifying 
from personal knowledge but is only relaying a statement made by another, questioning 
will not be of much assistance in clearing up ambiguities and will in many cases only elicit 
assumptions, conclusions and “filling” by the witness about what the declarant may have 
tried to convey. It will then be up to the fact-finder to recognize the potential for 
misunderstanding. Possibly the only hearsay exceptions that control for the ambiguities in 
language are those that provide for admission of standardized routine records where the 
boundaries of meaning of specific words, phrases or figures are possibly somewhat more 
settled through their routine use. Written statements by witnesses, however, are probably 
the worst option – a hearsay witness could possibly know and remember information that 
may assist in putting the declarant’s statement in perspective and elucidating its meaning 
whereas a written transcript most likely would not contain this kind of information. 
 
Sincerity 
 
The last hearsay danger is the possible lack of sincerity by the declarant. Through cross-
examination, the argument goes, lies can be exposed and because the testifying witness is 
in court available for observation, fact-finders are able to discern the measure of 
truthfulness of the witness by observing his behaviour on the stand. Consequently, the lack 
of opportunity to cross-examine or observe the testimony would mean that lies would go 
unchecked.  
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The possibility of a dramatic Perry Mason moment in court is fairly low, as is pointed out 
in most trial advocacy textbooks. Evidence scholars have identified five different types of 
impeachment – demonstration of a motive to lie (a bias), a tendency to be dishonest 
(character attack), lack of memory or defects in sensory perception, disclosing prior 
inconsistent statements made by the witness, or exposing problems with the internal 
consistency of the testimony or inconsistencies with other evidence.424 These tools do not 
necessarily require that witness be examined in court: evidence of bias or prior instances of 
dishonesty as well as prior inconsistent statements or contradiction between the statement 
of the witness and other evidence in the case can be established through other evidence; the 
lack of memory or sensory perception may be apparent from the statement itself or be 
established by other evidence as well. The drama of having the person admit discrediting 
facts of course would be lacking if there is no cross-examination. Setting the value of 
cross-examination and the proper way of conducting it aside, I am left with this question: 
are fact-finders able to recognize a liar by looking at one? 
 
Danielle Andrewartha425 explains that lies are a common feature in everyday 
communication and it is highly unlikely that they would be any less prevalent in litigation. 
There are three types of lies: outright lies (also most common), exaggerations, and subtle 
lies where literal truths are used to create a wrong impression. Most liars lie for selfish 
reasons and most lies are about the speaker himself.426 The commonly held confidence 
among people that they are able to detect lies by observing the visual and verbal cues, 
however, appears to be misplaced. Andrewartha cites several studies that have almost 
unanimously agreed – people, regardless of their profession, age, special interest, gender or 
other variables are poor lie detectors, their reliability being no higher than chance. One of 
the few exceptions is the study by Ekman and O’Sullivan427 where US Secret Service 
agents, police officers, polygraph specialists, psychiatrists, college students and judges 
were asked to watch ten videos of people who were either being truthful or lying. 
Significantly, in this study the individuals in the videos displayed some measurable 
indications in the form of either facial movements or changes in the tone of voice that 
allowed a lie detection with 86 per cent accuracy using a computer-assisted analysis. The 
study found that only the Secret Service agents achieved a higher than chance reliability in 
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lie detection. Those more successful at catching liars reported using non-verbal cues and 
were also better at spotting microexpressions than the others. In general, studies indicate 
that people tend to not only fail to pay attention to the behavioural signals but very often 
misinterpret them. The commonly held beliefs about what a typical lie looks like are often 
erroneous. Jeremy Blumethal in his article428 drives the point home – while the courts have 
always regarded observing the behaviour of a witness of vital importance for assessing the 
credibility, fact-finders look for the wrong things and make unwarranted conclusions – 
often to the extent that truthful witnesses will be perceived as liars and trial lawyers risk 
losing the case if they do not employ credibility-enhancement trickery ranging from 
rehearsals to dressing specifically for the occasion.429  
 
Empirical research shows that there are indicators that correlate with deception. Some of 
them are visual (shrugs, hand to face gestures and grooming – “adaptors”, pupil dilation) 
but most are auditory (speech errors, speech hesitations, response length, pitch, irrelevant 
information, negative statements, non-immediacy, and levelling) owing to the fact that the 
auditory channel is more difficult to control than the visual.430 Most troubling, however – 
the commonly held beliefs that liars have shifty eyes, shifty bodies and shifty feet, that they 
tend to blush or go pale, that they fidget excessively and avoid eye contact by moving their 
head a lot – are not supported by current empirical research and the actual behaviour of a 
liar is often the exact opposite: they sit still and avoid fidgeting.431 The auditory cues 
commonly associated with deception – hesitation, higher pitch of voice and speech errors – 
seem to be in line with the empirical data but as Blumenthal points out – are easily missed 
when the fact-finder focuses on verbal cues or visual information. The conclusion here is 
that while visual cues may be unreliable for lie detection, auditory indicators are much 
more reliable and much harder to control by the lying subject. Research also indicates that 
with proper instruction, fact-finders are able to make use of auditory cues.432  
 
Assumptions on the mental processes involving lying have also directly inspired some of 
the hearsay exceptions. Hearsay statements are deemed more trustworthy when the time 
period between the observed event and the statement has been relatively short (the 
argument being that the declarant would not have had time to concoct a lie – exceptions for 
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present sense impression, excited utterance, then existing state of mind being the examples 
of this) or the reason for making the statement has been such that making a truthful 
statement was in the interests of the declarant (business records, statements for medical 
diagnoses or treatment). Myers and others explored some of these assumptions and the 
current relevant research in their article.433 Their conclusion is one of uncertainty: while 
there is no empirical evidence showing that stress inhibits lying, there is indirect evidence 
that lying is a mental task that requires extra effort, and that under stressful conditions, 
humans tend to perform at mental tasks more poorly.  
 
This all means both good and bad news for the law of evidence as it currently stands. The 
bad news is that fact-finders are generally baselessly confident in their ability to spot a liar 
– and the insistence that witnesses should be brought to court so the fact-finder could 
observe them blush and fidget as they lie is therefore misplaced. On the other hand, with a 
little bit of guidance fact-finders can be helped to be better at lie detection and once that 
happens, having an opportunity to observe and especially listen to a witness while he is 
testifying may help weed out some untruthful statements. This will only work in relation to 
the witness who is testifying in court and to the substance of the testimony based on his 
personal knowledge.434 As regards the truthfulness of hearsay statements, many exceptions 
to the hearsay rule are specifically designed to mitigate the risk of insincerity. However, 
while intuitively attractive, assumptions behind exceptions like “excited utterance” or 
“present sense impression” or “dying declaration” do not have empirical support. 
Moreover, as Bellin demonstrates, modern times and contemporary communication habits 
present new challenges to the hearsay exceptions: in the age of smartphones, Facebook, 
Twitter and instant messaging, the present sense impression exception that was conceived 
with oral and verifiably contemporaneous communication in mind, has lost much of its 
footing.435 Some hearsay exceptions are conditioned on ascertaining that the declarant had 
or did not have a specific motive such as the “business records exception”. Those may fare 
better, but the result of their application depends on the accuracy of fact-finding regarding 
the declarant’s motive and quite possibly here too, societal changes may have rendered 
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once important motives or mechanisms less relevant.436 This all being said, even if these 
exceptions help at least to some extent  guard against admission of unchecked lies, they 
often leave the other three hearsay dangers unchecked.  
 
 
What should the law on hearsay be like? 
 
In order to facilitate accurate fact-finding, we observed there are two main issues: the 
cognitive abilities and needs of the fact-finders, and the characteristics of the particular 
kind of evidence. We looked at the four areas in which hearsay evidence may prove 
inaccurate without the inaccuracy always being detectable. We also looked at what is 
currently known about the ability of fact-finders to take these potential inaccuracies into 
account in their assessments and evaluation of the evidence (be it termed reliability or 
lumped together under “weight”). Now the main task begins – to assess what kind of legal 
framework would best facilitate accurate fact-finding in regards to hearsay evidence, given 
what is known about hearsay and fact-finders.  
 
In terms of regulation, the English Law Commission437 identified six different ways of 
dealing with hearsay evidence. The list is instructive as the Law Commission not only 
enumerates the various options but also comments on their respective strengths and 
weaknesses. The options that were weighed included blanket admissibility, admissibility 
based on the best evidence principle, a general rule of admission with discretion to exclude, 
a general rule of exclusion with discretion to admit, and automatic admissibility of certain 
categories. The Law Commission in its report dismisses them all for one reason or another. 
Most discretionary rules are regarded as problematic because of their unpredictability, the 
Law Commission argues. The free admissibility approach would likely infringe the ECHR 
confrontation clause, open the door for untested rumours and cause waste of court time. In 
explaining why instead of just submitting the evidence to the fact-finder for evaluation, 
hearsay should be excluded (and English law at least by default excludes hearsay), Roberts 
and Zuckerman argue that the dangers of fabrication are too great to ignore in the criminal 
procedure setting – a criminal conviction should not be based on police officers 
“testilying” or someone’s poor memory, off-the-cuff remark, misunderstood comment or 
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vicious gossip – all of which could easily go unchecked without the requirement that 
witnesses testify from personal knowledge and in court subject to cross-examination.438  
 
The Law Commission was much more worried about the apparent harmful side-effect that 
excluding hearsay apparently had – the rule’s strict and inflexible application prevented 
courts from admitting cogent and probative evidence on points for which no other better 
evidence was available.439 So not only did England and Wales relax their hearsay rule to 
the point that it is now fairly hard to imagine a situation where a party would need to rely 
on a hearsay statement but be unable to do so, New Zealand has chosen to practically 
abolish theirs and many scholars have advocated relaxing it if not outright abolishing it in 
the United States.440  
 
Yet all seem to agree to one thing – hearsay evidence is of inferior quality if it is not 
amenable to cross-examination for precisely that same reason – the lack of cross-
examination. It has been said countless times that the best tool we have devised for testing 
witness evidence for its reliability is cross-examination at trial.441 Park and Lininger went 
even as far as to argue that the value of a hearsay rule is equal to the value of cross-
examination.442 In the discussion above, we saw that there were two other tools for 
ensuring reliability that have been mentioned: oath and face-to-face confrontation with the 
accused. Those two particular tools, however, seem only to assist in ensuring the sincerity 
of the witness in giving the statement but are even on their face value worthless in 
exploring, let alone enhancing the quality of perception, memory or narration.  
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And even the statement about the potency of cross-examination must be qualified: its 
power to unearth information about and test the accuracy of statements regarding an event 
going back months or years is severely limited by the memory of the witness and, as 
Lininger argues, cross-examination has a distinct “dark side” that may make it not only less 
effective than has been thought but also a tortuous ordeal to the victims and witnesses that 
in the longer run would prove counterproductive to the objectives of the criminal justice 
system.443  
 
Starting point – admit where necessary  
 
The starting point for my approach comes from Michael Seigel.444 Seigel explains the issue 
of admitting or excluding hearsay in terms of inductive logic and the need to improve the 
conditions for rational fact-finding. The more fact-finders know and the more evidence 
they have to base their decision on, the more likely that decision will be accurate, unless 
the information is such that it corrupts the fact-determination process. Seigel argues that 
hearsay statements fall in two basic categories: those that are incomplete and those that are 
outright false. While incomplete statements may still prove useful in determining the facts 
(albeit only to the extent that they contain relevant information), the outright false 
statements may be harmful if their falsehood is not detected. The falsehood, of course, may 
be the result of any one of the hearsay dangers. According to Seigel’s thesis, the rule 
against hearsay must filter out statements that may be false and do not allow for the 
evaluation of the accuracy of the statement – primarily then those statements that are not 
accompanied by sufficient information about the circumstances of making the statement or 
perceiving the fact or condition by the original declarant.  
 
Seigel also recognizes that a more relaxed approach towards hearsay evidence may 
produce what amounts to an unhealthy incentive to keep the primary witnesses away from 
the trial and instead produce hearsay witnesses out of tactical cunning or convenience. To 
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counter that, he proposes a best evidence rule – not a new idea445 but certainly presented 
much more eloquently and articulately than his precursors have managed to do, and I will 
return to this later.  
 
Seigel’s point about more evidence, unless false and corrupting, being better for accurate 
fact-finding is hard to argue against. Even though the conclusions about the current 
empirical research showing jurors’ ability to accurately assess the value of hearsay 
evidence are a bit premature (given the small number and somewhat inconsistent results of 
the studies as well as the limitations of the methodology used), the majority of these 
studies indicate that juries are able to recognize the diminished reliability of hearsay 
statements and appreciate the various factors that affect reliability. This suggests that 
instead of imposing strict exclusionary input controls that would deprive fact-finders of the 
evidence completely, other “less destructive means” may help fact-finders make better 
informed decisions.  
 
Exclusionary input controls are also difficult to implement, not only in the obvious case of 
trials by unitary tribunals but also in jury procedure. Unless the trial is preceded by 
comprehensive discovery and pretrial screening for detectably inadmissible evidence, 
hearsay statements are often uttered first and objected to only once the fact-finder has 
already been exposed to them. At that time, input control transforms into reasoning control 
which may not be effective. My approach will thus start from the premise that hearsay 
evidence should be admissible and I will next consider whether there are circumstances 
that warrant restrictions on its admissibility. 
 
Although some scholars advocated wider admissibility of hearsay evidence even before the 
empirical studies about jurors’ cognitive abilities started coming in,446 for me the “let them 
have it all, surely they can sort it out” approach does not appear convincing even in the 
face of arguments citing routine reliance on hearsay in everyday business such as buying 
real property.447 Memory gets distorted and fades, language is inherently ambiguous, 
perception is a complex phenomenon where lots can go awry, and sincerity is hard to 
evaluate. These dangers are well documented. Sure, they are present in eyewitness 
accounts as well but the difference is that cross-examining the hearsay witness will offer 
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only limited opportunity to check for potential issues with the original declarant’s 
statement and even less so when the out-of-court statement is offered in writing. 
Nevertheless, many hearsay dangers are not known to or sufficiently appreciated by the 
fact-finders (jurors and judges alike), as we saw earlier with regard to popular beliefs about 
memory and lie detection. Even if fact-finders intuitively discount the value of some 
hearsay,448 the rules must ensure the fact-finder will get as close to the source of the 
information as possible. This is arguably one of the original aims of the hearsay rule 
anyway – to shorten the chain of information by forcing the proponent to bring in the most 
direct evidence (best evidence) - at the threat of excluding the information altogether if the 
chain is still too long. Thus, blanket admissibility with no additional conditions will not 
work as it does not ensure that the fact-finder has adequate information to evaluate the 
hearsay statement and understand which of the hearsay dangers might still be present. One 
might argue that blanket admissibility is more suitable for professional fact-finders who 
have received training449 on the weaknesses of hearsay evidence and are thus able to look 
out for what is not there even when the deficiencies are not directly highlighted by the 
parties. This seems to be the main argument in support of the regulation (or lack thereof) in 
jurisdictions like Chile or Germany where no fact-finding body is composed of untrained 
individuals only. Nevertheless, imposing quality control measures in those jurisdictions is 
equally important to reduce the possibility that parties’ lack of diligence coupled with the 
fact-finders’ ignorance leads to inaccurate findings. For this reason, I reject the option of 
complete deregulation and blanket admissibility of hearsay evidence. Roberts and 
Zuckerman are right: the risk is too great and stakes too high. 
 
I also reject the option of using a default rule excluding hearsay with categories of 
exceptions – a scheme like in the Federal Rules of Evidence. This model has several 
problems even when coupled with the inclusionary discretion like in the CJA 2003 or the 
catch-all exception in FRE 807.  
 
For starters, discretionary inclusion creates inconsistency in application and thus 
unpredictability – as the English Law Commission pointed out.450 One could probably 
guide and limit this discretion by adding normative constraints like in FRE 807. However, 
this still does not provide a safeguard against an ill-informed judge, let alone one who is 
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biased. Simply put, even with the guidelines in effect, the judges may reach a conclusion 
that is at odds with what we know about human psychology.451 Categorical admission of 
certain types of hearsay could work to ensure more uniformity, however, this happens to be 
exactly the situation with the hearsay rule in the United States at the moment. An argument 
could be made that some of the categories are ill-defined and this causes the hiccups in the 
system, thus, the remedy should be a careful review of the categories with adjustments 
where needed. Perhaps this is so. However, in spite of numerous efforts by scholars and 
legislators to frame a set of exceptions that would not be too broad or narrow, no 
successful and well-received set of exceptions has emerged. The existing exceptions hailed 
as embodying centuries of judicial wisdom such as the excited utterance exception, the 
exceptions pertaining to reputation evidence or the dying declarations, for example, have 
turned out to be insufficient in guarding against the hearsay dangers and are often at odds 
with psychological research.452  
 
Some scholars have opined that the problem lies in the focus of the hearsay rule and its 
exceptions. Ashworth and Pattenden argue, “[a] truly functional approach would, however, 
be more closely tied to the precise dangers against which the hearsay rule guards”.453 Logic 
therefore dictates that if there are exceptions to the rule excluding hearsay, the exceptions 
should cover instances where cross-examination “could not be expected to assist the court 
to evaluate the reliability of the evidence (as where the compiler of routine records could 
not be expected to recall the circumstances in which he included or excluded a particular 
entry) and wherever the original declarant is available for cross-examination although he 
has forgotten the facts underlying his out-of-court statement.”454 Good point – especially 
considering that sometimes the main thing cross-examination does is demonstrate what is 
not known about the statement. However, considering the four hearsay dangers, what kind 
of statement would obviate the need for cross-examination to the point that fact-finders 
would be as informed without cross-examination as they are if cross-examination takes 
place?  
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Edward Imwinkelried argues that the exceptions to the hearsay rule should be dictated by 
the relative importance of the respective hearsay risks.455 So, the argument goes, if the 
principal risk is that the declarant might lie, the exceptions to the hearsay rule ought to be 
fashioned so as to allow the admission of those statements where the risk of insincerity is 
somehow lower. If, however, the main concern is that the declarant’s memory might fail or 
there are errors in transmission, the exceptions should be targeting statements where those 
risks have been reduced to acceptable levels. One of the main points Imwinkelried makes 
is that most common law hearsay exceptions are excessively focused on the danger of 
insincerity, yet disregard the danger of fading memory. In Imwinkelried’s opinion, the FRE 
include several exceptions such as those allowing for present sense impressions, recorded 
recollections or business records that, if correctly applied, serve to take the memory factor 
into account as well as provide for additional guarantees of sincerity. Imwinkelried’s point 
is well taken and naturally hearsay exceptions that provide for added guarantees are 
preferable to those that purport to mitigate only one of the hearsay dangers. The 
unreliability of a hearsay statement can stem from any one or more of the four hearsay 
dangers, including memory. However, I cannot agree with Imwinkelried’s assessment that 
the risks to be mitigated should be chosen based on the frequency with which they are 
posed. If categories of admissible hearsay are drafted, they should be framed so that fact-
finders will have sufficient information to evaluate the statement’s reliability or so that the 
reliability is assured by the nature of the statement. In the present sense impression 
exception that Imwinkelried seems satisfied with, for example, the risk of memory fading 
is low because of the contemporaneity of the observation and the making of the statement 
by the declarant; and the possibility of insincerity could be mitigated by the lack of time to 
concoct lies.  However, even if we concede that lying takes mental effort and the self-
interest motivation may not have kicked in yet, there are still the risks of faulty perception 
and miscommunication that are not dealt with unless more information is presented or 
there is a demonstration of the lack of reliability because more information is not available. 
Plus – knowing that fact-finders tend to be overly self-confident about their lie-detecting 
abilities, insincerity might be a greater danger after all. 
 
One can also argue that the hearsay exceptions are nothing more than minimum standard 
for reliability and any further assessment will be done by the fact-finder but we need to 
protect the fact-finder against the kind of evidence that falls below the minimum standard 
or, as Gordon van Kessel posits, protect us against unwarranted and non-reviewable 
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verdicts by the fact-finder.456 This argument would be fine, however, it still leaves the 
question of what the minimum standard is based on – is mitigation of two out of four 
danger factors (e.g. memory and sincerity for present sense impression) sufficient to admit, 
for example? Additionally, as we saw earlier, parts of the current lists of exceptions have 
been discredited by empirical research showing that assumptions that the “judicial 
wisdom” is based on may not be true (anymore). One of the most eloquent attacks on the 
validity and workability of the categorical admission model is by Eleanor Swift who points 
out that the greatest problem with the categorical approach is that it cannot be validated yet 
is based on the assumption that the categories actually increase accuracy and reliability.457 
 
In rejecting the categories of automatic admission with a default exclusion model I would 
also point to the tendency of any kind of rigid system to be sooner or later found producing 
absurd results – this mostly because life has great variety to offer, especially in different 
parts of the world. This diversity is also one reason why there could not be a universal list 
of categories of admissible hearsay: any statement’s added reliability is deeply rooted in 
the culture and tradition in any particular place at a particular time and possibly even 
confined to a specific segment of the society. Categorical exceptions make generalizations 
that sweep with a broad brush. For example, even if the majority of the society are devout 
Christians and statements in family bibles would to this majority have a special meaning, 
the statement made in a family bible-turned paper weight by the passionately atheist 
declarant would be admitted but completely without any valid reason. The problem with 
categorical exceptions is that while certainly ensuring uniformity, they can produce results 
that do not help the fact-finding process. The diversity of situations, declarants, witnesses 
and statements means that decisions about reliability must also be individualized as 
opposed to sorted into pre-arranged boxes. Can a minimum standard of reliability be 
defined through universally (or at least generally) applicable objective criteria? It appears 
to me that this may be an effort in vain and thus reliability should not at all be a pre-
condition of admissibility of hearsay statements but instead it should be determined on a 
case-by-case basis by the fact-finder in the context of the particular time-space. 
Admissibility should be conditioned upon the availability of the information enabling the 
fact-finder to reach an informed reliability judgment. This would mean for the most part 
doing away with exclusionary input controls but imperatively introducing the relevant 
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background information. This is very similar to the foundation fact approach proposed by 
Eleanor Swift458 and also bears resemblance to the Chilean approach.  
 
So – admit but under what conditions? 
 
Eleanor Swift argued that the current law of hearsay in the United States is indefensible as 
it is based on external filtering of information reaching the fact-finder but the filtering 
process is not validated, cannot be validated and in some instances has been empirically 
proven wrong. In other words, the list of exceptions is arbitrary and does not make sense. 
The same criticism is still in the air, not only about the law in the United States but also in 
England and Wales (the CJA 2003 includes several of the common law exceptions later 
proven to have dubious foundation; the trial judge’s discretion to admit mitigates the 
effects of this to some degree). Swift also offered an alternative – the foundation fact 
approach. The gist of the proposed alternative is that hearsay evidence should be presented 
to the fact-finder for evaluation if the proponent is able to produce a witness (or several 
witnesses) with knowledge of the foundation facts related to the statement – how the 
declarant was able to perceive the events; how much time had passed between the original 
event and when the declarant made his statement and whether anything else may have 
affected his ability to remember the events in question; what were the circumstances of 
making the statement, including who was the statement made to (to show sincerity and 
language use). Based on this information, the fact-finder would be able to conclude how 
reliable the statement was and in doing so would not be constrained by the arbitrary 
external filter of the hearsay exceptions. Foundation facts about perception or memory 
could also form part of the statement itself. Where information about perception conditions 
is not available, the missing part of process foundation may be supplanted by identity 
foundation – but only to the degree that it in the opinion of the trial judge still allows for 
informed evaluation of the hearsay statement. For example, if the process foundation 
witness does not know how the declarant perceived events in question, another foundation 
witness may be called to testify about the sensory faculties and punctual character of the 
declarant (Swift refers to this as adjusted foundation). Whatever the situation, the 
foundation fact approach requires that there always be at least one witness who can be 
cross-examined about the hearsay statement, the only exception being cases where judicial 
notice can be taken. 
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Swift’s approach solves a lot of problems mainly because it is flexible and empowers the 
trier of fact to make reliability determinations by supplying the necessary information as 
opposed to forcing the fact-finder into external and possibly arbitrary constraints. It also 
serves the policy goal of getting the fact-finder as close to the original declarant as 
possible. In her article, Swift demonstrates how even the current hearsay exceptions can 
relatively easily be made to conform to the foundation fact approach or are already 
substantially in conformity such as the business records exception; or why some statements 
currently admitted under one of the hearsay exceptions would not qualify under her model 
and why they should not either. An example of this situation would be dying declarations 
or statements for medical diagnosis or treatment where applying the exception currently 
only requires that the proponent prove, for example, the condition of the declarant at the 
time of making the statement but requires no proof regarding the situation at the time of 
perception. Where this foundation fact is not available and cannot be supplemented 
through adjusted foundation, the statement should not be admissible. Similarly, ancient 
documents exception where the only criterion for reliability is the age of the document, 
should be eliminated, Swift argues.459 
 
Swift’s foundation facts approach is designed for a bifurcated tribunal as it is the trial judge 
who needs to exercise control over whether sufficient foundation for hearsay evidence has 
been laid or not. As she has envisaged it, exclusionary input control would still be the tool 
of choice. Her approach also does not include a mechanism to differentiate between 
situations where hearsay evidence is truly needed and where it is just a matter of 
convenience that deprives the fact-finder of the opportunity to have the declarant himself 
testify. These two aspects appear in need of some more attention for the model to really 
take off and work in a paradigm where hearsay is by default admissible. 
 
The problem with having the trial judge decide whether to admit hearsay statements or not 
is twofold. First, in unitary tribunals the exclusionary input control will not have the 
desired effect. Furthermore, even where the trial is by jury, hearsay statements are often 
uttered by witnesses at trial without any forewarning. If the proponent is then not able to 
produce the foundation witness(es) or if the foundation proves insufficient, the statement 
should be excluded. By that time, the fact-finders will have heard a great deal about the 
witness, the declarant and the statement (or they will have sat in the jury room while the 
judge and the opponent conduct voir dire of the foundation witnesses) making sure that 
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they remember very well what they must disregard thereby possibly defeating the purpose 
of the whole exercise. One way to fix this would be to require parties to give each other 
advance notice of their intention to present hearsay evidence and having statements with 
insufficient foundation excluded during pretrial procedure, possibly by a judge who will 
not try the case. This would also solve the problem with deliberately disregarding that 
would otherwise haunt a unitary tribunal, however, would still not solve the problem with 
hearsay statements blurted out by witnesses inadvertently and unexpectedly. One could 
argue that the jurors would disregard this anyway and that limiting instructions might have 
some effect as they would be based on reliability as opposed to some esoteric legal 
concepts.460 Another option is to rely on cross-examination and instead of excluding 
hearsay that has insufficient foundation, allow the opponent to demonstrate the lack of 
foundation facts through questioning and possibly by calling an expert to testify about the 
significance of one foundation factor or the other. This would, of course, assume skillful 
trial advocates and competent experts (but this seems to be the assumption in all criminal 
procedure). To augment the effect of such cross-examination for a bifurcated tribunal, the 
presiding judge could also instruct the jury about the dangers of hearsay statements that 
lack foundation. Not excluding hearsay evidence, however, would save court time and 
empower the fact-finder to make an informed decision. This also follows the principle of 
internal validation. The judge would still retain the general power to exclude evidence that 
tends to create undue prejudice or cause needless waste of time. 
 
As regards the best evidence issue, Seigel’s model appears promising.461 Seigel recognizes 
that because of deteriorating memory, in some cases hearsay may be the best evidence 
there is available. Very useful in those cases is the requirement that the witness, in spite of 
his poor memory about the event observed, would still come to court whenever possible. 
This would constitute an additional safeguard against fabrication, especially if the hearsay 
statement is in writing. The witness would also provide the necessary foundation for the 
statement and be available for cross-examination. 
 
Seigel’s approach may be too accommodating in cases where the declarant cannot be 
identified.462 This increases the chances of fabrication and opens the door for anonymous 
gossip. Combining Seigel’s and Swift’s proposals could make for a workable solution for 
different kinds of tribunals and this is what we are looking for.  
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Proposal: best evidence with foundation facts  
The combination of the best evidence principle and foundation facts approach would create 
a legal framework where, in general, hearsay evidence is admissible provided that two 
conditions are met: the proponent is able to present the foundation facts that enable the 
fact-finder to assess the reliability of the statement, and the hearsay statement is the best 
evidence available. The control method used in such a scheme is a combination of input 
and reasoning controls, however, focusing the fact-finder’s attention to the foundation facts 
and the possible hearsay dangers would likely have the effect of directing any fact-finder to 
make a more informed decision about the reliability of the statement and discount it where 
appropriate – and this all without anyone excluding evidence. The definite advantage of 
this kind of input control is that there will be no need to maintain the dubious notion of 
dichotomy of purpose or to “un-ring the bell” when the fact-finder has accidentally become 
aware of a hearsay statement. Therefore, this approach is suitable for both unitary and 
bifurcated tribunals.  
 
As regards the best evidence principle guiding the reception of hearsay statements in lieu 
of firsthand accounts, this would serve two closely related purposes: to prevent wasting 
time and to get the fact-finder the best information available. This must nevertheless not  
become a license to have the eyewitnesses give written statements and then stay out of 
court with the pretext that they do not remember anything (which, depending on the time 
that has elapsed before the case comes to trial may actually be the truth). The presumption 
here must be that the best available evidence is firsthand testimony and hearsay statements 
would become an option only when it has been ascertained to the satisfaction of the court 
that firsthand testimony is for some reason not the best evidence. Nevertheless, even when 
the witness no longer remembers the details he recorded right after the event, his testimony 
would still constitute the necessary foundation facts to allow for the presentation of the 
hearsay statement. This, too, would be amenable to any type of trial by any type of tribunal 
– and would even satisfy the confrontation requirement in the cases where the original 
declarant can appear to the court.  
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CHAPTER 4. STANDARD OF PROOF 
Introduction 
The standard of proof might just as well have been the first rubric out of the three and not 
the last. While the exclusionary rules attempt to control the fact-finding process by 
controlling the input and limiting the array of evidence available to the fact-finders, the 
standard of proof deals with the question of the level of certainty of the fact-finder’s 
decision. The question of certainty, however, is ironically anything but certain and debates 
are ongoing even about how to conceptualize what it is that the fact-finder needs to be 
certain of. 
 
In this chapter I will take a closer look at attempts to ensure the accuracy of fact-finding 
through enacting the minimum level of certainty. Input controls such as exclusionary rules 
or mandatory form of proof rules aim to regulate the information flow to the fact-finder 
and in effect filter out or force in some types of information in order to provide the fact-
finder with ‘palatable food for thought as well as a balanced diet’. The standard of proof is 
at work nearer to the other end of the information processing chain – it determines at which 
point the fact-finder can say it is legally able to make findings of fact with the required 
level of confidence.  
 
The history of the standard of proof is colourful. The mental processes of the fact-finder 
are elusive and difficult to describe, hence the desired end state is not simple to formulate. 
A meaningful standard should be measurable to at least some degree of objectivity. Here 
even deciding what parameters should be described is subject to dispute. Should we 
describe the standard of proof in subjective terms by telling the fact-finder how convinced 
they should be before rendering a verdict? Perhaps the standard could be expressed in 
objective terms instead – setting forth, for example, what kind of evidence legally 
constitutes the required level of proof. As we will shortly see, both approaches have been 
in use and are currently in operation in one jurisdiction or another. But should the standard 
also be expressed or defined in different terms depending on the procedural design or the 
fact-finder profile? And are the standards actually capable of guiding the fact-finder or is 
there really just one standard for being convinced much like an on-off switch,463 i.e. are 
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humans even capable of rating the various degrees of doubt? What if the current research 
in psychology were to confirm that the standard of proof is a useless tool in guiding the 
fact-finder and no matter how formulated, the expression of the standard has no real 
control over what level of probability causes the fact-finder to act? 
 
In this chapter, I will first see how this reasoning control device fits into the system of 
other devices – the burden of proof and the presumption of innocence. A short historical 
overview is also in order before turning to the sample jurisdictions for specific examples of 
how the standard of proof is conceptualized and used. Based on this comparative overview, 
I will explore the mechanism of the fact-finder’s decision making process from 
psychological point of view and the various mechanisms by which the standard of proof 
interacts with fact-finding decision making. Finally, I will once again attempt to offer a 
common framework regarding the standard of proof suitable for all sample jurisdictions. 
 
 
The interrelated concepts of presumption of innocence, burden of proof 
and standard of proof 
 
The standard of proof cannot be considered in isolation from two other concepts in 
criminal evidence law: the burden of proof and the presumption of innocence. In fact, the 
three concepts are so close that sometimes they are regarded as different facets of the same 
control measure. As Underwood explains,464 the burden of proof is a guide for the fact-
finder to help decide close cases. It first entails a standard for how the fact-finder should 
determine whether the case is a close one, and then it determines who should win a close 
case. Analytically, the burden of proof is actually a term that lumps together two different 
burdens. We need to distinguish between burden of production and burden of persuasion. 
The burden of persuasion is a rule that allocates the risk of non-persuasion – the party who 
bears the burden but fails to meet its demands will lose the case. Or in Underwood’s terms, 
the burden of persuasion determines the winner in a close case. The burden of persuasion is 
also referred to as the ‘legal burden’ or the ‘fixed burden’ and this implies that it does not 
shift during the trial. As we will see later, in some circumstances it actually does. It is a 
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classical example of such burden allocation that, in a criminal case, the burden of 
persuasion rests with the prosecution.465  
 
The burden of production (also known as the burden of adducing evidence or the evidential 
burden) means the party’s obligation to present or point to evidence in support of their 
claims. The burden of production is usually at least initially collocated with the burden of 
persuasion and in that context means that the party who bears the burden of production will 
automatically lose if they fail to come forward with evidence to enable a reasonable person 
to find in their favour.466 This amount of evidence is also known as the prima facie 
evidence. Once the party with the burden of persuasion has met their burden of production, 
the onus of presenting or pointing out of evidence is shifted to the party seeking to 
disprove the initial contention.  
 
As Mueller and Kirkpatrick explain, in general, the burdens of proof are allocated to the 
party who seeks court’s action.467 There are, however, additional considerations that bear 
on how the burdens of proof are divided amongst the parties. The burdens can be allocated 
to serve substantive policy objectives such as to make certain lawsuits easier to pursue. 
Sometimes the allocation of burdens reflects which party is more likely to be able to carry 
the burdens due to the access to evidence, for example. The allocation of the burdens of 
proof sometimes also reflects the probable truth of a party’s claim as compared to the 
opposite claims.468 Finally, in some instances the unavailability of definitive proof requires 
that the burden of proof be allocated accordingly.469 While in criminal cases the burden of 
proof is universally known to be on the prosecution, the allocation of the burden of proof is 
actually a bit more complex even in criminal cases and in regards to some facts the burden 
may lie with the defence. This is, historically speaking, no new development. Most 
notably, the burden of proof to establish affirmative defences such as self-defence, insanity 
or duress was on the defence in most if not all Western jurisdictions well until the middle 
of nineteenth century (representing rare uniformity in approaches taken by both Common 
law and Civil law traditions, arguably influenced by how private law disputes were 
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conceptualized in Roman law).470 Both Blackstone and Mittelmaier471 in substance agreed 
that while the prosecution was under an obligation to prove inculpatory circumstances, the 
exculpatory side of any criminal case was to be championed and proven by the defence, 
albeit to a lower standard than the prosecution’s case would have to be proven.472 Inspired 
by Blackstone, the same approach was adopted in the United States.473 George Fletcher 
argues that in places where the prosecution now bears burden of disproving the defences, 
this arrangement is but a more advanced form of the drive to better protect the rights of the 
defendant. This movement kicked off independently in both the United States and in 
continental Europe in the late nineteenth century and stems from the realization that 
criminal and civil law matters are fundamentally different. Criminal sanctions can only be 
imposed on those who the state can prove have committed a crime.474  
 
Presumptions belong to the same toolbox as burdens of proof and they operate to shift the 
burden of proof in regards to some specific facts. One could also say that every burden of 
proof carries with it a presumption to the contrary: unless the proponent succeeds in 
persuading the fact-finder, the factual allegations are presumed to be false. In criminal 
cases, the most famous and fairly universally accepted “presumption” is the presumption of 
innocence. According to it, a person is deemed not guilty unless a court has determined the 
contrary. The history of the presumption of innocence seems to be somewhat murky. As 
Rinat Kitai explains, the notion of presumed innocence developed into its contemporary 
form some time during the Enlightenment but the concept itself in continental Europe is 
much older and is sometimes traced back to ancient Hebrew law, Roman law, canon law or 
12th century Italian law.475 The substance of the presumption was not necessarily what it is 
today – in medieval Italy, for example, one school of thought held that it was contingent 
upon the defendant’s social status, good name and prior life and thus not everyone enjoyed 
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the protection of the presumption of innocence. Canon law at the same time held that 
presumption of innocence is applicable to all people regardless as people were supposedly 
good by their nature.476  
 
Although today the presumption of innocence has gained near universal acceptance, there 
are still critics arguing it should not even be a guiding principle in criminal procedure. 
According to Kitai, there are those, for example, who earnestly claim that even the fact of 
pending criminal investigation should be enough to strip the suspect of the presumption of 
innocence, that the medieval Italian model of fact-based presumption of innocence should 
be followed, or that because our life experience shows that defendants predominantly turn 
out to be guilty, presuming them innocent would not only be hypocritical but also 
detrimental to the criminal justice system’s ability to combat crime.477 Some of these 
arguments may well help us understand the forces influencing fact-finders in their 
judgment – for example, as we saw earlier, fact-finders convict more easily those who have 
prior convictions as compared to those who have none. Thus, once known to the fact-
finders, previous convictions may well in fact have exactly the effect that the critics of the 
presumption of innocence argue they should have – that of reversing the presumption and 
the associated burden of proof. 
  
Often the presumption of innocence is regarded as not really a presumption at all.478  The 
argument goes, it is not based on specific facts but is more of a policy statement and a 
moral declaration rather than a true presumption. Many regard it as just a restatement of the 
burden of proof.479 The burden generally lies with the prosecution and means that the 
prosecution bears the risk of losing the case, should it fail to prove any element of the 
charge.480 The paradigm where the “presumption restates the burden” is surprisingly 
widely accepted: for example, Mueller and Kirkpatrick in their book and Dennis in his both 
subscribe to the same approach. Yet this approach seems to put the cart before the horse. 
The presumption of innocence, at least in the modern times, is regarded as a fundamental 
human right animated by appreciation of such very profound values of liberal society as 
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liberty, dignity, privacy and reputation of the individual.481 This makes the presumption of 
innocence, not the burden of proof, the starting point and the basis for procedural design. 
At the same time, the presumption of innocence is also the control measure that sets the 
starting point or base value for the reasoning process by fact-finders. The allocation of the 
burden of proof to the party officially charged with proving the defendant’s guilt is but a 
logical corollary of the decision to presume all people innocent until proven otherwise.482  
 
So how does the standard of proof fit into this scheme? The standard of proof or the 
standard of persuasion describes the weight of the burden of proof. While the burden of 
proof on the one hand determines what the fact-finder should do if the case before it is 
factually a close one (meaning that no one party has a clear advantage), it is the standard of 
proof that defines for the fact-finder what a close case means.483 In other words, how far 
ahead the party bearing the burden of proof must be of the other in order to overcome the 
associated adverse presumption. Or, to use the analogy of the scales of justice – by how 
much should one weighing pan outweigh the other for the party to prevail.  
 
As we observed before, the allocation of the burden of proof has been justified in a number 
of different ways. The same can be said about the standard of proof. Placing the burden of 
proof in criminal cases on the government reflects the inherent imbalance between the 
individual accused and the government intent on punishing someone – not only has the 
government more resources to collect evidence but it is also the government seeking the 
court’s action.484 By placing the burden of proof on the government, the law reflects the 
gravity of a potentially erroneous conviction for the individual, and the much-reiterated 
understanding that it is far better to let the guilty go free than to punish an innocent 
person.485 The standard of proof further helps to ensure that this allocation of burden will 
actually work. As Underwood explains, any standard of proof that is higher than “more 
likely than not” rigs the scales in favour of the defendant and reduces the chances of 
conviction in all cases. It may do so to offset the systemic imbalance of the scales of justice 
– perhaps fact-finders are for some reason more prone to convict than acquit. But setting 
the standard of proof high may do more than just re-balance the scales: it may rig the scales 
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in favour of the defendant so the fact-finder will not convict unless the prosecution is 
winning by a landslide.486 This kind of pre-rigging of scales by imposing a high standard of 
proof has the general effect of making convictions harder to obtain – both when they would 
be warranted and when they would be erroneous. Thus, the decision to rig the scales this 
way essentially reflects the need to avert abuse of power in close cases by fact-finders or 
prosecutors and a notion that the cost of erroneous conviction is higher than that of 
erroneous acquittal.487 There is also another function to the higher standard of proof and 
that is to impress on the public and the fact-finders the importance of the judgment in a 
criminal case.  
 
The standard of proof can be articulated as a form of words thought best to describe the 
required level of certainty. An example of this is the famous “beyond a reasonable doubt” 
formulation. Other formulations of this sort share a similar tenet: they all purport to 
objectively describe how much one side should outweigh the other, and this in spite of the 
subjectivity of evaluation of evidence. On the other hand, and we will be seeing this 
shortly, there are jurisdictions that do not have a specific formulation for the standard of 
proof worded in terms of objective difference in weight. This of course does not mean that 
they in fact do not have a standard – the standard may describe the fact-finder’s subjective 
level of conviction instead – or have simply remained unarticulated. Since the standards, 
even where articulated, are not universally quantified and are mathematically speaking, 
imprecise,488 even the same formulation of the standard of proof may turn out to mean 
different things in different jurisdictions and to different fact-finders.  
 
Stating a standard of proof is a measure of direct reasoning control: an imperative to the 
fact finder regarding the level of confidence they should have in their decision. The picture 
would be incomplete, however, if one were to not appreciate the alternative control 
measures in place that also tend to affect the level of certainty required of the fact-finders. 
One such measure is the form of decision. While nominally controlling only the “output 
format”, the requirement that the fact-finder should state their reasons for the findings of 
fact could in effect also impact the reasoning process which would now have to cater for 
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the required output format.489 Similarly, appellate review standards may influence the fact-
finders. Where the appellate courts are to reevaluate evidence anew on appeal, their 
decisions can create a more particularized and nuanced framework of corroboration-and-
sufficiency rules that in effect take the place of a general standard of proof. Then again, if 
the appellate institution is prohibited from engaging in any fact-finding of their own, it may 
be the lower courts working from the more general standard and this would probably mean 
less uniformity.  
 
Before turning our attention to the sample jurisdictions, one more remark is in order. It 
may be tempting, as I mentioned before, to lump the intimately intertwined concepts of the 
burden of proof, standard of proof and presumptions into one and deal with them as if they 
were just different facets of the same idea. In fact, this is often done and the well known 
article by Underwood cited above is one example of this. While this “aggregated approach” 
may be useful for some purposes, it is rather dysfunctional for our inquiry that focuses on 
the psychological aspects of different evidentiary controls on fact-finding. And from this 
perspective, to merge the three into one means not recognizing their operational 
differences.490 For this reason, while the survey of jurisdictions will occasionally and 
briefly touch upon the presumption of innocence and the allocation of the burden of proof, 
I do so only to provide the reader with some more context491 and will not delve into the 
intricacies of these other adjacent concepts.  
 
Now it is time to turn to our sample jurisdictions and see how their respective laws deal 
with the burdens and standard(s) of proof in criminal cases. To make this account 
comparable, I will provide a general overview of the allocation of burden of proof and then 
look at whether and how the jurisdiction has articulated the standard of proof. I will also 
attempt to identify whether (especially in those jurisdictions that do not articulate a specific 
standard) there are any additional controls that indirectly aim to regulate the level of 
certainty of the decision, such as a requirement of a unanimous verdict, for example.  
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Main features of the regulation regarding the standard of proof in the 
sample jurisdictions 
 
England and Wales 
 
The fact-finder in England and Wales can mean a number of things. If the case is to be 
tried in the Crown Court, the trial is before a jury of twelve. According to Section 17 (1) of 
the Juries Act 1974, the verdict need not be unanimous but at least ten out of twelve or 
eleven jurors must concur and jurors must have had sufficient time to deliberate. If by the 
close of the case, there are only ten jurors, nine must concur on the verdict. Section 17(4) 
sets forth that the Crown Court must not accept a majority verdict unless the deliberation 
time has been at least two hours. If, however, a sufficient majority cannot be reached, the 
judge will declare a mistrial and the case can be retried if the prosecution so chooses. The 
jury does not have to give reasons for their verdict. Where the trial is by a panel of 
magistrates, they do not have to write reasoned findings of fact either but when the case is 
appealed, they must “state the case” for the appellate court. Stating the case means writing 
up a statement of facts that the court found proven. 
 
The defendant is presumed innocent until proven guilty and the burden of proving criminal 
charges lies with the prosecution, although the allocation of the burden of proof is not all 
that straightforward. In the 1935 case of Woolmington v. DPP492, the court speaking 
through the words of Lord Sankey refused to presume malice and place the burden of 
disproving the mens rea on the defence. Yet in some instances,493 the defendant bears the 
burden of proof. Probably the most well-known example of this is the insanity defence 
where the defendant bears the full burden of proof (meaning, both the burden of persuasion 
and the burden of production). There are also other exceptions to the general burden of 
proof rule where the burden of proof with regard to some element of the offence is placed 
on the defendant.494 Although the presumption of innocence and its corresponding 
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allocation of the burden of proof on the prosecution is hailed as “the golden thread” that 
weaves through the fabric of English criminal law,495 the law in its current state is actually 
somewhat unprincipled and offers the prosecution easy ways out in quite a few 
situations.496 As the allocation and shifts of burdens of proof are beyond the scope of this 
thesis, they will not be discussed any further. 
 
The standard of proof in criminal cases in England and Wales is “beyond reasonable 
doubt” and this standard is applicable to all criminal cases regardless of which court the 
case is pending in. The ubiquitous question of what is meant by a reasonable doubt has 
given rise to two approaches in case law. Historically, the standard probably crystallized in 
its current formulation some time in the 18th century but could have in some shape or form 
been in use even earlier.497  There are those who attempt to explain this formulation by 
bringing analogies or defining the kind of mental state the jurors should have to warrant 
conviction (or the kind of doubt that would bar a conviction). One common analogy is that 
of business decisions – if the fact-finder harbours doubts that would cause them to stop and 
think in their more important business dealings, they should know that they are having 
reasonable doubts.498 A well-known description can be found in Walters v. R,499  where the 
court remarked that  
 
“[p]roof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean proof beyond the shadow of a doubt. The 
law would fail to protect the community if it admitted fanciful possibilities to prevent the 
course of justice. If the evidence is so strong against a man as to leave only a remote 
possibility in his favour which can be dismissed with the sentence ‘of course it is possible, 
but not in the least probable,’ the case is proved, but nothing short of that will suffice.” 
                                                                                                                                                
sharp and pointy instrument with him in a public place for a “good reason“; Misuse of Drugs Act 1971 s. 28 
places upon the defendant the burden of proving that he had no knowledge and did not suspect that he was in 
possession of a controlled drug. There is also the potentially far-reaching principle that where the evidence is 
peculiarly within the knowledge of the defendant, the defence should carry the burden of proof. This is also 
known as the implied shift of the burden of proof. 
495
 Woolmington v. DPP,[1935] A.C. 462, 481. 
496
 Ian Dennis, Reverse Onuses and the Presumption of Innocence: In Search of Principle, [2005] Crim. L. 
Rev. 901.  
497
 See Barbara Shapiro, The Beyond Reasonable Doubt Doctrine: Moral Comfort or Standard of Proof?, 2 
Law & Human. 149 (2008). Shapiro’s article is mainly meant as a critical response to the theory by James 
Whitman who in his book argued that ‘beyond reasonable doubt’ was not a minimum standard for fact-
finding certainty but the roots of the reasonable doubt rule lie within medieval Christian theology and the 
“standard” had nothing to do with finding particular facts but, rather, aimed at coaxing, comforting and 
prodding anxious and reluctant Christians. Similarly, he argues that the unanimity rule was never meant so 
much to ensure the accuracy of fact-finding but to share the moral burden the jurors must have felt in “taking 
responsibility for the act and imposing the punishment for it” – see James Q Whitman, The Origins of 
Reasonable Doubt: Theological Roots of the Criminal Trial (Yale University Press: New Haven CT 2008).  
498
 See, for example, R v. Ching, 63 Cr. App. R. 7 (1976). But see also R v. Gray, 58 Cr. App. R. 177 (1973) 
where the court found that an explanation that a reasonable doubt is the kind of doubt “which might affect 
you in the conduct of your everyday affairs” set the standard too low and was therefore improper.  
499
 2 A.C. 26 (1969), 
160 
 
Appellate courts have discouraged trial judges’ attempts to explain what reasonable doubt 
means – not only are the jurors a diverse population with likely different reasonability 
standards and value judgments,500 but there is supposedly also a risk of confusing the jury 
by the explanations.501 The courts do, however, agree that the standard of “beyond 
reasonable doubt” is a high one and while proving the case beyond any doubt would be 
near impossible, the measure of certainty in the fact-finders’ mind should be such that the 
jurors “are completely satisfied” or “feel sure of the prisoner’s guilt”.502 More recently, the 
Court of Appeal has emphasized that in their instructions to the juries, judges must make 
clear that juries should decide cases based on the evidence and set aside their feelings, 
convicting only when they are “sure” of guilt.503 The Crown Court Bench Book also takes 
the approach that the jury should be simply instructed to convict only if they are “sure that 
the defendant is guilty” and that any further explanations would be unwise.504 Ian Dennis 
explains that in cases where conviction depends wholly or partly on inferences drawn from 
circumstantial evidence, the “beyond reasonable doubt” standard means that the fact-finder 
cannot logically convict unless they are sure that inferences of guilt are the only ones that 
can reasonably be drawn. If there are innocent explanations to the circumstantial evidence 
that are more than just merely fanciful, these inferences would constitute reasonable 
doubt.505 Although the standard of proof in criminal cases is generally “beyond reasonable 
doubt,” this standard is not applicable to factual issues where the burden of persuasion lies 
with the defence: there the standard is the “balance of probabilities”506 – a lower standard 
that has been described as requiring a conclusion on behalf of the fact-finder that the 
proponent’s factual allegation is “more probable than not”.507  
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United States 
 
The Sixth Amendment to the Constitution guarantees the right to a trial by jury to 
defendants in all criminal prosecutions. Nevertheless, jury trial is actually not available to 
defendants charged with “petty offences” – misdemeanours and infractions where the 
maximum punishment is a 5000 dollar fine (10,000 dollars for organizations).508 In other 
more serious cases, jury trial is the default option but the defendant may waive this right 
and be tried by either a magistrate judge509 or a district judge sitting alone.  
 
A Federal jury is normally composed of twelve jurors but if both parties agree, the size of 
the jury can be reduced. Jury verdicts must be unanimous and where the jury cannot agree 
to a verdict, mistrial may be declared and the count of the indictment that caused the jury to 
deadlock may be retried.510 The jury does not have to give reasons for their verdict,511  but 
judges are required to issue written findings of fact according to Federal Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 32. 
 
The law on burdens and standards of proof in the United States has inherited a great deal 
from its predecessor, English law. There is a presumption of innocence and the burden of 
proof is placed on the prosecution. The standard to which this burden must be carried out is 
“beyond a reasonable doubt.” Although it is subject to some debate when exactly this 
standard crystallized in American case law and whether the standard that was used before it 
was higher, lower or similar to it,512 the rule that the prosecution must prove the 
defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt is well established and as the Supreme Court 
ruled in In re Winship,513 is applicable to the states through the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. In Winship, the Court explained that the presumption of innocence 
and the government’s burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt are bedrock axiomatic 
and elementary principles that are indispensable to reduce the risk of erroneous 
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convictions. This, the court explained, expresses an important value judgment in a society 
that values a person’s good name and his liberty. Moreover, the presumption of innocence 
and the corresponding allocation of burden of proof impress upon the fact-finders the need 
to “reach a subjective state of certitude of the facts in issue” and help build confidence in 
society about the applications of the criminal law.514 In the same opinion, the Supreme 
Court also expressis verbis states that the burden of proof is on the prosecution in regards 
to all elements of the charge.  
 
This being said, the burden of proof is still in some instances shifted to the defendant. Most 
notably, this is the case with affirmative defences – the kinds of defences where the 
defence is not relying on disproving an element of the crime but seeks to establish 
additional facts that would bar conviction – the insanity defence is a good example. As 
Mueller and Kirkpatrick note, the defendant has the burden of going forward with regards 
to either type of defence. In affirmative defences, however, the defendant may also bear the 
burden of persuasion.515 In Patterson v. New York516, the Supreme Court held that it was 
unconstitutional to shift the burden to the defence with regard to mens rea which is an 
essential element of the offence. However, it also potentially opened the door for the 
legislature to frame the substantive law so that more of what the defence can do would fall 
under the heading of affirmative defences – for example, cutting the mens rea out of the 
elements of the crime and setting forth that the absence of the requisite mental state is an 
affirmative defence.517  
 
The standard of proof in criminal cases for the prosecution is “beyond a reasonable doubt” 
and just like in England, there is a divide between those judges who think it should not be 
muddied by trying to further explain it,518 and those who attempt to clarify it by 
explanations or analogies.519 The Supreme Court has approved of different instructions 
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given to the jury as to what ‘reasonable doubt’ means. For example, in Victor v. 
Nebraska,520 the trial court had instructed the jury that ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ means 
an abiding conviction as to guilt. Similarly, in Holland v. United States521 the Court upheld 
an instruction that a reasonable doubt would be the kind of doubt that would cause a 
reasonable person to hesitate to act in the more important affairs in their own lives.522  
 
In Cage v. Louisiana523 the Supreme Court cautioned lower courts not to set the standard 
too low by exaggerating the degree of doubt needed for an acquittal. There the trial court 
had characterized reasonable doubt as “grave uncertainty” and “actual substantial doubt” 
while also equating the beyond a reasonable doubt standard with “moral certainty”. The 
Court opined that taken as a whole, this could have lowered the standard for conviction to 
an unacceptably low level.  
 
When the burden of proof lies with the defendant, the standard is usually lower – by a 
preponderance of the evidence.524 Occasionally and especially with regard to the insanity 
defence, higher standards are required in statutory law525 and upheld by courts.526  
 
 
Estonia 
 
In Estonia, criminal cases are tried before a single professional judge for felonies in the 
second degree (maximum punishment does not exceed five years imprisonment) or before 
a panel composed of one professional judge and two lay assessors where the charge is one 
of a first-degree felony. In a collegial court, judgments are by a simple majority and the 
lone dissenter may file a dissenting opinion if they so choose, according to KrMS § 23. 
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Note that according to KrMS § 306(4) the dissenting opinion of a member of the panel in 
the trial court will be added to the case file but not promulgated with the judgment. In 
practice, dissents at trial level are extremely rare. 
 
The presumption of innocence is enshrined in Article 22 of the Constitution which reads in 
relevant part as follows. 
No one may be deemed guilty of a criminal offence before he or she has been 
convicted in a court and before the conviction has become final. No one is required 
to prove his or her innocence in criminal proceedings. 
 
The presumption of innocence is reiterated in KrMS § 7 (3): “all unresolved doubts about 
the guilt of the suspect or defendant shall be interpreted in favour of the suspect or 
defendant”. These provisions form the backbone of the regulation regarding the burden and 
standard of proof in criminal cases.  
 
The Supreme Court has on a number of occasions stated that while the burden of proof is 
on the prosecution and the defence is entitled to refrain from presenting any evidence of 
their own, if the defence choose to adopt a more active tactical stance, especially by 
claiming alibi defence, it must also present evidence in support of the alibi or at least offer 
information that would enable the prosecution to verify the defence version.527 The court 
does not explain how this kind of shift in the burden of proof is reconciled or balanced 
against/with the presumption of innocence.  
 
The standard of proof in Estonia is not clearly articulated in statutory criminal procedure 
law. According to KrMS § 60 (1), “Circumstance is considered proven if, based on the 
evidence presented, the judge is convinced of its existence or non-existence,” and KrMS § 
61 (2) provides that “The court evaluates all evidence as a whole according to its inner 
conviction.”  
 
The case law of the Supreme Court’s different chambers is illustrative of the concept of 
standard of proof being somewhat confusing. The administrative law chamber explains that 
in tax law, the standard for making a prima facie case of fraud is “reasonable doubt,” and 
that the standard of proof for guilt in criminal cases is significantly higher.528 The civil law 
chamber, on the other hand, explains that the standard of proof in misdemeanour cases is 
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much higher than in civil matters, as evidenced by significant formal restrictions on 
admissibility of evidence.529 Apparently they view the standard of proof as a quality or 
reliability standard of individual pieces of evidence.  
 
The Court has consistently in the opinions by all three chambers emphasized the 
requirement for the reasoned finding of facts which is a mandatory part of trial court 
judgments.530 According to the oft-quoted mantra, the judgment must spell out what facts 
based on what evidence were found to have been proven, what evidence was rejected or 
disregarded and for what reason so that the reader is able to follow the formation of the 
judge’s inner conviction about the facts of the case.531 The criminal law chamber, however, 
has taken the issue of standard of proof a bit further by attempting to explain what the 
lower court should do in cases where there is some doubt about the prosecution’s guilt 
hypothesis. In felony cases, the Court has found that “where the doubts about the 
prosecution’s version of events cannot be reconciled by methods available to criminal 
procedure, the doubts must be interpreted in light favourable to the defendant.”532 In a 
recent case533 the Court admonished that it is up to the prosecution to present evidence in 
support of the defendant’s guilt and the court must not on its own initiative take over the 
role of the prosecution and start looking for inculpatory evidence where the prosecution 
has failed to prove some element of the charge.534 This kind of judicial assistance to 
prosecution is considered a reversible error. Curiously, in misdemeanour cases that are 
governed by an older Code of Misdemeanour Procedure, the Court has held that the trial 
court, faced with ambiguities or gaps in the evidence, should take steps to reconcile the 
ambiguities and fill the gaps by collecting additional evidence.535  
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 E. Sup. Ct. No. 3-2-1-10-09. 
530
 Save for the judgments in short format where findings of facts and legal reasoning is omitted and the 
judgment only consists of introduction and the operative part. 
531
 See, for example E. Sup.Ct. No. 3-1-1-75-11, or E. Sup.Ct. No. 3-1-1-21-10. 
532
 E. Sup.Ct. No. 3-1-1-73-05. 
533
 E. Sup.Ct. No. 3-1-1-89-13. The defendant was charged with illegal possession of a large quantity of a 
controlled drug. Under Estonian law, large quantity means a quantity that is sufficient to cause intoxication to 
at least ten people. There was expert opinion in the case as to what substances were found in the powder 
seized from the defendant, however, prosecution offered no evidence about the quantity needed to intoxicate 
one person as „the criminal law judges know these quantities anyway“. The judge in her opinion cited a 
forensic pharmacology textbook in finding what a single dose of the drug was and convicting the defendant. 
534
 See also, E. Sup.Ct. No. 3-1-1-91-07, or E. Sup.Ct.No. 3-1-1-67-06. While similar lapses can occur 
anywhere when prosecution seems weak and the defendant appears guilty, in Estonia they are certainly 
historical artifacts. Most judges have for a long time worked under the previous version of the CCrP which 
placed on the court the obligation of independently finding evidence and investigating the charges. The Code 
of Misdemeanour Procedure in effect in 2013 is still following the same logic.  
535
 E. Sup.Ct. No. 3-1-1-125-12.  
166 
Even though the Estonian legislator has apparently regarded articulating an objective 
standard of proof in criminal cases a futile matter, the case law of the Supreme Court has 
taken a different approach and come up with some broad statements framed in terms of the 
level of certainty and doubt. Upholding the judgments of lower courts, the Supreme Court 
explained that not all doubts need to be interpreted to the defendant’s advantage. Instead, 
the in dubio pro reo536 principle in Estonian criminal procedure means that only doubts 
that are substantiated,537 realistic and credible538 should warrant this consideration. 
Apparently the Court in Estonia is struggling with the same issue that has puzzled courts in 
the United States and England: how best to define the kind of certainty required for a 
criminal conviction in objective or interpersonal terms. The result apparently is moving in 
the same direction as well – not every shadow of a doubt should thwart a conviction and 
absolute certainty is not required. Curiously, the standard of proof required for arrest 
warrants and pretrial detention has been articulated much more clearly: the prosecution 
must present evidence that “create a reasonable suspicion that the person to be arrested has 
committed a criminal offence, and that there is reason to believe that if not detained, the 
person will flee or commit more crimes.”539 We do not see in Estonia the attempts to 
describe the requisite levels of doubt or certainty by analogies from everyday life. Perhaps 
it is assumed that professional judges would not benefit from those kinds of explanations 
anyway. While there is considerable theoretical discussion going on about the standard of 
proof in both England and the United States, no such discussion has ensued in Estonia, 
save for a few articles about whether criminal procedure concerns itself with finding the 
truth or has ceased to pursue this high aspiration after “becoming adversarial” in 2004,540 
and the Commentaries to the KrMS published in 2012.541 
 
 
Chile 
 
The fact-finder profile in Chile is entirely professional. While lesser offences are decided 
by a single judge, more serious criminal matters are tried before a panel of three 
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professional judges of the criminal trial court. There are no lay fact-finders in Chilean 
courts.  
 
CPPC Article 4 sets forth that no person may be considered guilty of a crime unless 
convicted by a court judgment that has come to force. This formulation mirrors provisions 
establishing the presumption of innocence in other jurisdictions and has the same general 
effect of placing the burden of proof upon the prosecution.  
 
According to CPPC Article 295, the circumstances that are relevant to the adjudication of 
the criminal matter may be proved by any means produced and incorporated in accordance 
with the law. Article 297 states that the tribunal is free in their evaluation of evidence but 
must not contradict logic, the maxims of experience or scientific knowledge. As I have 
pointed out previously, this freedom in evaluation of evidence is a fairly recent 
development and a radical shift from the previous regime which closely resembled the 
Roman-Canon system of legal proofs.  
 
The tribunal must prepare a written judgment where it spells out the weight and 
significance it accorded to each piece of evidence, including those it chose to disregard. In 
the latter case, specific reasons for disregarding particular evidence must be written out.  
 
Article 340 contains a clear statement of a standard of proof: “No person may be convicted 
of a crime unless the tribunal is, beyond all reasonable doubt convinced that the crime 
described in the charge has indeed been committed and that the defendant participated in 
the commission thereof in a manner punishable by law.” The law also stipulates in the 
same article that the court can form its conviction only based on the evidence adduced at 
trial and that nobody can be convicted based on his own statement alone. According to 
Article 19 of the Court Organization Act (Codigo Organico de Tribunales),542 the criminal 
trial courts decide cases by a simple majority vote. However, when there is a difference of 
opinion among the judges, Section 2 of the same article requires that the judge who 
proposed the disposition most unfavourable for the defendant, must join one of his 
colleagues’ votes. This peculiar provision is apparently designed to prevent the three-judge 
panels from deadlocking.  
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Germany 
 
The fact-finder profile in Germany may have many different shapes depending on the 
severity of the charge and the court the case is tried in. Minor offences are dealt with by a 
judge sitting alone or by a judge sitting in a panel with two lay assessors. Where the 
defendant is charged with a more severe crime, the case will proceed in a regional court 
with three professional judges and two lay assessors. When the regional court is hearing an 
appeal from the local court, the court will be composed of two professional judges and two 
lay assessors. The appeal is both on issues of law and fact and can take the shape of a 
retrial (albeit where no procedural errors are averred or new evidence presented, can be a 
trial on the record of the initial hearing).543  
 
Neither the German Constitution (Grundgesetz) nor the StPO includes provisions that 
would pertain to the presumption of innocence or the corresponding allocation of the 
burden of proof. Nevertheless, being a member state of the Council of Europe and the 
ECHR, the presumption of innocence must also be a guiding principle of German criminal 
procedure through Article 6 of the ECHR. Fletcher also references six different lines of 
reasoning finding support for the presumption of innocence in German law.544 This also 
means that the burden of proof regarding the defendant’s guilt or innocence cannot 
primarily rest with the defence (the defence would have nothing to prove). Indeed, 
commentators point out that while the defendant does not have to prove his innocence, it is 
the obligation of the court with the help of the prosecutor to ascertain the facts necessary 
for reaching a judgment.545 As Roxin explains, German criminal procedure, unlike their 
civil procedure, adheres to the principle of inquiry (Untersuchungsgrundsatz) and seeks to 
ascertain material truth as opposed to formal truth.546 This is not just the court’s right but 
also its obligation. The principle of inquiry means that the court must investigate the matter 
ex officio and is not bound by the parties’ motions or evidence presented by the parties.547 
A German trial court is nevertheless not unrestricted in its power to conduct inquiry: StPO 
§ 155 sets forth that “The inquiry and judgment shall extend only to acts averred and 
individuals named in the indictment.” This arrangement, however, means that while the 
defence does not have the burden of proof, the burden is not on the prosecution either – it 
                                                
543
 Claus Roxin, Strafverfahrensrecht: ein Studienbuch, 22.Aufl. (München: Beck, 1991), 358-359. 
544
 Fletcher, note 463, at 881. 
545
 Lutz Meyer-Goßner, Strafprozeßordnung, Gerichtsverfassungsgesetz, Nebengesätze und ergänzende 
Bestimmungen, 44.Aufl. (München: Beck, 1999), 612, para.3. 
546
 The distinction and its further implications have been discussed earlier in the first chapter of this thesis. 
547
 Roxin, note 543, at 77. 
169 
is the court’s responsibility (to be carried out with the help of the prosecutor’s office) not 
only to adjudicate but also to investigate and convince itself that there is no other evidence 
that could help ascertain relevant facts of the case and should be examined. This court’s 
obligation is expressed in StPO §§ 244(2) and 244(4).  
The German take on the standard of proof is found in StPO § 261. According to it, “The 
court shall decide on the result of the evidence taken according to its free conviction gained 
from the hearing as a whole.” As Meyer-Großner and others explain, the “forensic truth” 
that the criminal process is based on is the judge’s full conviction that is gleaned from the 
trial that has been conducted according to the principles of immediacy and orality.548 The 
kind of certainty required for a judgment of guilty is the degree of certainty that “according 
to the judge’s life experience is sufficient to be beyond reasonable doubt”.549 This certainty 
must be achieved through careful consideration of all relevant circumstances both for and 
against the defendant, and while purely theoretical doubts in the defendant’s guilt should 
be disregarded, “mathematical certainty” is not required. A German trial judge will have to 
set forth his reasons in a written judgment. Commentators emphasize that while the 
judgment must be based on the judge’s personal inner conviction formed on the basis of 
evidence adduced at trial, it must nevertheless conform to the rules of logic and is subject 
to review according to “objectivated criteria of probative force” by higher courts.550 The 
trial judgment is required to include a careful analysis of evidence and it must clearly state 
the factual conclusions the court has reached. The judgment must reflect that the court has 
taken into account all evidence in the case, exhaustively assessed the same, and has been 
aware of all at least somewhat plausible alternative conclusions that the evidence in the 
case could warrant.551 As far as the in dubio pro reo principle is concerned, it is regarded 
not as an evidentiary provision but as a rule of decision for the case when the judge 
actually has doubts about some circumstances of the case (and the existence of these 
doubts has been spelled out in the judgment – the in dubio pro reo does not force the judge 
to entertain doubts that do not arise in his mind; it is not prescriptive in this sense).552 In 
addition to this general principle about what to do in case of doubt, commentaries often 
include lengthy digests of higher court judgments and scholarly texts on evaluation of 
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particular types of evidence (e.g. the factors that should be considered in evaluating the 
statements of a witness or a defendant).553  
 
Russia 
 
In Russia, the trial of crimes punishable by imprisonment for no longer than three years is 
before a justice of the peace. Other more serious crimes are tried before a federal judge or 
upon the motion of the defendant, can be tried before a jury of twelve. In certain 
enumerated offences, the trial court must be composed of three professional judges and 
some particular offences (most notably, terrorism and crimes against the state) cannot be 
subject to a jury trial even if requested by the defendant.554  
 
According to УПК Art. 354, appeals against judgments of federal judges and federal juries 
can only be predicated on errors of law; if a judgment by a justice of the peace is appealed, 
the appeal can encompass issues of fact determination as well.  
 
In Russia, УПК Articles 14 and 17 entail the basic principles of standards and burdens of 
proof in criminal cases. Article 14 provides that all defendants shall be presumed not guilty 
until a judgment of conviction has become effective. According to section 2, “[t]he suspect 
or the accused is not obliged to prove his innocence. The burden of proof of the charges 
and the refutation of the arguments given in defence of the suspect or the accused, rests on 
the prosecution.” Section 3 further elaborates on the topic: “3. All doubts about the guilt of 
the accused, that can not be removed in the manner prescribed by this Code shall be 
interpreted in favour of the accused. 4. A conviction can not be based on assumptions.”  
 
Complementing this article, УПК Article 17 sets forth the principles of evaluation of 
evidence: “The judge, jury, and the prosecutor, the investigator, the investigator evaluate 
the evidence according to their inner conviction based on the totality of the available 
evidence in a criminal case, guided by the law and conscience. 2. No evidence has a 
predetermined force.” According to an earlier version of the УПК, investigators, 
prosecutors and the court had the obligation to take all legally prescribed measures to 
achieve full and objective clarification of the circumstances of the case, both inculpatory 
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and exculpatory factors as well as aggravating and mitigating circumstances. The 
commentators have argued that this obligation demands that the fact-finders ascertain 
“objective” truth rather than “formalistic” one and that the defendant’s guilt must be 
ascertained with “absolute certainty”.555 This version of the Code has since been abolished 
and instead, УПК Article 15 now stipulates that the court must guarantee the conditions 
necessary for the parties to perform their obligations and exercise their rights. One cannot 
but wonder whether this means that the “absolute certainty” requirement of guilt was also 
abolished.  
 
As was noted earlier, while the judge in a bench trial has the obligation of writing a 
reasoned judgment, the jury has no such obligation and only has to answer questions posed 
to it in the verdict form. Here again, the code makes no mention of the level of certainty or 
the quantum of evidence necessary for a guilty verdict. According to УПК Article 339, the 
jury will be called to answer three questions about each count of the indictment: (1) 
whether the act in question took place; (2) whether the defendant committed the act; and 
(3) whether the defendant is guilty of the act. In addition, there may be more questions 
presented to the jury – like, whether there are mitigating circumstances, whether the 
defendant had the requisite criminal intent, or whether the defendant, if found not guilty of 
the offence charged, is guilty of a lesser included offence. These questions serve to shed 
some light on the jury’s reasoning process and as Esakov pointed out, constitute a sort of 
special verdict (as opposed to a general verdict that would only answer the general question 
of guilty/not guilty). Esakov also relates that formulation of the verdict form is one of the 
most difficult tasks for Russian trial judges presiding over jury trial these days – the 
questions must be phrased in factual and non-lawyerly terms.556  
 
Another feature may be instructive about the standard of proof in Russian jury trials - the 
regulation of jury voting. Although УПК Article 343 stipulates that the jury should strive 
towards a unanimous verdict, it also provides a relatively easy way out: if no consensus has 
been reached within three hours from the start of deliberations, the verdict will be by 
majority vote. A verdict of guilty requires simple majority of the jurors to vote for 
conviction; if at least six jurors out of the legally mandated twelve vote for an acquittal, the 
verdict will be “not guilty.” While the code makes no mention of the required standard of 
proof, an argument could be raised that the standard ultimately turns out to be “by a 
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majority of jurors’ votes” which basically means that there are more jurors who think the 
defendant is guilty than those who believe he is innocent. Taking the jury as a whole, in the 
mind of this collective fact-finder, the guilt must then be “more likely than not.” The time 
limit set for the unanimity requirement of course becomes fairly odd – the standard of 
proof seems to drop from absolute certainty (everyone must agree) to “at least 58.3 per cent 
probable” in just three hours and for no reason other than perhaps to save time on jury 
deliberations. If the jury delivers a verdict of not guilty, the trial judge must acquit. A 
guilty verdict does not possess similar binding effect: the trial judge can, if the verdict is 
obviously ill-founded, set the verdict aside and acquit the defendant notwithstanding the 
jury’s verdict or declare a mistrial and set the case for a retrial.557 
 
Appeals can be taken by all parties – not just the defence and prosecution but the victim as 
well. In regards to fact-finding errors, УПК Article 380 stipulates that reversal will follow 
in particular where the findings of fact are not supported by admitted evidence,558 where 
the judgment contradicts itself, where the court failed to take into account circumstances 
that could have changed the outcome of the case, or where the court failed to account for 
why some evidence was taken into consideration and other evidence was disregarded. 
Pursuant to Article 385(2), acquittals by a jury can be appealed only based on a claim that 
the prosecution was unlawfully prevented from presenting evidence to the jury or that a 
procedural error affected the questions put to the jury for deliberations. 
 
 
Some general observations 
 
The jurisdictions that we have looked at are all in accord about the general principles: the 
defendant is presumed innocent and does not have the burden of disproving the charges 
against him.559 Similarly also, the burden of proof actually is in some instances shifted to 
the defence. The rules for shifting the burden of proof, however, offer some variety not 
only in terms of whether the burden is shifted in a particular situation but also in terms of 
the extent to which the shift occurs.  
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Aside from the allocation of burdens, the standard of proof also offers intriguing questions. 
To start off, there seem to be two kinds of approach to the issue of the standard of proof – 
just like many scholars have pointed out before. As Fletcher wrote in 1968, there are those 
jurisdictions that define the requisite standard of proof by a specific form of words, and 
those that do not (and instead, rely on the Latin maxim in dubio pro reo – all doubts to be 
resolved in favour of the defendant – and stipulate that the fact-finder must have the “inner 
conviction”).560  
 
Surprisingly enough, here the only line that still seems to somewhat hold is the mainstream 
dichotomy of Anglo-American and Continental camp: while England and the United States 
at least formally adhere to the standard of proof beyond (a) reasonable doubt in criminal 
cases, Germany and Russia make no mention of any standard at all besides the intime 
conviction of the fact-finder. And then there is Chile that expressly demands that the court 
be convinced beyond all reasonable doubt, and Estonia where the code of criminal 
procedure prescribes no specific objective or interpersonal  standard of proof for decisions 
of guilt or innocence but the Supreme Court has developed a standard that sounds very 
close to “beyond reasonable doubt” while still also referring to the in dubio pro reo maxim.  
 
One would think that there is a strong correlation between articulating a particular standard 
of proof and the fact-finder profile or the trial design – the argument being that the 
articulated standard of proof is needed for jurors who are not trained in law and do not 
have to provide reasons for their verdict.561 Not so in this world anymore, though: Russia 
only refers to the free evaluation of evidence principle and makes no special provisions for 
their jury. Chile with their standard in statutory law has no jury and the Estonian Supreme 
Court has developed their own standard formulation even though no standard is expressly 
provided for in procedural law.562 Germany, where lay assessors are also routinely used at 
trial level, has no standard of proof articulated in the law; in England where lesser offences 
are tried by a panel of lay magistrate judges, the same rules of standard of proof apply as 
would for a jury trial or a trial by a professional judge: the standard is “beyond reasonable 
doubt”. Thus, there seems to be no correlation between the fact-finder profile (professional 
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or amateur or a mixed panel; solo or in a group) and the use of an articulated standard of 
proof as a reasoning control measure. 
 
If one were to control for the format of the decision by the trial court, we are equally at a 
loss: German courts must prepare a reasoned judgment that spells out how the judge’s 
inner conviction was formed. The same is required of Russian judges sitting without a jury, 
Chilean three-judge panels and of Estonian judges, regardless of whether they have lay 
assessors sitting with them or they are the sole arbiters of fact. While German and Russian 
law does not purport to articulate any specific standard of proof, Chilean law includes the 
“magic words” and the Estonian Supreme Court has carved out a standard themselves. The 
Estonian and Chilean standards remain anomalous and their genesis could deserve a closer 
look but the overall pattern seems clear: in countries where there is no articulated standard 
of proof, the requirement of reasoned judgment serves as the reasoning control measure 
instead of the standard of proof.  
 
 
Discussion 
 
In an attempt to find a suitable approach to work across the board, we will first look into 
the assumptions underlying the choices in different jurisdictions – how are standards of 
proof supposed to work and what controls are in place to ensure that they do. We will then 
take a look into what is known about the reasoning process of fact-finders and whether and 
how these assumptions pan out. Upon this study, I will offer my recommendations 
regarding the use of standard of proof for enhancement of the accuracy of fact-finding.  
 
 
Mechanics of the standard of proof: a reasoning standard 
 
The actual functioning of the standard of proof deserves a closer look. Is the standard of 
proof even an actual standard against which the trial court’s reasoning process is 
compared? Hock Lai Ho argues that it cannot be conceptualized as an effective “external” 
standard in pursuit of fact-finding accuracy for several reasons.563 One, that the “required 
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level of confidence” does not say anything about what this confidence is based on; two, 
that the standard of proof being unquantifiable cannot serve as a decisional threshold; and 
three, having an external standard like this is morally indefensible (even if it were 
quantifiable or feasible, the standard of proof cannot be an arbitrary measure used to 
promote policy goals at the expense of doing injustice in individual cases). If one were to 
attempt using it as an actual standard in reasoning, the fact-finder’s decision making 
process would have to be made “visible” to the reviewer and the standard of proof itself 
would have to be concrete and objective enough (or at least, intersubjective) to enable 
meaningful review (this does not necessarily dispel all Ho’s criticisms). Standards of proof, 
where articulated in law, actually are worded in a way that implies that there is an 
objectively ascertainable level of certainty. Estonia and Chile are the two sampled 
jurisdictions that seem to have gone down this path by articulating a standard of proof 
while seeking to make the reasoning process underlying the fact-finding more transparent 
through reasoned judgments. 
 
Demand in these jurisdictions that the fact-finders provide reasons for their decisions is an 
attempt to crack the lid off the black box of fact-finding and to make the reasoning process 
itself subject to review. To what degree this attempt is successful is unclear.564 After all, a 
reasoned judgment is not a verbatim transcript of the judge’s thought process but a 
carefully crafted and considered document unlikely to have been written in complete 
disregard for its fate in the appellate process. Thus, while gross errors in logic or obvious 
discrepancies between the trial record and the judgment can be an indicator that the case 
did not receive the careful consideration it deserved (or that the judge was not able to 
competently handle it in spite of his efforts), there would still be cases that can escape 
reversal if the writer is skillful and insincere.565 While reasoned judgments may not really 
provide insight into the actual process of forming the decision about facts they answer a 
different question: can the findings of fact be justified according to the prevailing canons of 
reasoning?566 Perhaps one can argue that the required level of certainty can by definition be 
achieved only as long as the conclusions of fact can be justified by rational reasoning?567  
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According to Damaška, historically the articulation of a standard of proof and reasoned 
judgments had been more or less mutually exclusive. They serve a similar purpose but 
target different parts of the decision forming process. Damaška proposes a number of 
reasons for this development – the court bifurcation and fact-finder profile being central 
among them. Nevertheless, it seems premature to conclude that this historical convention 
must continue to guide the regulation (and indeed, as evidenced by Chile and Estonia, it 
does not): while any desire to relieve judges from their writing assignments seems to be 
mostly motivated by the need to conserve judicial resources,568 calls to make juries more 
accountable or abolish them as amateur and arbitrary are more frequent and seem to have 
gained some traction.569 Stephen Thaman, for example, argues for having reasoned verdicts 
based on the practice in Spain and Russia where instead of general verdict, juries must 
deliver a special verdict. In the Spanish case the verdict should not only set forth 
specifically what facts were found proven but also include a reference to the evidence in 
record that the jury drew the inference from.570 Verdict forms for special verdicts like this 
can be developed by the trial judge specifically for each case or can be more generic as in 
the Russian case. In addition to elucidating the reasoning behind fact-finding, verdict forms 
like this can also help structure the fact-finders’ deliberation process to ensure that all 
legally relevant aspects of the charge are covered in deliberations. As Damaška explains, in 
mixed panels, the presiding professional judge is a “towering figure”571 who incidentally 
also leads the deliberations. Although procedural law may provide a list of questions to be 
decided by the court – essentially a generic verdict form,572 the trial judge chairs the 
deliberations and ensures that legally important steps are not skipped. The professional 
judge is ultimately also responsible for writing the judgment even in the unlikely event of 
being outvoted by the lay members.573 
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The mechanics of the standard of proof: exhortation 
 
Arguments have been raised that the reasoning process in fact-finding is by its very nature 
not amenable to a rational itemized account and the increase or decrease of the level of 
confidence is an aggregate not attributable to specific pieces of evidence. This argument 
speaks against insisting that the reasoning process behind fact-finding be set out in 
transcript-like manner where every piece of evidence is analyzed and every fact explained. 
If so, we need to look at the standard of proof from quite a different perspective. 
 
Ho and Thompson are right – “beyond reasonable doubt” by itself does not correspond to 
any numeric probability figure, even if one were to conduct fact-finding by assigning 
mathematic probability to the facts the charge is based on and calculating the total 
probability on the basis of the probability of the component facts.574 Moreover, such 
strictly probabilistic approach to fact-finding still appears to be a theoretical concept rather 
than something actually practiced in courts anywhere in the world. So when expressions 
like “beyond reasonable doubt” are used to express the standard of proof, there is really no 
exact scientific method to determine whether in fact such certainty of decision was 
achieved or not, and there is even no consensus as to what numeric probability figure 
would correspond to which standard.575  
 
As a reasoning control, a standard of proof is often included in the instructions to the jury. 
The judge instructs the jury that they should not convict unless they are convinced of the 
defendant’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt (or whatever the standard happens to be). The 
jury, so we hope, will heed the judge’s instructions and acquit the defendant unless the 
prosecution’s case is so solid that no reasonable doubt remains about it in the jurors’ 
minds. Here the standard of proof serves as an exhortation, a call for the jury not to convict 
unless they have the proper level of confidence about their decision. The decision making 
process itself, however, remains a black box. Whether or what kinds of doubts the jurors 
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actually harboured or what went into their calculus of guilt or innocence is left to their own 
conscience (unless the jury returns a special verdict). Usually the appeals process after a 
trial by jury is about whether the jury instructions were proper. The appeals court may also 
grant a retrial if the judicial exhortation in the jury instructions was improperly done (as in 
some cases where the higher courts have found that the trial court explained the standard of 
proof incorrectly) and we have examined a few examples of that already. Claims that the 
verdict is wrong in that the assessment of evidence was erroneous are much harder to make 
and a general verdict can be overturned usually only if it is manifestly unsupported by the 
evidence.576 The standard of proof (beyond reasonable doubt) is not necessarily the same 
standard enforced through appellate review. English law, for example, provides that a 
conviction can be reversed if it is “unsafe”. The approach in the United States is possibly 
best explained by the circuit court in U.S. v. Cook: 
 
In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a conviction, the 
Court of Appeals views the evidence in the light most favourable to the government, 
resolving evidentiary conflicts in favour of the government and accepting all reasonable 
inferences drawn from the evidence that support the jury's verdict; the Court will reverse 
only if no reasonable jury could have found the defendant guilty. 577 
 
Thus, the standard of proof, when used as an exhortation, is a guide to the fact-finders but 
not a standard against which one could compare the resulting judgment and complain that 
the standard was not followed. For a trial lawyer, however, it is the latter and not the 
former that counts.578 
 
Ho has taken a similar position. He argues that standard of proof can only be 
conceptualized as an “internal” standard, and argues that instead of standardizing the level 
of confidence in the facts found, the standard should focus on the fact-finder’s attitude 
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towards the deliberation process.579 Thus, instead of the level of confidence in the end 
result, what matters is the level of caution exercised by the fact-finder – and this should be 
varied in accordance with the severity of the potential consequences (a not necessarily 
novel idea, as Ho also notes). Because caution is distributed differently in different cases, 
the attitudes must correspond. The fact-finder’s attitude in criminal matters should be one 
of “protection” reflecting the value judgment that convicting the innocent is far worse than 
acquitting the guilty.580 This “attitude standard” approach seems to be reminiscent of 
Whitman’s theory that instead of fact-finding accuracy, the articulated standard “beyond 
reasonable doubt” was a moral comforting device581 and resonates with Miller Shealy’s 
calls to include in the instructions phrases that underline the gravity of the task that the 
fact-finders are about to embark upon.582 
 
The use of an articulated standard of proof or even a standard of caution/attitude as an 
exhortation assumes that such a device would actually work and that a fact-finder, having 
heard or read the standard of proof statement is somehow influenced by it so that he is 
more demanding towards the evidence, more rigorous in his analysis and more aware of 
the level of confidence or doubts he has about a conviction. In fact, since the law knows 
many different standards of proof,583 the assumption is that these standards would all evoke 
a different target level of confidence in the fact-finder. If there is no scientific evidence of 
such effects, insisting that the defendant’s guilt be proven beyond a reasonable doubt or to 
any other standard may well be just ceremonial. Whether exhortations work or not, is 
something we will have to look into from a cognitive science perspective.  
 
There is another assumption implicit in the use of articulated standards of proof as a 
control measure. The standards of proof describe the required level of confidence the fact-
finder must have in their decision. Let us for a moment remember the reason why such 
standards are articulated in the first place – it is to avoid erroneous convictions. The 
standard has been raised high in order to make sure that innocent people do not get 
convicted, at the expense of some guilty probably walking free, authors often add.584 
Insisting that the fact-finder must be very confident that the defendant is guilty seems also 
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to assume that there is a correlation between this confidence (or attitude, as the case may 
be) and the accuracy of the decision. This assumption by itself is outright illogical585 and 
must entail two more – that the necessary “ingredients” for an accurate decision can be 
adequately controlled for, and that the fact-finder possesses the skill necessary to make an 
accurate determination based on the information supplied. 
 
Now we have sifted out three questions that law itself cannot answer but the answers to 
which would be necessary if we were to design a reasoning control that works. We first 
need to look at the nature of fact-finding – how do human decision makers naturally go 
about figuring out what happened in the past based on information they are presented. We 
will then examine whether cognitive scientists have determined a correlation between 
confidence and competence. Our third inquiry is into the impact of exhortations. These 
three factors may well help us understand what the law can reasonably expect from fact-
finders and what is just a historical artefact and should be reconsidered in the interests of 
ensuring more accurate fact-finding. 
 
 
How does fact-finding work?  
In order to design a procedural device that would control the process of fact-finding we 
would first need to know what exactly it is that we are controlling and how it works. 
Similarly, in order to assess whether a device already in place is capable of handling its 
function, we need to be able to articulate the intended outcome. Christoph Engel makes the 
link clear: whether courts make materially wrong decisions depends on what judges and 
jury members do. A behaviourally informed perspective is paramount.586 As Dennis 
remarks, there is a surprising neglect of fact-finding theory in evidence textbooks and 
many of the formal rules are based on untested assumptions about how fact-finders 
approach their task of evaluating evidence.587 Cognitive psychologists who have 
researched decision-making in legal settings agree. Dan Simon describes the discourse in 
legal literature as more or less a battle between two camps: the rationalists who posit that 
judicial decisions (including but not limited to fact-finding) should proceed as a rational 
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logical inquiry making use of deductions, inductions and analogies;588 and the Critics who 
argue that the Rationalist approach is not descriptive of what is actually happening in 
judicial minds and that the mood swings and intuitions of the judge are more determinative 
factors than the rules of logic. This latter approach is especially closely associated with 
legal realist school of thought.589  
 
The approach of this work should come as no surprise by now – instead of untested 
assumptions and historical tradition, we will look at the current research in cognitive 
science in order to first understand how fact-finding actually works, and then see what the 
role of the standard of proof can and should be.  
 
Ideal Juror and other ideal models 
Empirical research into adjudicative fact-finding began in earnest with the mock jury 
experiments of Pennington and Hastie. In 1981 they published an article590 where they set 
out to describe jurors’ tasks in a trial and evaluate the various attempts that had been made 
to mathematically model the fact-finding process, given the empirical research that had 
been undertaken by that time. They called their model the “ideal juror model” – because it 
represents assumptions and expectations of the law for juror decision making. The authors 
argue that jurors at least strive to adhere to the ideal as instructed by the judge.591  
 
According to this model, the juror’s task of reaching a pre-deliberation verdict is divided 
into seven subtasks. First, the juror is expected to record and encode the trial information – 
this includes not only the substance of testimony or documents but instructions by the 
judge and observations by the jurors themselves. The next task is to learn the verdict 
categories – the juror, once again through the judicial instructions, will be made aware of 
the legal basis for his judgment. Pennington and Hastie view this in terms of four 
dimensions: the identity of the defendant, the actions of the defendant, the mental state of 
the defendant and the attendant circumstances of what happened at the time of the crime. 
Each of these dimensions may be (and usually in one form or another is) represented in the 
substantive criminal law applicable to the case at hand. For example, in a murder trial, lack 
of criminal intent (mental state) would prevent conviction of murder but may nevertheless 
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not constitute an obstacle to conviction of a lesser included offence such as manslaughter 
or negligent homicide. This even when all other dimensions have been established. Once 
the legal framework is in place, the juror will proceed to select from all available trial 
information the information that is legally admissible as evidence. An ideal juror would 
discard information that the judge has ruled inadmissible or that is no evidence at all (such 
as the behaviour of trial attorneys or the opening statement). Subtasks 4, 5 and 6 are the 
intertwined inferential operations of creating a sequence of events, evaluation of evidence 
for its credibility and evaluation for implications – whether the created and credibility-
evaluated event supports a finding of guilty in some of its dimensions or would rather 
support the opposite conclusion. The seventh, final subtask is the one of hypothesis-
testing.592 The ideal juror would take the hypothesis of not guilty as the default (this 
because of the presumption of innocence), and methodically compare or eliminate other 
competing hypotheses using the standard of proof as a guide to either accept or reject the 
hypothesis of guilt. Upon completion of this process, the juror would reach his 
predeliberation judgment according to the categories learned during subtask 2.  
 
Although this model is created with lay jurors in mind, the principal scheme of a judge’s 
fact-finding process is not very different. The main difference is that whereas jurors start 
learning about judgment categories only at the close of the evidence from the judge,593 the 
judge has the benefit of drawing on his legal training even before the start of the trial. The 
other difference is that unless the case is heard by a panel of judges, what would be only a 
preliminary, predeliberation judgment for jurors, will be the final judgment for a judge 
(save for the possibility that he changes his mind at the opinion writing stage when he 
realizes that his original fact determination cannot be justified according to the prevailing 
canons). 
 
The model by Pennington and Hastie is logically organized and the steps it entails 
represent the various mental operations that logically must be undertaken in order to reach 
the verdict. As the authors themselves conceded back then, an actual “perfect juror” is a 
rarity.594 Real jurors are less than perfect encoders, have the potential to misunderstand 
judge’s instructions, are quite possibly incapable of filtering out the information about the 
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case that they have received but are not supposed to consider, and may be less methodical 
than necessary to conduct a full analysis of all facts.  
 
There have been several attempts to describe the fact-finding process by algebraic 
formulae, however, these attempts have not gained traction in legislative circles or the 
courts. Pennington and Hastie’s article contains a good overview of the different algebraic 
models. The one characteristic that unites all of the models is that the mathematical models 
do not account for the idiosyncrasies of actual fact-finders and are thus empirically not 
descriptive.595 Some models, while purportedly descriptive, suffer from oversimplification. 
Such is, for example, apparently the information integration model that in its form as 
reviewed by Pennington and Hastie,596 does not take into account the effect of the order in 
which evidence is presented – and the order of presentation undisputedly has effects. Then 
some stop half-way through the process – while they purport to describe how jurors decide 
the probability of the guilt hypothesis, they do not deal with the issue of establishing the 
threshold for a guilty verdict – incidentally, the part that is most relevant to this work. An 
example of the latter is the sequential weighting model that takes into consideration the 
order in which evidence is presented but does not explain the role of the standard of proof 
in reaching the final verdict. Pennington and Hastie also criticize the mathematical models 
for the assumption that guilt or innocence is a unidimensional parameter. They argue that, 
in fact, there are at least four different dimensions in determining the guilt or innocence of 
the defendant: the perpetrator’s identity, mental state, actions and attendant 
circumstances.597 All of the four factual dimensions are represented implicitly or explicitly 
in the elements of the criminal offences and must be established in order to reach a verdict 
of guilty.  
 
Possibly the most successful and certainly the most well-known of the mathematical 
models is Bayes’ theorem. It purports to describe how fact-finders get from “prior 
probability” – the probability that a particular piece of evidence would be found if the 
accused were guilty – to “posterior probability” – the probability of the accused being 
guilty given the new piece of evidence that was just added. This calculation can be 
repeated as many times as is necessary and at the end it purports to yield a figure indicating 
the probability of the guilt of the defendant, given all the evidence.598 Bayes’ theorem has 
also been used to explain probability analysis by cognitive psychologists, however, 
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experiments provided ample evidence that the theorem did not describe human judgment 
accurately (the subjects failed to adequately revise their opinions in light of the new 
evidence – a phenomenon that was labelled conservatism in the late 1960s).599  
 
With the emergence of research into heuristics, biases and the discovery of base-rate 
neglect in 1970s, the research focus in cognitive psychology shifted away from Bayes’ 
theorem. Nevertheless, legal psychology was not disturbed by this shift in the mainstream 
and arguments in favour of organizing the fact-finding process or at least the discussion 
about it around Bayes’ theorem went on well into the late 1990s600 and still occur today.  
 
What makes Bayes’ theorem attractive to lawyers is that the origin of the assessment of 
probability of individual events or facts is the subjective belief of the fact-finder rather than 
some objective empirical data. Even though this makes Bayes’ theorem more appealing 
both in describing fact-finding in courts and as a guide for fact-finders to conduct their 
inquiry, this also provides ammunition for the critics saying that the theorem is nothing but 
a scientific-sounding smokescreen to disguise what really goes on.601 The critics do not 
stop there and have objections to the application of the theorem every step of the way. For 
example, setting the initial “prior probability” figure is argued to be just a guess as there is 
no known base value; calculations themselves have been found so numerous as to surpass 
human capabilities, and even if the calculations had been grouped together602 and properly 
performed, the resultant figure has no counterpart in the law – the standard of proof does 
not come with a probability figure attached to it603 and quite possibly one cannot be 
assigned.604 As Roberts and Zuckerman summarize, by now, the “Bayesians” have 
conceded that the theorem is not descriptive of actual fact-finding process and the 
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“Bayesioskeptics” agree that the theorem has at least educational value.605 Van Koppen 
agrees and puts it more bluntly: 
 
In fact, hypothesis testing is so far off what actually happens in court that it is not only 
unsuccessful as a descriptive model, but also too alien to the legal tradition to be of use as a 
prescriptive model either.606 
 
The Story Model and dual processing 
 
Empirical studies indicate that fact-finding process is much better described through a 
different model that Pennington and Hastie developed through empirical research in the 
1980s and outlined in their article in 1991 - the Story Model.607 The model was inspired by 
the work of two political scientists, Bennett and Feldman,608 who in 1981 pointed to the 
tendency of trial lawyers to start their opening statements by saying, “Our story is…” 
While often easily dismissed as just a convenient form of words, Bennett and Feldman 
argued that the expression actually reflected human thought and decision making process 
on a much deeper level.609 Pennington and Hastie anchor their story model to the general 
psychological framework called explanation based decision making.610 A large body of 
research by social scientists and psychologists indicates that people intuitively use mental 
structures - “schemas” or “scripts” in order to explain how the world around them 
works.611 These schemas are based on the person’s own life experience and the cultural 
context and entail assumptions about what typically happens when certain facts are present, 
or what typically follows when certain events have taken place. The scripts contain notions 
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of social and physical causation and assumptions about what is usual or unusual, normal or 
abnormal. Should the factual predicate be ambiguous or incomplete, people fill the gaps 
relying on what they know about the world around them. The goal of these mental 
operations is to construct narrative explanations about events. Ambiguous or disputed facts 
are then interpreted depending on the script that is superimposed on them and thus the 
same facts could yield different narratives, although some may be more plausible than 
others.612  
 
Thus, decisions about facts are based on three types of information: the information about 
the case at hand learned at the trial; the fact-finder’s world knowledge, and the knowledge 
about story structure. Based on these three inputs, the fact-finder constructs narratives (one 
or many) that would explain the evidence in the case. One of these narratives will be 
ultimately chosen based on four factors: coverage, coherence, uniqueness, and goodness-
of-fit.613 Coverage means that the story encompasses the evidence presented. The more 
evidence remains unexplained, the less likely the story. Coherence means that the story is 
internally consistent, plausible (i.e. corresponds to the fact-finder’s knowledge of how the 
world typically works) and has all the elements of a full “episode” – initiating events, 
physical states, psychological states, goals, actions and consequences.614 The three 
components make up the story’s coherence. If there is more than one coherent story, the 
stories lack uniqueness and that means decreased confidence in picking one over the 
others.  
 
According to the Story Model, it is the story that the juror constructs that determines their 
predeliberation verdict – upon learning the verdict categories, the fact-finder will perform a 
classification task of finding the best verdict category to fit their story. This is the stage at 
which according to the story model standard of proof is applied: the goodness-of-fit 
analysis. If the fact-finder concludes that none of the stories reaches the threshold, there 
must be a default judgment available. In criminal cases this is supplied by the presumption 
of innocence.  
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The story model of decision making has become the orthodox model for jury decision 
making615 but just like its creators wrote, it is not complete.616 While its basic point about 
information organization into story structure is supported by empirical studies,617 other 
scholars point out that there are still aspects of fact-finding decision making that the Story 
Model does not address, at least not explicitly. The most important question not explicitly 
addressed by the story model is probably this: where do the stories come from?618 The 
theory that helps explaining the initiating mechanism of story creation is that of dual 
processing – and it is fairly universally accepted.619  
 
The dual processing theory posits that humans have two separate systems for information 
processing and decision making: the automatic system and the controlled or deliberate 
system. Glöckner and Betsch620 explain that the automatic system tackles complex decision 
making tasks quickly and effortlessly, processes information in parallel and the individual 
himself is not even aware of the decision making process – the result just appears naturally 
(or intuitively). This automatic system is responsible for most everyday decisions and 
works based on what the individual has learned and experienced in the past, using different 
“mental shortcuts” rather than careful, consciously controlled and directed step-by-step 
logical analysis. This heuristic-based rather than analysis based quick thinking can 
demonstrably produce false conclusions.621 Today researchers agree that intuitive thinking 
may be derived from two different sources. Heuristics and biases may have a detrimental 
effect on solving issues of drawing inference based on limited information but intuitive 
decision making can also be the product of true expertise where experience has honed the 
individual’s ability to recognize and weigh different options quickly and unconsciously. In 
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the latter case, problem solving will greatly benefit from trained intuition.622 The deliberate 
system, on the other hand, is under the conscious control of the individual, processes 
information serially and uses effortful logical operations. The deliberate system is thus 
amenable to various control mechanisms such as checklists, flow charts, limiting 
instructions etc. 
 
There are different theories about how the two systems interact or when and how one 
would switch between the two systems. The latest theories are connectivist: the two 
systems are in bidirectional interaction and work in concert to achieve coherence in 
cognition, i.e. a coherent story. Glöckner and Betsch explain that the automatic system is 
the primary system of information processing that starts organizing information as soon as 
it comes in and automatically generates narrative explanations. Where lack of information 
is detected, the secondary system (deliberate system) springs into action constructing 
inferences and selecting new strategies to search for more information.623 Information 
integration as well as the application of the selection rule are both operations of the 
automatic system.  
 
The knowledge of how the human mind processes information has several important 
implications for the trial procedure. For starters, story construction does not start at the 
close of the evidence but drives the front end of the information processing chain – the 
encoding phase – from the very beginning of the trial624 even though the fact-finder may 
not be aware of this happening (this is a function of the automatic system).625 This means 
that a fact-finder at trial is not like a tape-recorder that passively takes in all information 
presented and then ‘plays it back’ at the end to inform the decision making process, but is 
actively constructing knowledge all the time.626 Wyer and Srull report that such goal-
directed selective encoding not only influences how information is interpreted (i.e. what 
any given piece of evidence means) but also which information is encoded (i.e. what the 
juror will remember and include in their story construction and what will be 
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disregarded).627 An example of this effect is also discussed in Pennington and Hastie’s 
1986 study where subjects remembered the evidence that supported the story that 
corresponded to their verdict choice better than the facts that were pointing in the opposite 
direction.628 Dan Simon in his seminal article629 explains this as a function of the coherence 
maximization process and demonstrates that the process is bidirectional: incoming new 
information initially helps to form the story but then the story also starts to influence the 
encoding and perception of new information. In order to achieve cognitive coherence,630 
information that is consistent with the developed narrative receives amplified attention and 
is often overvalued; inconsistent information, on the other hand, tends to be heavily 
discounted, reinterpreted and undervalued. These bidirectional interactions are called 
coherence shifts and they have been widely observed.631 Wyer and Srull also point out that 
encoding of information occurs at the time information is first received and that once 
information has been encoded, “concepts that are activated subsequently have little 
influence on either the interpretation of the already encoded information or the recall of 
it”.632 The crucial stage of encoding and the forces that influence it also explain why the 
meaning of any particular piece of evidence is dependent on other evidence in the case and 
why for example judicial limiting instructions have only a limited effect. 
  
This calls to question the wisdom of giving jury instructions at the end of the trial and 
seems to set the legally trained fact-finder apart from their untrained counterpart: they 
possess the knowledge of the substantive criminal law and the elements of the charge (in 
effect the verdict categories) before hearing the evidence. The idea is not novel633 and has 
in some jurisdictions been implemented with generally positive effects.634 Simon 
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summarizes arguments for and against pre-instructing juries and concludes that the positive 
effects outweigh the possible counterarguments.635  
 
Another conclusion that follows from the exposé of empirical research into the decision 
making process is that presentation and substance of evidence can hardly be viewed 
separately. As Michael Pardo noted,636 evidence law and scholarship tends to rely on the 
assumption that fact-finders evaluate evidence in an atomistic fashion, however, the 
message of the empirical research is that evidence evaluation proceeds holistically – the 
value of any particular piece of evidence is determined to a great degree by the 
interpretation given to the other evidence in the case.637 This is something that trial 
advocacy scholars have taken notice of and smart trial lawyers make use of.638 Especially 
instructive on this point is the 1988 study by Pennington and Hastie that demonstrated the 
significant effects of good storytelling by attorneys. There different groups of mock jurors 
were exposed to the same evidence, however, the researchers varied the order of evidence 
presentation for both the defence and the prosecution. It turned out that where the 
prosecution evidence was presented in an order organized by the story logic as compared to 
the witness order, conviction rate jumped from 63 to 78 per cent (in both cases the defence 
evidence was in story order). The difference was even more drastic when the defence 
evidence was presented in the story order and prosecution evidence in witness order – the 
conviction rate was only 31 per cent. Also noteworthy is that the jurors were more 
confident about their decision when evidence was presented in story order thus facilitating 
comprehension.639 This also seems to be consistent with the coherence shifts theory 
proposed by Simon – confidence levels are higher when fact-finder is able to construct 
stories that are clear opposites. 
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The role of emotions in decision making 
 
Faithful to the often touted goal of keeping emotions out of the realm of law and judging, 
works on fact-finding decision making tend to be silent about the role of emotions640 or 
values in the fact-finding (story-making) calculus.641 One of the authors of the Story 
model, Reid Hastie, concedes that the role of emotions has been consistently neglected and 
explains that emotions can play an important part in the phase of story pattern selection.642 
Empirical studies indicate that emotions like sympathy or anger will not only influence 
decisions about punishment (and one may argue that there it may even be appropriate as a 
measure of community reaction to the crime) but about fact determination as well.643 Based 
on reviewing the relevant literature, Feigenson and Park distinguish five paths by which 
emotions can come to bear on fact-finding decisions.  
 
First, emotions can influence information processing strategy. Some emotions are more 
conducive to a top-down approach and may lead to resorting to stereotypical reasoning 
(e.g. anger). Others have in their cognitive structure uncertainty that leads to more cautious 
bottom-up information processing. Thus the effects on the strategy are not based on the 
general valence of the emotion (positive or negative) but on the specific characteristics of 
the particular emotion.644  
 
There is also the mood-congruency effect that tends to affect information encoding. For 
example, jurors experiencing some negative emotion tend to be more attuned to negative 
information both in terms of perception and memory. For example, emotions evoked by 
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gory images of the crime scene tend to sway the fact-finders towards better remembering 
negative information about the defendant.645  
 
These two mechanisms work side-by-side and, depending on the particular person, can 
mitigate or compound each other. There is also evidence that the initial, perhaps pre- (sub) 
conscious decision “which way the verdict should go” is made intuitively before the 
rationally calculating system kicks in and starts generating the justification for the initial 
decision by building stories around it.646 Knowing that intuitive decisions are made first, 
fast and easy may also explain where the initial impetus for selection of the schema or 
story pattern is derived from.  
 
Emotions (whether they be elicited by the target of the judgment or completely unrelated) 
may also become the input that indirectly (as an appraisal tendency) or directly inform the 
ultimate decision. For example, angry people tend to blame more easily. Thus, information 
which might otherwise be amenable to interpretations either way will be interpreted by the 
angry people as part of the guilty-story.  
 
 
Judges 
 
Since most research cited thus far explicitly deals with jurors or mock jurors, one cannot 
help but wonder: what about professional fact-finders – judges? Is the research equally 
applicable to judicial fact-finding or is there some truth to the assumed “judicial 
exceptionalism?”  
 
We already identified one difference that may have an impact on fact-finding by judges as 
compared to that by juries – judges have prior knowledge of the applicable law. This may 
allow judges to pay more attention during trials to information that is relevant according to 
the legal rules the judge will later have to apply in the case. As discussed earlier, such 
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background information can have an effect on what information is encoded and how it is 
perceived.  
 
One may also wonder whether judges’ legal training may cause them to rely more on their 
deliberate system rather than settling with automatic gut reactions. After all, if one is aware 
of one’s cognitive tendencies, their impact may be mitigated; also, being repeatedly 
exposed to the accounts of criminal behaviour might moderate the affect it creates. By the 
same token, however, one may also hypothesize that judges may be liable to convict more 
easily as the stories of criminal behaviour intersect with their lives more frequently (on a 
daily basis!) and may thus appear more plausible than innocent explanations.  
 
Studies of judicial fact-finding as opposed to juror fact-finding are scant but do 
nevertheless paint a picture demonstrating that differences are insignificant and judges 
engage in similar patterns of fact-finding as do jurors. Linda L. Berger explains that one 
should distinguish between two types of cognitive tasks judges perform: passing judgment 
(such as predicting whether one poses a flight risk or assessing credibility of testimony – 
fact-finding, that is) and problem solving (such as selecting the relevant law, interpreting 
the law and sometimes making the law).647 The distinction is important in the context of 
intuitive thinking. Judges, just like the rest of the population, use both the automatic system 
and the deliberate system and for them, too, the automatic system is the primary 
information processing tool that produces quick intuitive judgments and processes 
information non-consciously. Judges may actually benefit from their expertise-based 
intuitive problem-solving648 but as regards their fact-finding, Berger concludes, judges are 
no different than other people. Expertise-based intuition, Kahneman and Klein explained, 
can be developed in an environment where tasks are adequately practiced and the 
individual receives immediate feedback649 – such as driving a car where driver’s handling 
of the controls of the vehicle is immediately reflected in the changes of direction or speed. 
Fact-finding in courts is not such a task, mostly due to the lacking feedback. Thus, when it 
comes to fact-finding, what was said about jurors and their liability to fall victim to 
heuristics, biases and coherence shifts is also applicable to judges. 
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Is the story model applicable to judges as well then? Dutch researchers Van Koppen, 
Wagenaar and Crombag developed the Story Model further and posited that there are ten 
universal rules of evidence that, although developed based on Dutch system where there 
are no juries, should, they argue, hold true for all legal systems.650 They call their theory 
the Theory of Anchored Narratives and yes – judges and juries alike appreciate a good 
story that has a central action and provides cues explaining why the actors acted the way 
they supposedly did. So much so, the Dutch researchers found, that with a very good story 
that fits expectations and makes sense, prosecutors can get defendants convicted even in 
cases where evidence is virtually absent.651 Where the Anchored Narratives theory takes it 
one step further is the notion of anchoring. Anchoring means that all essential elements of 
the charge narrative must be independently based in the “knowledge of the world in the 
form of rules which are generally true” beyond a reasonable doubt.652 While Pennington 
and Hastie’s Story model is descriptive, the Anchored Narratives theory includes a 
normative component – decisions, Van Koppen argues, go wrong because of defective or 
insufficient anchoring. While the individual fact-finder may consider a story plausible 
because of their own personal experience and world knowledge, failure to connect to the 
“generally true” – an objectively verifiable fact may easily cause the decision to be based 
on false assumptions that would not withstand closer scrutiny. The strength of the evidence 
is entirely dependent on the safety of the anchors and thus decision makers should be 
required to spell out the basic rules or knowledge that their evaluation of evidence is 
grounded in.  
 
Just like the Story Model, the Anchored Narratives Theory does not explicitly account for 
the phenomenon of dual information processing that explains how and why specific 
narratives are constructed and evidence is evaluated. Furthermore, the Anchored Narratives 
theory posits that evidence is interpreted and should be evaluated by anchoring it back to 
some generally accepted truths about the world that are articulable, however, empirical 
research, as we observed earlier, tends to disprove this assumption and indicates that most 
of the evaluations are actually intuitive rather than deliberative and coherence shifts will 
make the evidence seem supportive of the story that has been picked over the other 
possible variants. Its descriptive ambiguities and possibly inconsistencies aside, the 
Anchored Narratives theory nevertheless appears to offer a welcome framework for judges 
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to subject their intuitive judgments to reflective scrutiny. Spelling out the “ground anchors” 
may alert the judge to reasoning fallacies and cause them to take another look at their fact-
determination. 
 
Guthrie, Rachlinski and Wistrich report a study conducted with American trial judges.653 
Their study that included several different tests was specifically aimed at exploring judges 
decision making patterns (legal decision making, not just fact-finding). The results to a 
large degree proved what was to be expected: judges like all people are not “syllogism 
machines” and make most of their decisions intuitively. Intuitive decisions, the authors 
remark, can be remarkably accurate but also certainly entail a potential for mistakes. 
Specifically, their research shows that judges’ decision making process is subject to the 
same idiosyncrasies of the automatic system have been observed in people outside the legal 
context.654  
 
The authors describe an unexpected aberration from this pattern of intuitive snap 
judgments. When called to decide the legality of a search performed by a police officer 
without a warrant versus deciding the permissibility of the search based on the same facts 
minus the knowledge of what the search actually produced, the differences were 
statistically insignificant. The authors hypothesize that this somewhat surprising result is 
due to the complex and fairly rigid regulation of search and seizure law. The complex 
structure of the regulation, they argue, must have signalled the judges to abandon the 
intuitive decision making and switch over to the deliberate system.655 The findings of the 
study indicate that judges are capable of overriding the automatic system by the deliberate 
system. The authors argue that judges are not wrong in using their intuitive judgment but 
should be given incentives and conditions that promote overriding the intuitive mode by 
using the deliberate mode of decision making, if for no other reason then to verify the 
original intuitive judgment. Guthrie and his colleagues suggest measures like appropriate 
continuing education and feedback, various checklists, a legal requirement that the reasons 
for the judgments be set forth either in writing or orally in open court, and that courts and 
judges be given sufficient time to deliberate.656 They also propose that, where possible, 
                                                
653
 Chris Guthrie et al., note 646. See also Chris Guthrie et al., Judging by heuristic: Cognitive Illusions in 
Judicial Decision Making, 86 Judicature 44 (2003). For a full discussion of the study regarding the use of 
heuristics by judges, see Chris Guthrie et al., Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 Cornell L. Rev. 777 (2001). 
654
 The study tested for framing, egocentric bias, inverse fallacy, anchoring and hindsight bias that were all 
present. 
655
 Guthrie et al., note 653, at 27. 
656
 This connection is further explored in Brian Sheppard, Judging Under Pressure: A Behavioural 
Examination of the Relationship Between Legal Decisionmaking and Time, 39 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 931 (2012). 
196 
decision making authority should be allocated so as to minimize the potential for reasoning 
fallacies such as anchoring or hindsight bias.657  
 
Now that judges have been exposed as primarily intuitive fact-finders, much like jurors, 
one would probably wonder whether the judges’ everyday work has also primed them to 
convict more easily. After all, the steady stream of criminals passing through their 
courtrooms on a daily basis could be just the backdrop needed to prime judges to 
automatically start constructing and easily accept narratives supporting guilty verdicts.658 
Indeed, even the United States courts have hinted that defendants might be better off opting 
for a jury trial at least in some cases.659 The question of the defendant’s relative chances 
with judges and juries was examined by Harry Kalven and Hans Zeisel in their 1966 book 
“The American Jury” where the two explored judge-jury agreement and found that for the 
most part (in 78 per cent of all cases), judges and juries were in agreement about verdicts. 
The disagreement if present, however, would be somewhat asymmetric: juries tended to 
acquit when judges would convict much more than juries tended to convict when judges 
would acquit. Substantially the same results were reported by Eisenberg and others who 
claim based on their study of state-court jury trials that judges have a lower threshold for 
conviction.660  
 
The long-standing consensus that juries are more lenient may, however, have some 
limitations as exposed by Andrew Leipold. His article661 reveals a curious pattern. While 
he himself and many others have traditionally considered it common wisdom that having a 
jury trial would be advantageous for the defence, the conviction rate for federal jury trials 
over the examined 14-year period (1989…2002) was 84 per cent, whereas the conviction 
rate for bench trials was a mere 55 per cent.662 Leipold notes that these conviction rates are 
a relatively recent development and that in mid-20th century the proportions were reversed. 
Even during the period examined by Leipold the jury conviction rate continued going up 
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and the bench trials conviction rate kept decreasing. Leipold sees a number of factors as 
possible causes for this divergence. Firstly, the divergence may be caused by the choices 
made by the litigants in regards to whether to prefer a bench trial or a jury trial. The 
defence decision to choose jury trials over bench trials can have many explanations. 
Perhaps defence attorneys are not aware of the new dynamic, or they are aware and 
disregard, or they are aware and make rational choices based on the nature of the cases. 
Apparently the notion that juries are more acquittal-prone than judges is well established 
within the legal profession and considered common knowledge.663 Leipold posits that it is 
probably a combination of all three.664 Leipold also suggests another reason for the steady 
decline in bench trial conviction rates – judges may have felt straitjacketed by the federal 
sentencing guidelines and opted to acquit where the guideline-mandated sentence appeared 
too stiff. Yet another possible explanation surfaces through reading Paul Holland’s article 
on bench trial advocacy.665 There Holland aptly points out that judges like juries are liable 
to take mental shortcuts and succumb to automatic decision making. This coupled with 
their intimate knowledge of trial mechanics and tactics employed by the attorneys makes 
them a special audience as fact-finders and it is, indeed, baffling that many attorneys still 
regard bench trials as something inferior or simpler than a jury trial. This, Holland argues, 
causes attorneys to neglect the need for well-prepared story-telling as if bench trials would 
not benefit from it. Perhaps the low conviction rates on United States federal bench trials 
are a product of poor trial advocacy by prosecutors?666 But what may have caused the 
seemingly different results of the earlier judge-jury agreement studies? The answer may be 
in the research design. Kalven and Zeisel, just like Eisenberg and his colleagues only 
examined jury trials – cases where the jury option had been chosen and the case tried 
before a jury; Leipold also examined federal cases that were not included in the sample of 
the judge-jury agreement studies. Thus it is perhaps premature to declare that judge-jury 
agreement studies no longer hold valid – the methodologies for the archival study by 
Leipold and the studies about judge-jury agreement are just too different to be 
comparable.667 And one more point on which most scholars appear to agree: while we may 
compare judges and juries against each other or to some normative model we have devised, 
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there really is no base line in this kind of research of fact-finding accuracy. As MacCoun 
comments, if there was, it would probably have replaced trials by now.668 
 
 
Group decision-making 
Following up on the research on individual decision-making by Pennington and Hastie, 
James Holstein looked at mock jurors’ deliberations. Individual jurors’ interpretations of 
evidence may differ to a great deal and it is the deliberations where the jurors work to sort 
out their individual differences. Sklansky argues that the fact that jurors deliberate is an 
advantage juries have over single judges – not only because of the variety of perspectives 
brought to the table but also because deliberations help discipline the reasoning process 
and enforce reasoning controls.669 Edward Schwartz and Warren Schwartz note that jurors 
also have different understandings about the standard of proof and what level of certainty is 
required when the standard is set at “beyond a reasonable doubt”.670 Nevertheless, Devine 
and colleagues found that jury instructions are fairly well comprehended (contrary to the 
usual fear that jurors are not able to understand their instructions671), however, depending 
on the quality of deliberations, analysis of evidence and considering alternate viewpoints 
may be less than optimal depending on the style of deliberations, factioning of the jury and 
the existence of a strong leader in the group.672  
 
Holstein’s study examines discussions between mock jurors that indicate that the story 
model presented by Pennington and Hastie with regard to individual decision-making also 
extends to group decision-making: individual jurors are bringing different narratives to the 
deliberations and try to reconcile their interpretations in order to arrive on a consistent 
story they can all agree on. The narratives themselves then become justifications for a 
verdict choice the particular juror is advocating.673 Holstein’s study reveals that jurors’ 
deliberations are not organized around the elements of the charge as instructed by the judge 
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but jurors seek to determine “what really happened”. This produces an interesting situation: 
more narratives invariably mean longer deliberations and higher chances of a hung jury - 
and this even when most of the narratives support the same verdict choice. As Holstein 
explains, the deliberations turn into an inadvertent competition of the stories and advancing 
several theories supporting the same verdict will actually decrease the chances of the jury 
unanimously agreeing to it. Similar observations have been reported in the study by 
Diamond and Vidmar who had the opportunity to observe actual trial juries during their 
deliberations.674 Diamond and Vidmar’s study involved observing civil juries in Arizona 
where a new rule had just been adopted that permitted juries to discuss the case during trial 
and quite predictably showed that real jurors, just like mock jurors, attempt to make sense 
of the evidence, compare and contrast different versions of “what happened” and fill the 
gaps in their stories. In another article, Diamond and Vidmar analyze the discussions in the 
jury room and conclude that while “admonitions” and “blindfolding” may have some effect 
and provide jurors with an argument for use during deliberations, they are overall 
ineffective at keeping jurors from filling in gaps and interpreting evidence based on their 
own life experiences.675  
 
John Manzo looked at the particular techniques jurors use to justify or “sell” their positions 
to their fellow jurors and described three main ones that purport not only to argue in favour 
of one version or another but also introduce new information. Jurors often use normative 
assertions (“that’s what a reasonable person should do”), claims of expertise (“I have been 
in the industry for twenty years, I know how it’s normally done”) and declarations of 
knowledge (“I live nearby, I know that intersection”).676 The latter technique, Manzo notes, 
is very rare and in the deliberations observed by Manzo also not as closely linked to the 
actual case. This is probably due to the jury selection process seeking to identify and 
exclude from jury individuals who would have personal knowledge of the case. As authors 
describe, though, avoiding jurors bringing into the deliberations information that has not 
been introduced in the course of the trial is becoming increasingly difficult: jurors share 
                                                
674
 Shari Diamond & Neil Vidmar, Inside the Jury Room: Evaluating Jury Discussions During Trial, 87 
Judicature 54 (2003). 
675
 Shari Diamond & Neil Vidmar, Jury Room Ruminations on Forbidden Topics, 87 Va. L. Rev. 1857, 1915 
(2001). Their analysis indicates that jurors engage in forbidden disucssions in spite of judicial instructions to 
disregard some evidence and consider, for example, attorney’s fees and insurance coverage in civil cases 
even though such evidence is irrelevant in assessing the damages. But see also Shari Seidman Diamond et al., 
A ’Kettleful of Law’ in Real Jury Deliberations: Successes, Failures and Next Steps, 106 Nw. U. L. Rev. 
1537, 1591 (2012) where the authors describe jury deliberations where jurors effectively police attempts to 
consider forbidden evidence. The authors argue that in many instances the jury’s failure to stick to the 
admissible evidence may have been caused by unintelligible jury instructions. 
676
 For examples from jury discussions and detailed analysis of the samples, see John Manzo, You Wouldn't 
Take a Seven-Year-Old and Ask Him All These Questions: Jurors' Use of Practical Reasoning in Supporting 
Their Arguments, 19 Law & Soc. Inquiry 639 (1994). 
200 
their experiences on social media such as Twitter or Facebook, and, given an opportunity, 
will run an internet search to uncover information that was not presented to them.677  
 
As Allison Orr Larsen aptly points out,678 the jury deliberations in fact turn into something 
commonly not associated with a jury trial – a bargain. One of Larsen’s main points is that 
instead of denying the bargaining or viewing it as a breach of their sacred duty by 
unprincipled jurors, we should embrace it is a natural part of jury deliberations, especially 
given that 95 per cent of all criminal cases are disposed of by plea-bargains.  Larsen argues 
that through the doctrine of lesser included offences, bargaining has always been part of 
the jury trial679 and cites several studies showing that negotiations between jurors routinely 
happen. Most importantly for our purposes, however, a study conducted by the National 
Center for State Courts680 indicated that while only 6.2 per cent of all juries hung, there 
was at least one disagreeing juror in 54 per cent of all juries at the end of the deliberations. 
This indicates that unanimous verdicts do not actually mean that all jurors have reached the 
same conclusion in the matters being tried but that they all have agreed to a verdict they are 
amenable to.681 Waters and Hans report based on the same study that minority jurors 
favouring acquittal were more adamant and 35 per cent of them ended up hanging the jury 
versus the 12.5 per cent of the minority jurors favouring conviction.682  
 
The link between the human mind and standard of proof 
The excursion into the empirical studies on fact-finding appears to cast a shadow on the 
effectiveness of standard of proof statements as an actual reasoning control. Fact-finders 
use their automatic system to reach quick conclusions and construct stories to explain 
evidence in terms of human interaction narratives as opposed to engaging in a Bayesian 
calculation. Once the initial conclusion has been reached, it starts tainting the perception 
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and interpretation of subsequently introduced information to support a coherent picture of 
the events in question. Not only is the average fact-finder guided by heuristics and 
emotions, they are also confident that they have reached the right conclusion as long as 
most of the evidence has been neatly fitted into a plausible narrative. And their confidence 
is not necessarily a reliable indicator that they have accurately assessed the probability of 
the allegations based on the evidence – this due to bidirectional processing and coherence 
shifts. We have also discovered that judges are not immune against these cognitive 
“issues.” This unfortunately means that a standard of proof that is conceptualized as a 
standard of fact-finder’s confidence is by itself not very effective in avoiding errors. And 
as pointed out before, it will not work as a standard against which one could check the 
reasoning process itself either – not only is most of the reasoning process done by the 
automatic system of which the subject is unaware, the conclusions are inherently subjective 
and depend on the person just as much as on the information adduced. For this reason, 
substantive appellate review of fact-finding would turn into simple re-evaluation of the 
evidence.  
 
Now the question left is whether the standard of proof would have any effect on fact-
finding accuracy if used as an exhortation. Christoph Engel claims that different standards 
of proof are psychologically feasible – in terms of the story model, fact-finders under a 
higher standard would 
 
apply a stricter standard of coverage, coherence, and uniqueness. They acquit if minor 
pieces of evidence do not find a place in the story told by the prosecution. They do not 
tolerate a shade of doubt regarding the logical consistency of the story. In light of their 
world knowledge, they require high plausibility for this story. They apply a strict standard 
of scrutiny when testing the completeness of the prosecution's story. Finally, they impose a 
large minimum gap in plausibility if there is more than one story that can be told based on 
the evidence.683  
 
In terms of mental mechanisms, one could argue that the automatic system always 
processes information as long as it results in more than minimal change in the activation of 
options, and that the standard of proof simply manipulates the threshold at which an 
alternative is sufficiently activated. Glöckner and Engel’s experimental research suggests 
that there is more to it.684 In their experiment, mock jurors were divided into different 
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groups and presented with the same evidence. The different groups were given different 
instructions as to the standard of proof and the researchers also manipulated the probative 
value of the evidence (in one group, the eyewitness stated that she was 80 per cent certain, 
in another, that she was 95 per cent certain; in one group the number of individuals having 
the key to the place where the crime had been committed was higher than in the other). The 
jury instructions used were those used by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th circuit 
(requiring jurors to be ‘firmly convinced’ of guilt for a conviction). The results of the 
experiment showed that jurors set their confidence threshold higher where the standard of 
proof is beyond reasonable doubt as compared to the preponderance of the evidence. The 
results also showed that the threshold probability of guilt was higher when the standard of 
proof was “beyond a reasonable doubt” as compared to when the standard was a mere 
“preponderance of the evidence.” In numeric terms, unlike the 95 per cent that Judge 
Weinstein argued should correspond to the ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ standard,685 the 
mock jurors in Glöckner and Engel’s study only reported needing on average an 85 per 
cent certainty level to convict.686 The study confirmed that the jurors use primarily 
coherence-based reasoning to handle the vast amount of data thrown at them during trial. 
Coherence shifts occurred both in case of acquittals and convictions, however, were more 
pronounced in convictions. Coherence shifts differed according to whether the jurors had 
been given the preponderance standard or the beyond reasonable doubt standard to decide 
by. This asymmetry indicates that standard of proof is not (only?) working as a deliberate 
process scrutinizing the product of the automatic information processing but is already at 
work at the intuitive level. One may now wonder whether coherence shifts could reduce 
the effect of the standard of proof – perhaps the higher standard is simply achieved by 
more vigorous inflation-deflation in processing of the evidence? The study found no such 
effect – a higher standard of proof translated into lower conviction rates and higher 
probability of guilt thresholds just as expected. On the other hand, what was not happening 
was manipulations of the probative value having effect on the verdicts or the probability of 
guilt as indicated by the participants. This goes to show again that people do not 
mathematically integrate probabilities – people are “storytellers, not meter readers.”687  
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The good news is that different standards of proof are psychologically feasible. What we 
still need to find out is how to use legal text (jury instructions, standard of proof 
provisions, etc) to calibrate the standard. Apparently the precise wording matters as the 
study conducted by Horowitz and Kirkpatrick688 suggests. In this study the researchers 
took the different definitions of “beyond reasonable doubt” that had been used and upheld 
by courts in the United States and examined whether different instructions evoked different 
thresholds of certainty in the minds of jurors. As we saw earlier, the “beyond a reasonable 
doubt” formulation is in some courts used without any further explanation as to what it 
means but there are also courts where jurors are provided with an explication in order to 
help them understand what the standard should mean. ‘Beyond a reasonable doubt’ has in 
some courts been defined as being convinced to a “moral certainty”; there are jury 
instructions where the jury was told they had to be “firmly convinced” (this was also the 
kind of standard used in the later studies by Engel and Jeckel),689 or that reasonable doubt 
is the kind of doubt that would cause a ”reasonable person to hesitate to act” in important 
matters. The study tested for four different instructions690 and it also tested for the 
condition where no further explication was offered (as we observed earlier, there are some 
scholars and courts who think that the concept of reasonable doubt is by itself sufficiently 
clear and any attempt to define it would simply muddy the waters). Mock jurors (jury-
eligible adults representative of the community, not just college students) were first played 
a version of an audiotaped trial (one where evidence was strongly supportive of a guilty 
verdict or the other where the prosecution’s evidence was much weaker) and then given 
one of the five instructions and sent to deliberate. Later they were asked to indicate their 
verdict choice before deliberations, their confidence in their verdict before and after 
deliberations, and the minimum probability of guilt they would require for a guilty verdict 
– also before and after the deliberations.   
 
The study yielded two interesting results. In general, different instructions produced 
different threshold probabilities and different levels of confidence. The conviction rates in 
strong and weak cases were also appropriately different. None of the instructions produced 
a high enough self-reported guilt probability thresholds to be acceptable in the authors’ 
opinion – the highest threshold was triggered by the instruction requiring that jurors must 
be “firmly convinced” of the defendant’s guilt691 (68.87 per cent before deliberations for a 
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case where evidence supporting conviction was weak; 72.25 per cent when evidence was 
strong, both thresholds went up after deliberations – 80.75 per cent for the weak case and 
81.87 per cent for the strong case). Most importantly, however, the study did prove that 
depending on how ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ is explained to the jurors, the same 
standard of proof evokes in jurors’ minds a different threshold probability of guilt as well 
as a different level of confidence required for a guilty verdict.692 
 
The overall conviction rate was 75 per cent for the strong case and a surprisingly high 50 
per cent for the weak case where the researchers had expected the juries to uniformly  
acquit. Only the instructions using the phrase ‘firmly convinced’ appeared to elicit the 
desired response in jurors. Note that in the “moral certainty” instruction group, all juries 
convicted, regardless of the strength of evidence. The results of this study are at odds with 
several prior studies where mock jurors had reported significantly higher threshold 
probabilities693 and the authors hypothesize that the difference may be due to jurors valuing 
crime control in comparison to due process more than earlier, or because the earlier studies 
were primarily using college students as the test subjects.  
 
Faced with the fact that the same beyond reasonable doubt standard evokes different 
threshold levels of decision certainty, some scholars have called for a numeric 
representation of the desired threshold level. Harry D. Saunders has argued that this 
divergence constitutes an equal protection violation and makes the need to repair the 
standard an urgent priority.694 His idea is not novel: Dorothy Kagehiro argued for a 
numerical representation of the standard of proof based on several experiments she 
conducted that tended to show that while different verbal instructions failed to convey the 
desired heightened standard, combining a numeric representation with verbal explanation 
(“that is, you have to be at least 91 per cent certain in order to convict”) or numeric 
representation alone tended to convey the desired threshold value.695 Simon and Mahan’s 
study reported another interesting effect: jurors approached their task much more carefully 
after they had indicated their threshold probability of guilt for a guilty verdict.696  Not 
surprisingly, the suggestion of quantifying the standard of proof has been received with a 
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certain lack of enthusiasm. Glöckner and Engel, for example, are seemingly relieved that 
their study yielded reasonably high probability thresholds and concluded that expressing 
the probability threshold in numeric form is not necessary.697 Similarly, while Lawrence 
Solan expresses his concern about the fact that jury instructions regarding reasonable doubt 
are confusing and in some forms tend to convey threshold probabilities much lower than 
the commonly accepted 85  per cent or more, he too does not even make an argument 
against Kagehiro’s suggestion and just dismisses the recommendation.698 Solan himself 
advocates the use of jury instructions that would, instead of focusing on the level of doubt, 
focus on the government’s burden of proving the defendant’s guilt – the “firmly 
convinced” instruction that has been adopted in some jurisdictions in the United States. 
The standard has been tested in some empirical studies mentioned earlier699 and unlike 
some others, evoked threshold level of probability of guilt that has come closest to the at 
least 85 per cent probability deemed appropriate by the judges. Solan’s argument, however, 
seems to be contradicting itself: while busy advocating a particular formulation of jury 
instructions, he justifies the need to review the instructions by none other than citing 
studies indicating that jurors perceive some of the instructions in use as allowing for too 
low threshold probability of guilt. In face of empirical research suggesting that jurors are 
greatly assisted by specific probability figures in the jury instructions even without turning 
the entire trial into a Bayesian calculation, it is difficult to find a reason for not taking 
advantage of this tool.700 Solan’s main concern is probably the prospect of seeing appeals 
based on the claim that “the proof adduced does not amount to the prescribed 94.5 per cent 
probability of guilt” thus introducing “trial by mathematics” through a back door.701   
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Nevertheless, in light of what is known about human mental processes, numeric thresholds 
are not indispensable. Fact-finding is to a large extent handled by the automatic system that 
does not deal in percentages but in attitudes and emotions. Engel posits that the mental 
mechanism mediating the standard of proof and the automatic system’s decision making 
processes is that of setting a somatic marker.702 According to the somatic marker theory, 
emotions are instrumental in real-life decision making and this means that the standard of 
proof, if it is to have effect, must speak to the automatic system both to guide the 
evaluation of the proof as well as to cause the fact-finders to engage their deliberate 
system.703  
 
Changes in the environment cause a complex of responses that change body or brain state 
and can manifest in endocrine release, elevated heart rate etc. or in physiological changes 
that are observable even from the outside (e.g. posture, facial expressions, etc.). The 
responses aimed at the brain can trigger neurotransmitter release (such as dopamine, 
serotonin, etc), an active modification of the state of somatosensory maps such as those of 
the insular cortex (“as-if-body-states”), and a modification of the transmission of signals 
from the body to somatosensory regions. A package of these changes in the body and brain 
is what makes up an emotion and the perception of it is the “feeling” that can be pleasant or 
unpleasant.704 Emotions can be evoked by primary or secondary inducers. Primary inducers 
are the actual experiences of the innate or learned source of the emotion such as the 
encounter with the source of fear or burning yourself with hot water. Secondary inducers 
are memories or thoughts of primary inducers – although weaker, similar emotions are 
produced by even recalling the original painful event. This, Damasio and Bechara argue, is 
the mechanism through which people who have once burned themselves on a hot stove, 
learn to stay away from hot water – or learn to avoid risky moves on the stock market. 
Primary and secondary inducers can be activated at the same time. Apparently individuals 
with brain damage in the particular area that is responsible for recreating the emotional 
states, while having no issues with intellectual abilities, are not able to learn from their past 
mistakes (of which they are intellectually aware, i.e. are able to “talk the talk”) and keep 
acting disadvantageously (i.e. not “walking the walk”), thus proving the instrumental role 
emotions play in decision making – their brain is not able to link specific events to the 
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patterns of “what it feels like”.705 Similarly, in situations of uncertainty and ambiguity, the 
conscious calculating system (deliberate system) is offering certain choices, but it is the 
automatic system that is much better at detecting patterns and thus a “good feeling” 
signalled by a positive somatic reaction about a decision is what will often bias the 
individual towards the best choice.706 Damasio and Bechara also explain that while 
pertinent and task-related emotions707 are instrumental in making the right decisions, the 
feedback can be distorted by background emotions that bias the automatic system. The 
standard of proof in this sense is one part of the mechanism that creates the background 
emotion which will then in effect influence the level of certainty felt by the fact-finders.  
 
According to Engel, the standard of proof operates in conjunction with the ritual of 
swearing the jurors or appointing the judge, giving instructions and the courtroom decorum 
that “makes accountability salient” – impresses upon the fact-finder the gravity of their 
task and the serious role they play in the justice system thus making them more aversive 
towards risky, i.e. unfounded decisions, especially those convicting the innocent.708 This 
could explain why the mock jurors consistently report a lower probability threshold for 
convictions than judges709 or than the expectations of legal scholars. While apparently 
some configurations of jury instructions are more effective than others at influencing the 
emotional state and bringing about the appropriate background emotion, the ceremonial 
aspect of trial has largely been neglected in mock jury experiments – the trials have been 
substituted by watching a slide show and listening to audiotapes710 at best or more 
commonly reading summaries or transcripts,711 and judge giving instructions has been 
substituted by written instructions only. The explicit mention of a numeric probability 
figure as in Kagehiro and Stanton’s study712 had its effect through the same mechanism but 
for a different reason: it engaged the somatic markers associated with a high level of 
certainty. Apparently the other “legal-verbal” standards are more open to interpretation and 
                                                
705
 Id., at 348. 
706
 Id., at 359. 
707
 That is, emotions evoked by the evidence adduced at trial rather than extrajudicial events or conditions 
that the adjudicators have brought into the courtroom with them. 
708
 Christoph Engel, note 586, at 464.  
709
 See Rita James Simon & Linda Mahan, Quantifying Burdens of Proof. A Viewfrom the Bench, the Jury, 
and the Classroom, 5 L. & Soc'y Rev. 319 (1971). Judges were asked: "What would the likelihood or 
probability have to be that a defendant committed the act for you to decide that he is guilty?" and the median 
response was 97 per cent. See also, McCauliff, note 575, at 1325 where 126 out of 171 federal judges gave 
threshold levels of 90 per cent or higher.  
710
 Horowitz & Kirkpatrick, note 688. 
711
 Glöckner & Engel, note 684. Similarly, Francis Dane, In Search of Reasonable Doubt, 9 Law & Hum. 
Behav. 141 (1985), Dorothy Kagehiro & W. Clark Stanton, Legal vs. Quantified definitions of Standard or 
Proof, 9 Law & Hum. Behav. 159 (1985). 
712
 Kagehiro & Stanton, note 711. 
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liable to misunderstanding and do not directly engage with any particular probability 
threshold.713 
 
The studies about judges’ conviction thresholds of course have their limitations as the 
surveyed judges have probably all been exposed to legal literature and scholarly 
discussions of what the probability threshold for the “proof beyond a reasonable doubt” 
standard should be. Thus their self-reported standards may in part be dictated by these 
expectations. As we noted earlier, there are some studies that indicate that judges actually 
tend to use a lower certainty threshold for convictions. Paradoxically, this would also 
reinforce the claim that it is the ceremonial and emotional aspect of trial that is responsible 
for raising the bar – judges sitting alone are not exposed to much ceremony or exhortations 
calling them to be especially cautious in finding defendants guilty – judging is their daily 
job.  
 
Conclusions and suggestions  
Standard of proof is the minimum level of evidence needed for a conviction. A definition 
equally applicable across different jurisdictions, this is as precise as it can get because what 
is measured or evaluated to assess the requisite “level of evidence” is not something that 
has been universally agreed upon. Is it the level of confidence evoked in the fact-finders or 
is it a measure of probability created by the aggregation of all available evidence? Or, 
perhaps it is a pre-determined minimum set of particular types of evidence needed to 
justify a conviction? Or, perhaps it is neither and actually refers to the ability of the fact-
finder to write a convincingly reasoned opinion substantiating his verdict? And then there 
is the level itself – the desirable quantum of whatever is being measured – which is a 
political decision about how easy or difficult it should be to obtain a conviction. As we saw 
earlier, the higher the threshold for convictions, the more guilty will also be set free. But 
this is just half of the equation – the standard itself. We also need to think about its 
application in procedural terms: would the standard operate as a reasoning control 
reviewable through appellate procedure or is it more of a guide or an incantation directed at 
the fact-finder? All of the options are or have been on the table. However, if the standard is 
to do its job – enhance the accuracy of fact-finding - it must take into account the cognitive 
abilities of the fact-finders.  
                                                
713
 Horowitz and Kirkpatrick observe, for example, that where “moral certainty” was invoked, juries 
convicted in both strong and weak evidence conditions. They hypothesize that  “moral certainty” was taken 
as a licence to vilify defendants. Horowitz & Kirkpatrick, note 688, at 667. 
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The law often views human fact-finding as a primarily logical operation characteristic of 
the deliberate system, however, there is empirical evidence that the primary tool of 
decision making is the automatic system – decisions are made quickly and effortlessly 
based on massive amounts of data, engaging emotions and without the decision-maker 
himself being aware of the decision process. Facts are organized in narratives and once the 
initial choice has been made, information in processed bi-directionally: incoming 
information shapes the story that is under construction, and the story makes for a filter 
selecting and interpreting information that gets processed. What story of all possible 
options is selected seems to be determined by the fact-finder’s emotional state as well as 
world knowledge and experience. We also know that the automatic system has a number of 
weaknesses and humans are no fact-finding experts although they frequently think that 
they. 
 
Empirical studies indicate that most evidence processing happens automatically. 
Nevertheless, if and when engaged, the deliberate system is able to override the results of 
the automatic reasoning process. Although judges are frequently thought to be more 
inclined to using their deliberate system, empirical studies generally do not support this 
assumption and we will therefore treat them the same as jurors or lay assessors in regards 
to their information processing habits. 
 
How should the standard of proof then be conceptualized? A mathematical probability 
approach is really attractive: the legislature would set a threshold probability and the fact-
finders would only have to calculate the probability of guilt given the evidence introduced. 
This would result in an objectively reviewable decision. There are, however, problems with 
this kind of approach that render it impractical – starting from the philosophical question 
by Ho about where the target probability figure is taken from and how to even justify a 
legislatively mandated margin of error in adjudication (that assuming the law would not 
require absolute certainty and thus resolve to set all guilty defendants free). The probability 
enhancing power of individual pieces of evidence is open to dispute and on top of it all, the 
number of calculations and possible inferences may simply be unmanageable for human 
fact-finders. Empirical research also shows that the kind of atomistic evaluation of 
evidence that calculating a probability figure would call for is not what real fact-finders 
normally do – they construct stories and evaluate evidence as a whole.  
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Once we abandon the idea of mathematical objectivity, the standard of proof can no longer 
logically be about the probability of guilt but is rather about the fact-finder’s level of 
confidence in his guilty verdict. This seemingly semantic change solves the legitimacy 
issue: the guilty verdict is no longer wrong with ten per cent probability714 and there is no 
longer a ten per cent probability that the defendant is innocent but the fact-finder is now 90 
per cent sure that the defendant is guilty. This being said, expressing the required levels of 
certainty in terms of percentages has in several studies succeeded conveying the idea better 
than mere forms of words such as “by a preponderance of the evidence” or “beyond a 
reasonable doubt”.  
 
This kind of standard, however, is not a legal standard amenable to appellate review. There 
are no objective criteria for the appellate court, to say that the trial court erred because the 
evidence on record actually leaves reasonable doubts or, if numeric value is included in the 
standard, because the evidence only supports a confidence rating of 70 per cent instead of 
the required 95. Any appellate court going down this road would be simply substituting the 
trial court’s findings of fact with their own.715  
 
There is one more problem with defining the standard of proof through the measure of the 
fact-finder’s confidence. Confidence is not the parameter to measure as it does not always 
correlate with accuracy. Very confident decisions may also be very wrong. I therefore have 
to agree with Ho – a standard of proof conceptualized as the level of confidence in the 
verdict cannot serve as an external standard against which the accuracy of fact-finding is 
measured.  
 
Empirical research has fairly consistently demonstrated that fact-finders are able to 
distinguish between strong and weak evidence and apply different standards to their 
decision making by adjusting the threshold level of evidence according to the wording of 
different standards. Empirical research also shows that depending on whether and how a 
standard is explicated to the fact-finders, the same standard may evoke different target 
levels of evidence. The research by Glöckner and Engel demonstrated that standard of 
proof is applied at the level of the automatic system. Apparently the standard of proof 
                                                
714
 Hypothetically setting the threshold probability at 90 per cent – while apparently supported by some 
judges and scholars, this is still a completely arbitrary figure. 
715
 This in itself is not a problem – reviewing and reversing lower court decisions is what appellate courts do. 
However, in jurisdictions where lay participation in fact-finding is valued, having a professional appellate 
court overturn the verdicts of lay fact-finders in effect turns lay participation in fact-finding into a pointless 
gimmick – especially where the all-professional appellate court can engage in their own fact-finding instead 
of remanding the case for a retrial. 
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instruction creates a certain emotion or attitude towards evaluation of evidence which then 
affects how stringently the evidence is scrutinized and what kinds of doubt are 
entertained.716 In light of this insight, there is some wisdom in Estonian Supreme Court’s 
developing a standard: their opinions are in effect instructions to the fact-finders albeit 
aimed for future cases. While the studies about threshold evidence strength levels have 
been concerned with the existing phrase ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ used to denote the 
standard of proof, an easier solution than trying to come up with an instruction explaining 
the current phrase might be to simply rephrase the standard so that it evokes the desired 
attitude (perhaps also taking the advice of Kagehiro and Weinstein who advocated 
including a numeric representation of the minimum level of confidence expected). Exactly 
how a “perfect” standard of proof instruction should read, I cannot propose here for it 
entails a political decision about how heavy the “thumb on the scales of justice” should be 
and then empirical research in order to calibrate the standard so that it adequately carries 
this idea. The current “beyond reasonable doubt” alone, however, appears to be not 
sufficiently powerful by itself and should be augmented or expanded to ensure that it 
evokes the proper attitude in the fact-finders. 
 
The power of the instructions may be further enhanced by the courtroom ceremony and 
atmosphere through helping the fact-finders tune in to their task. This would also explain 
why professional judges would have reportedly convicted defendants on less evidence than 
lay fact-finders: for judges adjudication entails less ceremony and has become business as 
usual. To my knowledge, this specific hypothesis about courtroom ceremony has not been 
tested and additional empirical research would be useful in designing optimal procedure. 
One studying the ceremonial aspects of court procedure would also have to take into 
consideration the fact-finder profile: instructions to jurors are common practice and 
instructions to lay members of mixed tribunals are conceivable, however, bench trials pose 
a problem since the judge is alone in charge of the conduct of the proceedings and any 
rituals would quickly become empty routines and incantations simply would not have a 
logical place in a bench trial order. I would, however, strongly caution against stripping 
trials of any ceremonialism and turning them into simple overregulated meetings. 
 
                                                
716
 One may now wonder about the jurisdictions that seem to have no articulated standard of proof and use 
exclusively or predominantly professional fact-finders. Germany provides an instructive example: while the 
law indeed does not spell out even the presumption of innocence, the authoritative higher courts, 
commentators and law professors have spelled the principles out with precision and the substance of the 
standard may actually not be too different from the well-known ’beyond reasonable doubt.’ See my 
discussion about Germany earlier for more detail. 
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The fact that active narrative construction starts right at the beginning of the trial and fact-
finders start preferring one side over the other during the presentation of evidence already, 
suggests that a standard of proof instruction aimed at evoking the scrutinizing attitude 
should be given at the beginning rather than at the close of the trial. One further step to 
enhance the accuracy of fact-finding would be providing juries with the trial transcript or 
video as well as the text of the applicable law and instructions at the close of the evidence – 
keeping jurors dependent on their (selective) memories will only fuel trial trickery, cause 
avoidable disagreements over the substance of the evidence during deliberations, and while 
it may be appealing to attorneys relying on trial fireworks, is hardly conducive to accurate 
fact-finding. This would eliminate one of the variables that some studies have noted – that 
jurors do not remember the instructions correctly.717 After all, no professional judge is 
expected to render a verdict without having the trial transcripts or applicable law on hand 
so why should lay fact-finders do without these memory aids?  
 
Accuracy of fact-finding can also be augmented by engaging the deliberate system instead 
of relying on the automatic decisions. As we saw earlier, this can be done through the use 
of verdict forms or checklists and by simply requiring a written opinion of professional 
fact-finders. Written opinion detailing the fact-finder’s justifications for their findings is in 
use in Estonia, in Chile and in Germany. Although activating the deliberate system and 
helpful in checking for logical fallacies and inconsistencies, having written reasons may 
have undesirable side-effects. When appellate courts are allowed to overturn the fact-
finding by trial courts, there is a possibility of unjustified reversal when actually proper and 
accurate reasoning is misrepresented and distorted by the trial judge’s poor writing. The 
second problem with all-out opinion writing is painfully obvious in light of pressures put 
on court systems – opinion writing takes a lot of time and thus means slowing the courts 
down or demanding extra resources that may not be available. Nevertheless, appellate 
abuses can be curbed by appropriately framed legal standards and reasoned opinions would 
cause solo judges to stop and think as well as help hold them accountable. Some scholars 
have suggested that juries, too, should issue reasoned verdicts and in some jurisdictions 
this suggestion has also been implemented as we observed earlier. Reasoned jury verdicts 
may transform the jury’s role in ways that are not desirable. Recognizing the potentially 
wide and far-reaching implications, I will not expound on reasoned jury verdicts here.718  
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 Horan, note 624, at 92. 
718
 Some jurisdictions have decided that they will not just “have their cake but eat it as well” by combining 
lay and professional fact-finders into mixed tribunals. Having a judge lead the deliberations of the lay fact-
finders has proved to defeat the idea of lay participation – lay decision makers tend to align themselves with 
the professional judge’s opinions even if they outnumber the judge. Gerhard Casper & Hans Zeisel, Lay 
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In short, the standard of proof does not work as a legal standard that can be enforced 
through appellate proceedings but it does its work by creating the right emotional backdrop 
thereby calibrating the fact-finder’s automatic system. My recommendation to enhance the 
accuracy of fact-finding is then composed of four previously discussed points: 
1. Where procedural design allows for exhortation, re-formulate or expand the 
standard of proof so that it evokes the right attitude in the fact-finder. Under 
the current regime, this might start by formulating an explication of the 
standard phrase so the instruction would be more understandable. As long 
as it is clear that the standard of proof statement is not a legal standard but 
an instruction guiding the fact-finding, the explication may even include a 
numeric value.  
2. Courtroom ritual may be important. When using exhortations, the ritual may 
substantially enhance the impact of the instructions – but this needs further 
research. Where the trial is by a judge only, the judge should be required to 
prepare a written reasoned opinion. 
3. Lay fact-finders should receive written instructions, trial transcripts or 
recordings and verdict forms and/or texts of the applicable law.  
4. Instructions to lay fact-finders about applicable law should be given in the 
beginning of the trial. 
                                                                                                                                                
Judges in the German Criminal Courts, 1 J. Legal. Stud. 135 (1972). Casper and Zeisel’s study shows that in 
only a small percentage of cases where the lay judges and the professional judge initially disagreed about the 
guilt, did the lay judges actually end up holding on to their own position in the final vote and would usually 
surrender to the judge’s suggestions and arguments. Similar findings, especially that the presiding judge 
would employ different techniques to isolate and then talk the dissenting lay judge into agreeing with him, 
were reported in Stefan Machura, Interaction between Lay Assessors and Professional Judges in German 
Mixed Courts, 72 Int’l Rev. of Penal L. 451, 463-464 (2001). 
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CONCLUSIONS 
Can a German court trust a judgment from the United States or a witness statement given at 
a hearing in Estonia? This is the kind of practical question we need to answer in the 
shrinking world today. As interactions between judicial systems of different jurisdictions 
are becoming more commonplace, effective cooperation can mean the difference between 
success and failure in taking down international or transnational criminals, not to mention 
saving massive amounts of resources. For example, instead of flying a witness in from 
another country to testify at a trial, would it not be much more sensible to have the witness 
testify in the country where he is currently located via a videoconference or have the local 
authorities perform the witness examination and send a record of it over to where the 
statement is needed? A quick look at the relevant legislation in different jurisdictions 
reveals a mind-boggling diversity even in the simplest of things and it is this diversity that 
raises doubts over whether close cooperation might ever be possible. Cooperating 
jurisdictions would either have to trust that their divergent evidentiary methods yield 
results of comparable quality or agree upon a common way of doing things. The purpose of 
this thesis was to do demonstrate that it is possible to unify criminal evidence law to the 
point of developing a common set of rules that can be applied across jurisdictions. To 
illustrate and inspire this quest, I chose six different jurisdictions to serve as my sample 
jurisdictions: England and Wales, the United States, Estonia, Russia, Chile and Germany. 
They all have at least one central common goal, I found – accurate fact-finding, and they 
rely on the same tool - the human mind. In a sense, this thesis is a probe – I cannot possibly 
hope to cover the entire law of criminal evidence here and have, therefore, limited my 
inquiry to three topics of evidence law that are of central importance, subject to scholarly 
discussions and easy to track: evidence of prior convictions, hearsay evidence and standard 
of proof. While in the first chapter of my thesis, I dealt with various general issues, the 
three subsequent chapters were each devoted to one of the chosen topics.  
 
Differences, similarities and common goals: Chapter One 
We first started by a disambiguation: whereas criminal procedure is a broader subject and 
in many jurisdictions encompasses criminal evidence law as well, our main focus is 
evidence law – the rules that govern the collection, presentation and evaluation of 
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information with the objective of resolving the dispute over past events. The distinction, as 
we observed, is useful for analytical purposes. 
 
Much has been written about the differences between jurisdictions and what could explain 
or justify them. Mainstream comparative criminal procedure scholarship uses the single 
axis of adversarial versus inquisitorial procedure. Damaška who has been credited with 
authoring this model envisioned a two axes framework but he, too, soon reduced the four 
corners system to a simpler framework comprising two extreme ideal-types: inquisitorial 
and adversarial criminal procedure with the corresponding typical fact-finder profile, 
evidentiary regulation, allocation of procedural initiative etc.  
 
In some way probably a useful analytical tool, the dichotomy, once conceived as a 
descriptive instrument, has by now lost much of its descriptive power when we look at 
actual jurisdictions. Among my six sample jurisdictions, we saw that traditionally non-
adversarial Russia now hands their judges the dossier yet accords the procedural initiative 
to the parties, has a form of plea bargaining and has bifurcated trials when jury is involved. 
Germany’s trial judges have the lead role but the jurisdiction is now also embracing plea-
bargaining; traditionally adversarial England has liberalized regulations on hearsay as well 
as character evidence yet maintaining procedural initiative on the parties. These examples 
would in the traditional dichotomous world be highly unlikely but in the real world are 
becoming increasingly commonplace. Moreover, originally devised as a descriptive and 
explanatory tool, the distinction between inquisitorial and adversarial procedure is 
sometimes misused by attributing normative significance to it. This kind of focus on 
differences and incompatibilities tends to not foster trust or understanding that is essential 
for successful cooperation.  
 
Clinging stubbornly to the dichotomous model also means disregarding the instances of 
convergence – introducing some form of plea bargaining or at least accepting guilty pleas 
as basis for convictions seems to be one of the trends for example; we examined a recent 
work by Jackson and Summers who argue that another consensus is emerging around 
defence rights not just in Europe but all over the world. Looking at my survey of 
jurisdictions, it seems that today designing a criminal procedure to fit the needs of 
changing societies while taking advantage of the new technologies might actually be very 
much like a Lego with fairly malleable pieces: even though, for example, the concept of 
guilty plea as basis for conviction is gaining ground, it always has a local twist or “flavour” 
to it. 
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We then proceeded to examine a third approach to criminal evidence law that springs from 
the fact that criminal trial is fundamentally a communicative affair and it is the operations 
of human mind that the evidence law attempts to control. This being so, some scholars 
have argued, it only makes sense to examine criminal evidence law from the vantage point 
of psychology – for optimal results, one must consider how human mind is hard-wired. 
One of such scholars is Dan Simon who has written about the criminal evidence law in the 
United States, particularly about how one could improve the system by paying better 
attention to the cognitive abilities and needs of the people involved. Simon’s arguments are 
predicated on the assumption that the main purpose of criminal trials is accurate fact-
finding and his main point is that criminal evidence law should be devised in a way that 
helps the fact-finders reach accurate decisions.  
 
I posit that this same approach is valid for all jurisdictions of the world. It is exactly the 
human fact-finders and their mental operations that criminal trials rely on in all 
jurisdictions – and from my reading of current understanding of human psychology, save 
for some cultural idiosyncrasies, human minds work very similarly around the globe. My 
hypothesis is that accurate fact-finding also occupies a central place as a purpose of 
criminal procedure.  
 
There is hardly a jurisdiction in the world that does not consider “finding the truth” its 
purpose. True, there are also other purposes that criminal procedure is expected to serve 
and in the first chapter I briefly touched upon them. In a philosophical sense, it is far from 
settled what truth is or whether it is possible for humans to “find it.” From the moral  
perspective, realist ontology and epistemology is the least problematic combination. 
However, I concluded after a review of several theories of truth that a moderately sceptical 
take on the truth is more honest: whereas denying objective reality would jeopardize the 
legitimacy of criminal law, denying the inherent subjectivity of the fact-finders and the 
constraints placed on the truth-finding enterprise by procedural law would be simply 
hypocritical. In all my sample jurisdictions, as accurate as possible account of what 
happened in the past is an essential component of this truth. This accuracy of fact-
determinations is a central goal of the procedure and no rational Western criminal justice 
system can afford to argue that it does not matter who gets punished or what for. Not only 
would this be morally unacceptable and utterly illegitimate use of state power but also 
dysfunctional if the substantive criminal law is to reduce crime. Both reformation and 
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isolation would be without effect if applied to the wrong person. I therefore concluded that 
accurate fact-finding is, indeed, the common focal point for all jurisdictions.   
 
Human mind as the tool and accurate fact-finding as the intended outcome constitute the 
common ground bringing together different jurisdictions and thus constituting the basis for 
my study of evidence law. Granted, some of the regulation may pursue other, sometimes 
contrary and competing objectives. As was discussed especially in the fourth chapter of my 
thesis, most if not all contemporary jurisdictions also subscribe to a principle of “free 
proof.” The basic philosophy underlying the free proof principle is simple: life is too 
unpredictable and multi-faceted for any kind of a priori significance to be attached to any 
one piece of information. For this reason, the fact-finder should be presented with all 
possible information and should be free to assess the evidence in each case without any 
preconceived restrictions. The rules of evidence restrict the freedom of proof. As the 
argument goes, in general, more evidence is better, but there are situations where this 
unfettered freedom will produce inaccurate or otherwise undesirable results because the 
human mind is not able to adequately process certain types of information. It is exactly the 
cognitive needs and abilities of the fact-finder that, therefore, must dictate the proper scope 
and operation of the rules of evidence: restricting the fact-finder in situations where they 
are capable of handling the evidence in pursuit of accurate fact-finding would turn the rules 
of evidence into a hindrance. Conversely, where it is known that the human mind commits 
errors in processing the incoming information, rules are needed that would prevent the 
errors as much as possible by either keeping out the contamination or guiding the fact-
finder to appropriately handle the information. 
 
In the first chapter I also turned my attention to the mechanisms through which evidence 
law functions. Evidence law works through two types of controls that I refer to as input 
controls and reasoning controls. The former determine what evidence the fact-finder gets 
(either by excluding some information or causing some information to be presented)  and 
the latter prescribes how the evidence is to be evaluated (for example, by setting forth that 
in order to establish a fact, testimony of at least two eyewitnesses is necessary). Sometimes 
what in evidence law looks like an input control turns into a reasoning control because of 
the way procedure is designed. An example of this, as we saw earlier are the exclusionary 
rules in bench trial setting where the lone judge is expected to filter out some of the 
evidence before proceeding to ascertaining facts of the case. This intricate link between the 
rules of evidence and procedural design (including the fact-finder profile) is why I have for 
the most part kept the two analytically apart but there is no denying of course – in order for 
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the criminal process as a whole to do what it is supposed to, procedure and evidence must 
be in sync lest one defeat the efforts of the other. 
 
The main objective of this work might as well be re-stated as a search for the best 
arrangement for fact-finding – if one were able to scientifically demonstrate the superiority 
of one fact-finding arrangement over another, it would be hard to argue against its 
adoption. Or even more – if there was scientific proof that a particular fact-finding 
arrangement consistently contributes to factually inaccurate decisions, the legislators would 
have hard time convincingly arguing in favour of retaining it even in the face of other 
auxiliary goals they would like to pursue through criminal procedure and evidence 
regulation. If the law is to accomplish its objective, it must conform to the realities of life 
without resorting to wishful perceptions about things it cannot change. It is therefore 
imperative to closely examine how the human mind is hard-wired to work in order to 
devise a working set of rules of evidence.  
 
I approached the issue of “universal rules of evidence” through the study of six 
jurisdictions and three common traceable rubrics of evidence law. Apart from being 
adherents of rational (as opposed to irrational) approach to fact-finding, they present a 
number of differences, most notably in procedural design and fact-finder profile. My 
reason for selecting these jurisdictions was to not only demonstrate the diversity but also to 
examine how different evidentiary regulation would map onto differences in procedural 
design and fact-finder profile. As set out in chapters 2 through 4 of this thesis – links 
between evidentiary regulation and fact-finder profile today are often much weaker than 
traditional comparative evidence law scholarship would have us believe. Similarly, 
psychological studies surveyed in chapters 2 and 3 appear to debunk another widely held 
myth as if professional judges were the superior quality fact-finders immune to emotional 
appeal and free from biases and prejudices. Judges, studies indicate, are for the most part 
susceptible to the same cognitive fallacies as the rest of the population.  
 
Having found that the procedural design and fact-finder profile are only loosely connected 
in my sample jurisdictions, I then proceeded to examine the feasibility of the universal 
evidence law through the study of three specific rubrics – the results will be summarized 
next.  
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Evidence of prior convictions: Chapter Two 
 
The problem with character evidence and prior convictions more specifically is nearly 
universally recognized: while past conduct is somewhat probative of future behaviour, the 
danger is that the fact-finder may overvalue it and convict defendants based not on the 
evidence specifically pertaining to their current charge but on their criminal past. The 
difference lies in the degree of trust jurisdictions place on their fact-finders. In this regard, 
my survey of my six sample jurisdictions showed the United States as the most distrustful 
while Estonia came out as the most liberal. Judging the immediate past based on the more 
distant past is by no means an exact science. As earlier explained in greater detail, 
psychologists know today that there is no universal “criminal character” nor is behaviour 
purely a function of the situation: people tend to behave similarly in similar situations. The 
key to understanding how probative a past event is of the charge at hand lies in proper 
identification of the parameters that make up the “situation” for that person. One must also 
recognize that a single occurrence is not necessarily representative of a pattern and has low 
predictive power. There is another strand of research pertaining to the issue of prior 
convictions and this deals with recidivism studies – some offences, studies demonstrate, 
are more likely to be repeated than others. Recidivism studies are certainly worth taking 
notice of but should be treated with caution lest people be convicted solely because their 
criminal record includes one of the “high recidivism offences.”  
 
This all said, child molestation and sexual offence convictions deserve special attention. 
While not on the list of high recidivism crimes in any jurisdiction, a prior conviction of this 
type of crime has been demonstrated to inflame jurors to the degree that rational evidence 
evaluation is stalled and conviction becomes much more likely even if the charges are not 
sex-related in any way.  
 
Another common problem area exposed by psychological studies is a situation where 
evidence of prior convictions is supposed to be used only to undermine a defendant’s 
credibility. Research here indicates a disturbing tendency: prior convictions tend not to 
affect credibility assessments but are looked at as evidence of propensity to commit the 
crime he is charged with regardless of what the jury instructions or statutory language 
require. 
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Evidence law deals with the dangers associated with prior convictions both by using 
reasoning controls and input controls. Whether these controls are effective, warrants closer 
examination. Especially interesting is the phenomenon of presumed prior convictions as 
described by Laudan and Allen – even if all information about prior record is carefully 
screened out, jurors have been observed to have assumed the existence of prior convictions 
anyway - based on defence trial tactics, researchers hypothesize. More than others, this 
assumption hurts the defendants who have no prior record but nevertheless choose not to 
testify – a choice well known to be made to keep a prior record from being revealed. When 
prior convictions have been accidentally revealed, evidence law often includes a reasoning 
control – either a directive in the rules that the prior record should not be used to prove 
propensity to commit crimes or a similar instruction by the judge to the jurors. Reasoning 
controls are not problem-free: the instruction itself sometimes draws more attention to the 
evidence to be disregarded than it otherwise would have received; in many cases the 
studies report that limiting or curative instructions are simply not followed. Even though 
less than numerous, studies conducted on judges demonstrate a similar inability to 
deliberately disregard inadmissible evidence. 
 
The solution I suggested in chapter 2  lies in a two-pronged input control: evidence of prior 
convictions that have no relevance to the charge should be weeded out so that the fact-
finder will never see them. Others that go to similar offences should be accompanied by 
sufficient detail to help the fact-finder determine whether they in fact give rise to 
heightened probability that the person has re-offended. In addition, there seems to be a 
need for some education for the fact-finders so they could appreciate the balance of 
situation and character in determining possible patterns of human behaviour. Admissibility 
of prior convictions that satisfy the criteria of relevance by similarity should not be 
conditioned on the defendant testifying – providing the fact-finder with this information is 
not more or less helpful depending on whether the defendant uses his constitutional right to 
silence. While in a bifurcated tribunal setting this framework could be easily implemented, 
a unitary tribunal such as a lone judge or a mixed panel would need to have a separate 
judge much like a juez de garantia in Chile, tasked with deciding the admissibility of prior 
convictions. Since the procedure in most jurisdictions already includes some form of 
pretrial conference for trial planning purposes, having that conference held before a 
different judge should not pose a particular problem. Where pretrial investigation results in 
the compilation of a case file that is normally handed to the trial court in its entirety, 
screening would have to result in the removal of the irrelevant but prejudicial material from 
the dossier. 
221 
 
Hearsay: Chapter Three 
In the third chapter of this thesis, I examined the regulation of hearsay evidence. Not all 
jurisdictions conceptualize hearsay the same way. Some view hearsay as evidence of lower 
reliability and regulate its admissibility. Others treat it as a weight problem and trust the 
“free evaluation of proof” principle allows the fact-finder sort things out. Many 
jurisdictions treat written out-of-court statements differently from oral out-of-court 
statements and police reports separately from other written out-of-court statements. This all 
said, the four dangers associated with accepting second-hand testimony as listed by Ed 
Morgan – lack of memory, poor perception, insincerity and ambiguity of language – are 
well known in all my sample jurisdictions.  
 
Psychological studies I reviewed confirm that the four hearsay dangers are very real and 
the aspiration to get as close to the primary source of information should not be taken 
lightly or the information that reaches the fact-finder may be incomplete and distorted. My 
sample jurisdictions offer several ways for handling this issue. Some jurisdictions prefer 
input controls – unreliable hearsay is excluded so that it never reaches fact-finders. Others 
trust their fact-finders to be able to translate the lower reliability of second-hand testimony 
into weight assessment and thus do not deem it necessary to exclude hearsay statements – 
often pointing out that more evidence is better. There is an agreement that not all hearsay is 
equally unreliable. How to draw the line between sufficiently reliable and unreliable 
hearsay is again a question that presents various options for regulatory approach: some 
jurisdictions leave it to the discretion of the fact-finder or the gate-keeper. Others have 
created an elaborate maze of categorical rules (sometimes, ironically accompanied by a 
very wide discretion to admit so the rest of the rules become close to redundant).  
 
Psychological research has approached the hearsay issue at many different angles. First, as 
mentioned before, there are the four hearsay dangers that relate to the basics of human 
information processing – perception and encoding, remembering and recalling and 
expression. Knowledge about the mechanism of human information processing helps us 
understand what exactly are the vulnerable spots in the information processing chain and 
how one should go about minimizing the dangers – and what does not really work. Some 
of the categorical exceptions to the hearsay rule where they exist do not make much sense 
in light of psychology and most of them target one or two danger factors while leaving the 
others completely unchecked. At the same time, testifying in open court under cross-
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examination is also no guarantee of reliability – several studies have shown that even 
trained professional law (enforcement) personnel are generally inept when it comes to lie 
detection based on observation of witness demeanour. Extra trust invested in written 
hearsay in some jurisdictions may also be misplaced: the document cannot be more sincere, 
linguistically clear or perceptive than its author was – the only strength lies in the memory 
factor.  
 
Psychologists have also attempted to solve the other side of the equation: the ability of 
fact-finders to take the lower reliability of  hearsay statements into account when weighing 
evidence. This line of research has demonstrated that fact-finders are able to discount the 
value of hearsay evidence. This side of the equation may, however, prove unsolvable – 
there is no formula to calculate the factor by which the value of hearsay evidence should be 
discounted – it can hardly be a matter of categories as the actual reliability of hearsay 
evidence and its corresponding weight is different in each individual case. Possibly it is 
also dependent on the patterns of information evaluation prevalent in the community. 
 
My analysis in chapter 3 led me to conclude that although hearsay statements suffer from 
lower reliability, excluding them by pre-set categories or in bulk is not the best way to 
facilitate accurate fact-finding. Still, unlimited admissibility would also pose problems, 
especially where the fact-finder is not getting enough information about the reliability of 
the statement. Thus, I propose that evidence law should take the middle ground here: all 
hearsay should be admissible where the declarant is unavailable or does not and cannot 
reasonably be expected to remember the information in question. Naturally, proponent 
should first make a bona fide effort to produce an eyewitness with knowledge as admitting 
hearsay is clearly an inferior option. 
 
This liberal regulation should be complemented with the requirement that whenever 
hearsay is presented, it must be accompanied by the “foundation facts” – information about 
the declarant and the circumstances of making the statement. In case hearsay is introduced 
because the declarant claims to have forgotten everything, he would still have to testify to 
lay foundation for admitting his out-of-court statement. This takes care of confrontation 
issues as well as removes the temptation to present written memoranda instead of 
eyewitnesses on the pretext that they do not remember anything. How much weight the 
statement then ultimately carries is for the fact-finder to decide but it will be an informed 
decision. Hearsay statements for which the foundation facts are not available should not be 
admitted if they can be screened out beforehand. Reasoning controls, such as directions to 
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disregard are not very effective, especially if not accompanied by a sensible explanation. 
The lack of foundation may be just the kind of explanation needed to help the fact-finder 
adequately evaluate unreliable hearsay. This approach, slightly modified from Eleanor 
Swift’s proposal, would suit for all jurisdictions regardless of fact-finder profile or 
procedural design as it does not depend on having a gate-keeper (although would benefit 
from having one).  
 
Standard of proof: Chapter Four 
Finally, in chapter 4, I looked at attempts to ensure the accuracy of the result of criminal 
trials through defining the quantum of evidence needed for a guilty verdict. Whereas prior 
convictions and hearsay statements are issues pertaining to information of particular 
substance or genesis, standard of proof is at work towards the end of the process.  
 
Criminal procedure features the presumption of innocence – not just a very basic 
declaration but in modern law a fundamental right that necessitates another control 
measure – the burden of proof that in criminal cases for the most part rests with the 
prosecution. The standard of proof is the weight of the burden of proof – it describes the 
quantum of evidence necessary to overcome the presumption of innocence. But how would 
one measure the quantum of evidence and then describe it when there is no universally 
accepted measuring unit for evidentiary strength? 
 
Some jurisdictions have attempted to coin a specific phrase to denote the quantum of proof 
necessary for a valid conviction. Some of my sample jurisdictions require that the fact-
finder should prepare a written judgment detailing his reasoning from the evidence.  Is 
there a link between having an articulated standard and not asking for reasons as Damaška 
once wrote? While this would be a neat and logical connection, reality is different. Even 
those jurisdictions that require written reasons for findings of fact often use a standard of 
proof phrase, if not found in the statutory law then developed and adopted by courts. These 
phrases are surprisingly similar across all jurisdictions – with “beyond reasonable doubt” 
standing out as a recurring theme. Still, the phrases, however formulated, suffer from the 
same malady: how exactly would a fact-finder know when the required degree of 
evidentiary support has been achieved? And can one appeal a lower court judgment based 
on the argument that in light of the applicable standard of proof, evidence was insufficient? 
In jurisdictions with written reasoned judgments, standard of proof tends to develop into a 
set of judicially created reasoning canons and weight-and-sufficiency rules. The ‘beyond 
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reasonable doubt’ there becomes more of a question of whether the fact-finder is able to 
write a judgment that follows the expectations for judicial reasoning.  
 
Alternatively, in jurisdictions where no written reasoned judgment must be prepared, the 
standard of proof becomes more of an exhortation rather than a legal standard. This 
exhortation should impress upon the fact-finder the gravity of their duty and the need to 
exercise care and caution in order to avoid mistakes. The point at which deference to fact-
finder will no longer protect the judgment from being reversed on the facts is set at a lower 
level (i.e. the trial record must be manifestly devoid of inculpatory evidence if the appellate 
court is to reverse the trial court’s verdict). But one should not underestimate the potential 
of exhortations in jurisdictions with written reasoned judgments either: written reasons 
may not reflect the actual mental operations that result in the judgment: the writer may be 
skillful but insincere.  
 
Chapter 4 then examined whether it is possible to conceptualize standard of proof through 
a probability of guilt assessment. Arguments have been wielded for and against, sometimes 
mixing the probability of guilt up with the degree of confidence the fact finder has in his 
decision. On a theoretical level, probability of guilt, say, 90 or 95 per cent raises the 
question of how this figure has been arrived at and how one should justify that there is a 
ten per cent chance that the person convicted did not actually commit the crime. In that 
regard, talking about confidence rating is at least conceptually more acceptable. 
 
Studies in psychology of fact-finding have a few things to say about how fact-finding 
works. First, while the Wigmorean charts about inferential reasoning and Bayes’ theorem 
about integrating relative probability figures are certainly attractive in their neatness and 
methodicality, this is not how people actually go about finding facts. Fact-finding, 
psychological research shows, is a process of building coherent stories around the evidence 
and based on the fact-finder’s own world knowledge and emotions. This also means that 
fact-finding (at least in the legal setting) is inevitably subjective -  different people may 
well assess evidence and different stories built around the evidence differently because of 
their personal background. For the same reason, attempting to articulate the maximum 
level of doubt a fact-finder may harbour while still legally allowed to convict will not help 
standardize the decision making process. Appeals predicated upon the claim that the 
standard of proof has not been met are in this sense nothing but calls for the appellate 
tribunal to substitute the lower court’s judgment with that of their own.   
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We also observed that standards of proof viewed as confidence standards have their own 
problem – they are based on the assumption that there is a correlation between the fact-
finder’s confidence in the decision and the likelihood that the decision is actually correct. 
This, too, is not supported by scientific findings or even logic – one criminal jury 
apparently consulted an Ouija board to reach their verdict which then was confident 
(beyond reasonable doubt) but resting on a completely improper basis.  
 
The psychological studies we reviewed show that fact-finders start their attempts to make 
sense of the evidence as soon as the evidence is presented – and will not wait until all 
evidence is in. The process of story creation is a bidirectional one: while evidence that is 
being presented keeps shaping possible stories in the fact-finder’s mind, the stories as they 
are forming also influence how and what new information is assimilated. Studies show that 
people unconsciously strive for coherence and in order to achieve that they not only amend 
their versions of what happened as new evidence comes in but they also filter and interpret 
the new information to maximize this coherence. This processing for the most part happens 
automatically – most information is processed by the automatic system which offers quick 
intuitive judgments and processing ease (coupled with a number of well-documented 
reasoning fallacies resultant from biases and heuristics). Engaging the deliberate system 
may successfully counteract some of these dangerous mental shortcuts. 
 
Research indicates that while judges seem to be assumed to have almost a superpower to 
use only their deliberate system and switch off all emotions, this assumption has no 
scientific basis. Judges, too, engage in automatic snap decision making and are vulnerable 
to emotions.  
 
Research does, however, confirm that different standard of proof phrases convey different 
meanings – “preponderance of the evidence” in fact-finders’ minds actually evokes a lower 
standard than “beyond reasonable doubt.” Even the same standard, coupled with different 
explanation of its meaning may evoke different levels of threshold confidence. This is a 
very important finding as it demonstrates that exhortations work – by instructing fact-
finders to convict only when “sure that the defendant is guilty”, it is actually possible to 
cause fact-finders to proceed with greater caution. The mechanism through which the 
standard of proof exhortation works is hypothesized to be based on somatic markers. The 
standard of proof instruction affects the automatic system – it creates an emotion that in 
turn affects the attitude of the fact-finder and sets the minimum by which the fact-finder 
must find the guilt story more believable than the competing story of innocence in order to 
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be confident enough to convict. It is possible that some of the effect of the exhortations is 
due to the ceremonial aspect of court procedure. This would explain why some studies 
show that professional judges convict more easily than lay juries: to judges the courtroom 
setting and court procedure has lost its ceremonial force and has become “business as 
usual” – not to mention that at a bench trial, the judge receives no instructions or 
exhortations.  
 
Based on the empirical evidence, I argued in Chapter 4 that the standard of proof is not 
really a rule of evidence at all – at least not an enforceable legal standard on which a 
decision or its subsequent review could be based. Nevertheless, it is an important 
procedural tool that controls the fact-finding process – not at a conscious level but non-
consciously by calibrating the automatic system. Its value is even greater where fact-
finding is entrusted to lay fact-finders who receive the exhortation in the ceremonial setting 
of the courtroom. How a perfect standard of proof instruction reads, however, is not only a 
political question about how stringent it should be but requires additional empirical 
research to fine-tune it to evoke the desired threshold of confidence. Further research is 
also necessary about the proper ceremony and atmosphere surrounding it. 
 
Professional judges and bench trials pose a greater difficulty – the courtroom ritual and 
ceremony may have lost its effect over time (a hypothesis certainly worthy of study in the 
future) and with the judge being the sole arbiter of both law and fact as well as the person 
directing the course of the trial, exhortation has no logical place in bench trials. Here a 
written reasoned judgment may be the best possible solution to ensure that the decision to 
convict has not been made too lightly (and that the standard has not been raised so high 
that it is impossible to meet).  
 
Knowing the natural tendency of humans to employ the automatic system with all its built-
in fallacies, one should also introduce measures, procedural or evidentiary, to encourage 
the use of the deliberate system. For professional judges, checklists, sufficient time and 
continuing education has been suggested in addition to reasoned judgments but as far as 
jurors go, regulation in many jurisdictions urgently needs an overhaul. Since jurors start 
actively constructing stories as soon as the trial begins and evidence starts pouring in, the 
instructions about law should be given at the beginning and not at the end of the trial. Not 
only that – jurors should have both the text of the applicable law as well as the trial record 
available to them – there is no reason why the law or the evidence should be liable to loss 
and distortion due to the fading memory of jurors. On the other hand, knowing the legal 
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standard from the very beginning, jurors would be able to better pay attention to the legally 
relevant facts and recognize attempts by the trial counsel to confuse the issues.  
 
Conclusion from the conclusions 
What about the feasibility of universal rules of evidence then? The universal commitment 
to accurate fact-finding and the human mind as the universal fact-finding tool would 
certainly lend hope that there can be rules of evidence that would work across jurisdictions. 
This hope is even further strengthened by the coming together of the understanding of 
fundamental procedural human rights in the progressive democratic world. We have also 
seen that contrary to popular belief, professional and lay fact-finders are not very different 
in regards to their cognitive abilities so this is one more oft-cited prohibitive difference 
debunked – fact-finder profile is a political rather than an instrumental choice. Granted, 
depending on whether the choice is to use a unitary or a bifurcated tribunal, the options for 
designing a working set of rules of evidence may be slightly different – if there is no 
gatekeeper, exclusionary input controls become ineffective and turn into often non-
working reasoning controls – and sometimes exclusionary input controls are necessary. 
Hence my first general recommendation (and I am only echoing here that which has been 
said before by others) – regardless of what the choice for the fact-finder profile, procedure 
must provide for a separate gatekeeper. 
 
What complicates the answer, however, is the following two factors. First, there is the issue 
of cross-cultural differences in cognitive needs and abilities. In order to achieve accurate 
fact-finding, the drafters of rules of evidence must be mindful of possible cultural quirks 
and include additional controls or appropriate procedural measures. The way to understand 
where these differences lie and where additional controls are needed is through empirical 
research. Perhaps the irrational reaction to child molestation is one of those differences 
owing its existence to the value system of the West. Drawing on the studies about cross-
cultural differences I cited in Chapter 1, one might assume, for example, that in China, 
fact-finders might be less susceptible to evidence of prior convictions simply because there 
situation is viewed as a more prominent determinant of human behaviour than the person 
and his character.  
 
Possibly at least just as significant is the second factor: accurate fact-finding, while 
universally held in high esteem as the goal of criminal proceedings, is by no means the 
only one animating rule-making. There are several other auxiliary or even competing 
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objectives that criminal proceedings pursue – including defence rights that are not 
motivated by instrumental concerns, broader policy goals and political agendas, and limits 
on available resources. It is these goals and considerations that even in the face of 
empirical research into the cognitively optimal arrangement for fact-finding are responsible 
for rules that are not only wildly different across jurisdictions but are also in contradiction 
to what empirical evidence suggests is the best fact-finding arrangement. Either this or a 
much lazier reason – tradition (including popular beliefs that have been scientifically 
disproved like the dying declarations exception to the hearsay rule). While competing 
policy objectives can hardly stand where they demonstrably harm the goal of achieving 
accurate verdicts, tradition has proved much more resilient and resistant to science and 
argument. From a feasibility point of view and apart from cross-cultural differences, 
tradition is probably the toughest obstacle to any attempts to actually devise universal rules 
of evidence. Clinging to tradition dismisses scientific evidence with ease and comes 
complete with devices like the normative inquisitorial-adversarial dichotomy that serve to 
limit the options. Seeing the reign of tradition slowly retreating in criminal procedure and 
evidence law makes me hopeful that soon time will be ripe to more seriously consider the 
scientific foundation of criminal rules of evidence everywhere and thus take a step towards 
(more) universal criminal evidence law.  
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